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ABSTRACT
The chapters in this dissertation focus on mineral and energy policy but vary in the type of
their contribution to current mineral and energy economic knowledge. In the second chapter, we
present an applied policy analysis of rare earth markets. Specifically, we develop a Stackelberg
game of coproduction and model the production responses of the three major rare earth producers
to several different Chinese rare earth policies. We find that the response of each actor depends
on the revenue share of each rare earth for each producer. In the third chapter, we present a
method of calibrating constant elasticity of substitution functions which are commonly employed
in partial and general equilibrium models. The exemplary application of the calibration technique
focuses on fitting models’ implicit abatement cost functions to bottom-up, engineering estimates.
A key benefit of this calibration method is that the elasticities are optimized over an entire relevant
range of marginal abatement costs whereas other techniques are local approximations. The fourth
and final chapter develops and simulates theoretical propositions on the interaction of electricity
storage and tradable performance standards imposed on carbon emitted in the electricity sector. We
find that the introducing electricity storage under a tradable performance standard reduces societal
benefits relative to when storage is not available. The combination of the inherent inefficiency of
the tradable performance standards implicitly-subsidized low carbon generation and the increased
supply elasticity of low carbon generation through the introduction of storage leads to decreased
social surplus. Summarizing the three chapters contributions: the second presents an applied policy
analysis with a unique Stackelberg game of coproduction, the third develops a new method that
calibrates policy costs in equilibrium models, and the fourth develops new theory in energy policy
and then presents simulation results that support the theoretical propositions.
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In this dissertation I focus on mineral and energy policy in three different focus areas with three
different types of contributions. This first chapter serves to provide an overview of the next three
chapters in turn by providing a summary of the context, methods, and implications for each. In
Chapter 2, we present a coproduction Stackelberg game of global rare earth markets to evaluate
rare earth producer and price responses to Chinese rare earth policy. The primary contribution of
the second chapter is an applied policy analysis with a secondary contribution of evaluating co-
production markets through a Stackelberg game. A new approach to calibrating constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) functions, commonly employed in partial and general equilibrium analysis,
to bottom-up data is demonstrated in Chapter 3. This calibration procedure represents a method-
ological contribution that allows for representation of bottom-up data in top-down, equilibrium
models. Finally, in the fourth and final chapter we demonstrate that the inefficiency of a tradable
performance standard is exacerbated with the introduction of electricity storage. Chapter 4 offers
a theoretical contribution in the area of energy policy economics.
Chapter 2 focuses on global rare earth markets and the producer and price responses to Chinese
rare earth policies. As of 2017, China has been the dominant producer of rare earths for the past
decade. In 2010, China tightened their export quota which lead to large increases in the prices of
all rare earths. Following the tightening of the export quota, several nations filed suit to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) that the Chinese export quota violated WTO rules. The WTO deemed
the export quota unjustified but soon after the Chinse government enacted a production quota.
The limits to export or production of rare earths in China as well as the increase to rare earth
prices have brought about new producers. Both the export quota and production quota resulted in
illegal Chinese production, that is production that was either illegaly exported or produced beyond
the production quota. The REO price increases lead to development of two new producers, Moun-
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tain Pass (USA) and Mount Weld (Australia). In 2016, Mountain Pass discontinued production
due to financial and technical considerations. Therefore, as of 2017 Mount Weld remains the only
non-Chinese producer of rare earths.
Outside of the production quota, there are several potential Chinese rare earth policies that have
been discussed by rare earth analysts. We focus on a subset of these policies, specifically: rare
earth stockpiling of neodymium or dysprosium, improvements to recovery rates of neodymium
or dysprosium, and an environmental tax. We also evaluate these policies with and without the
production quota as well as with changes to the illegal Chinese rare earth market share.
These policies are simulated using a Stackelberg game of coproduction with three actors: legal
Chinese producers, illegal Chinese producers, and the Mount Weld mine. In a Stackelberg game,
the leader (China) decides its production knowing the responses of the followers (illegal Chinese
producers and Mount Weld). The Stackelberg game is appropriate given China’s role as a dominant
producer with excess production capacity that commits to an action (via the production quota).
Each producer seeks to maximize its profits from the sale of multiple rare earth oxides that are
coproduced from a single concentrate.
Evaluation of the producers’ optimal production functions as well as the simulation results in-
dicate that producers are more responsive to policies that effect rare earths which maintain a higher
share of their basket revenue. However, given coproduction of multiple rare earths from a single
concentrate, if production increases given a higher price or marginal revenue of a single rare earth,
the prices of all non-impacted rare earths decrease. For the stockpiling scenarios, the price of the
stockpiled rare earth increases but prices of all non-stockpiled rare earths decrease. Therefore, if
the stockpiled rare earth offers less of a share in a producer’s revenue, the gain in the stockpiled rare
earth’s price may be offset by the reduction in other prices and result in reduced production from
an actor. The increases to rare earth recovery rates increase legal Chinese production but decrease
production from illegal Chinese producers and Mount Weld. The environmental tax decreases legal
Chinese production and increases production from illegal Chinese producers and Mount Weld.
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The Chinese government has stated multiple different goals for its rare earth industry. The
stockpile purchases are intended to bolster prices of certain rare earths but could increase responses
from the competitors of the legal Chinese producers. The Chinese government has also stated goals
of reducing environmental damages of rare earth production but also seeks to reduce illegal rare
earth production. However, the simulations present that these two objectives are not in harmony
since taxing environmental degradation leads to an increase in illegal production. Although the
stated intention of the Chinese government’s stockpile purchases is to bolster prices of the certain
rare earths, it can increase or decrease production from the legal Chinese producers’ competitors.
Chapter 3 has a different focus and type of contribution than Chapter 2 but remains in the realm
of mineral and energy policy. In the third chapter a method for calibrating CES functions to bottom-
up data by adjusting substitution elasticities is presented. The method is then demonstrated in the
electricity sector by calibrating three models’ implicit abatement costs to bottom-up engineering
cost estimates indicated by a marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve.
Other methods of capturing bottom-up details in top-down models have generally been econo-
metric in nature (Okagawa & Ban, 2008; Steinbuks & Narayanan, 2014), involved linking a
bottom-up model with a top-down model (Böhringer, 1998; Böhringer & Rutherford, 2005), or
have defined explicit abatement cost functions (Kiuila & Rutherford, 2013). In our method, we
demonstrate that the calibration can be done by adjusting substitution elasticities, a parameter that
is commonly assumed or taken from literature. In addition, the calibration method presented in
Chapter 3 provides a means of global calibration across an entire domain as opposed to local cali-
bration around a set of points offered through econometric techniques.
The method of fitting is straightforward. The optimization minimizes the squared difference
between endogenous emissions reductions of a partial equilibrium model in response to a carbon
price to those of the exogenous MAC curve by adjusting a set of substitution elasticities. The
constraints are set such that the market equilibrium is maintained through zero profit and market
clearance conditions. Finally, price responsive demand can be represented through a constant
elasticity of demand curve. However, demand is represented as inelastic in our most reference case
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because it is assumed that the engineering estimates were gathered without consideration for the
potential of a demand responding to price changes. For example, the researchers who compiled the
MAC curve’s estimates may not have considered that an increase in demand for electricity services
may occur with a more efficient means of electricity consumption.
Results of the fitting procedure indicate that our method is able to accurately capture bottom-up
engineering cost estimates in CES functions by adjusting substitution elasticities. We also demon-
strate that a large proportion of fit improvement can be achieved through adjusting the substitution
elasticity of the nest containing the emissions-producing factors of production (in our case the en-
ergy nest containing coal, oil, and gas inputs). Fitted substitution elasticities are generally more
elastic than the reference elasticities, implying that the marginal abatement costs found in the mod-
els from literature may be overestimating actual abatement costs.
The calibration methods and results presented in Chapter 3 are only valid as improved rep-
resentations of bottom-up data insofar as our MAC estimates and assumptions behind the MAC
curve are correct. If we are to believe to that the engineer estimates do not consider equilibrium
effects, inelastic demand is appropriate. Additionally, negative abatement costs are rectified in
the calibration method by replicating scaling methods from Kiuila & Rutherford (2013). Yet it is
desirable to know why these costs are negative and to reconcile these differences to make them
consisten with economic behavior.
Finally, Chapter 4 contains a contribution to the economic theory of energy policy. Specifically,
we demonstrate that electricity storage exacerbates the inefficiency of a tradable performance stan-
dard (TPS). Although storage is beneficial absent a carbon reduction policy or with the first-best
policy, a TPS is a second-best policy and the interaction of electricity storage with a TPS leads
to a more inefficient outcome. To briefly explain the intuition, a TPS implicitly subsidizes low
carbon generation and leads to greater consumption of low carbon generation, relative to the first-
best policy, when demand is price-responsive. Electricity storage increases the supply elasticity of
low carbon generation in the peak period when stored electricity is released. Therefore, electric-
ity storage allows for even greater inefficient low carbon generation under a TPS when storage is
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introduced compared to when storage is not available.
Tradable performance standards have been more prevalent in recent years, examples being the
California Low Carbon Fuel Standard and the rate-based option under the Clean Power Plan. As
demonstrated by Holland et al. (2009), low carbon generators are implicitly subsidized under a TPS
which results in an inefficient level of low carbon generation with demand that is responsive to price
changes. Note that without price-responsive demand, a TPS matches the first-best equilibrium. It
is when the quantity of electricity demanded increases due to the implicit subsidy on low carbon
generation that the TPS results in an inefficient level of low carbon generation. In another sense,
low carbon generation is subsidized although its pollution produces the same damages to society,
albeit at a lower rate, than high carbon generation.
We develop five propositions and their accompanying proofs pertaining to low carbon genera-
tion with the introduction of electricity storage under a TPS. In summary, the propositions indicate
that low carbon generation will be greater under a TPS with storage than a TPS without storage,
absent any policy, or under the first-best policy. In addition, the propositions indicate that the distri-
butional impacts (from the introduction of storage under a TPS) between consumers and producers
depends on the change to the TPS permit price. An increase in the TPS permit price benefits low
carbon generators through an increase in implicit subsidies but hurts consumers through reduced
consumption resulting from an increased electricity price and vice versa.
To estimate and further demonstrate the increased inefficiency of a TPS with electricity storage,
we develop a simulation model of electricity dispatch for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas.
The simulation model represents 12 different that vary in season (spring, summer, fall, winter)
and type of demand day (average, peak, and low). TPS targets, fuel prices, storage capacity, and
available generation capacity are varied to demonstrate that the inefficiency is robust across several
different assumptions. We estimate that under the reference case assumptions, introducing 5GW
of electricity storage capacity under a 800 lbs CO2 per MWh TPS results in a $5.3 million dollar
loss in annual social surplus loss relative to the same TPS without electricity storage. The loss of
$5.3 million dollars represents 3.8% of the total social surplus change when a TPS is introduced
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without storage.
The implications of these findings are important when looking to the future of the electricity in-
dustry and policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions from electricity generation. As legislators
increasingly see a TPS as a potential policy for carbon reduction in the electricity sector, costs of
grid-scale batteries are dropping quickly. Therefore, steps should be taken to mitigate the negative
interaction between a TPS and electricity storage. How to best reduce the increased inefficiency
remains a question for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
SIMULATING PRODUCER RESPONSES TO SELECTED CHINESE RARE EARTH
POLICIES
This chapter was written in collaboration with Dr. Roderick Eggert†
As of May 2017, this chapter is under review for publication in Resources Policy
In this work, we explore the effects of Chinese rare earth stockpiling, environmental taxation,
and improvements in recovery rates on legal Chinese producers, illegal Chinese producers, and the
Mount Weld mine in Australia. A Stackelberg model is developed for firms producing multiple
products by a leading producer and two sequential followers. The model is parameterized for the
rare earth industry, specifically the production and prices of separated rare earth oxides (REOs)
from ore. Counterfactuals impose Chinese policies and are compared to the no policy, business-
as-usual (BAU) scenario. The five counterfactuals are: further Chinese State Reserve Bureau
(SRB) stockpiling of (1) neodymium and (2) dysprosium, (3) an environmental tax on the produc-
tion of legal Chinese rare earth ore production, and increased legal Chinese recovery rates of (4)
neodymium and (5) dysprosium. The BAU scenario and five counterfactuals are also run with (a)
four different levels of reference illegal Chinese production and (b) with and without the Chinese
production quota, yielding 48 total outcomes (6x4x2). The first finding is that any SRB stockpile
purchase increases the price of the stockpiled REO and increases legal Chinese ore production.
However, given the coproduction nature of the model, increased ore production implies more pro-
duction of all REOs and the prices of non-stockpiled REOs decrease. Therefore, if the stockpiled
REO represents a large (small) portion of illegal Chinese and Mount Weld revenue then illegal Chi-
nese producers and the Mount Weld mine will increase (decrease) production. An environmental
tax decreases legal Chinese production, increases production by the second and third actors, and
†Professor, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business, Engineering Hall, 816 15th Street,
Golden, CO 80401
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increases prices of all REOs. Increased legal Chinese recovery rates increase Chinese production
for all REOs, decrease production from the second and third actors, and decrease the prices of
all REOs. Increased levels of reference illegal Chinese production exacerbate the illegal Chinese
producers’ policy-driven production increases or dampen their production reductions. However,
increased levels of reference illegal Chinese production reduce the legal Chinese producers’ and
Mount Weld’s policy-driven production increases and further decrease their production reductions.
2.1 Introduction
In this work we ask “What influence could Chinese rare earth stockpiling, an environmental tax
on rare earth production in China, or increased rare earth recovery rates have on global rare earth
oxide markets?” Mined rare earth materials, which are further processed into rare earth oxides1
(REOs), are subject to supply risk because of the geographic concentration of production in China
and the resulting fragility of rare earth markets as illustrated by the dramatic price increases in
2010 and 2011. Since several consumer electronics and renewable energy technologies depend on
rare earths, the potential repercussions of these actions are a salient issue on many agendas.
Although rare earth prices in 2016 are much lower than their peaks in 2011, rare earth users
remain vulnerable to the consequences of potential Chinese policy. Five policy areas are of special
interest. First, the Chinese State Reserve Bureau (SRB) began a rare earth stockpiling program
in 2013. The first stockpile purchase was in mid-2013 and the SRB paid a 10% premium for the
stockpiled rare earths. In late-2014 it was reported that the government had built storage for more
than 40 thousand tons of REOs and the SRB may purchase up to 100 thousand tons, primarily
focusing on medium to heavy rare earths (Burns, 2014; McLeod, 2014). Second, a revised re-
source tax is now in effect and in response to the extensive environmental consequences of REO
production (Ge et al., 2016; Shira, 2016). Third and since the 1960s, an ongoing effort by multiple
research institutions has been to increase recovery rates of REOs from ore. A specific initiative is
that the Chinese Rare Earth Development Plan for the 2009-2016 period set a goal of an increased
1For convenience, rare earth oxides are used to represent all forms of rare-earth intermediate products after the sepa-
ration stage but before conversion to alloys and metal; however, it is that manufacturers use specialized intermediate
products such as carbonates, chlorides, and various other chemical forms.
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recovery rate for Baotou Iron and Steel and Rare Earths Corporation (Tse, 2011). The Chinese
government has also invested in and encouraged development of more efficient recovery equip-
ment (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 2012). Fourth,
since 2012 the Chinese government has set an annual production quota for rare earth producers
and in 2016 the Chinese government set the production quota at 105 thousand tons per year. Look-
ing forward, the annual production quota is expected to either remain constant or increase to 140
thousand tons by 2020 (Adamas Intelligence, 2015b; Burns, 2014). Finally, in 2017 the Chinese
government is actively attempting to reduce and eliminate illegal Chinese rare earth production.
The Mount Weld (Australia) and Mountain Pass (United States) mines began to produce rare
earths following the 2010-2011 price spike; however, the Mountain Pass mine ceased production
in 2015 due to financial and technological difficulties. Although rare earth production outside
of China has increased, the production of certain rare earths remains concentrated in China. In a
simplified sense, the supply of the light rare earths (LREEs2) will be more geographically diverse if
Mount Weld produces at planned capacity than the supply of heavy rare earths (HREEs34) whose
production is expected to primarily remain from illegal producers in southern China from ion
adsorption clays. As of early 2017, the Mountain Pass and Mount Weld mines have been the only
two new major sources of supply since 2010, with only Mount Weld being in production in early
2017. Although a small number of the well-explored known deposits outside of China could come
into production in the future, no new major sources of supply are imminent (Adamas Intelligence,
2015b; Humphries, 2013).
Recent research has partially but not entirely evaluated these policies and market developments
outside of China. Related to the coproduction aspect of our model, Nieto & Zhang (2013) demon-
strate that byproducts of rare earths significantly influence the more prominent, primary products.
Using a generalized Weng model to forecast production quantities, Wang et al. (2013) recommend
2Lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, and gadolinium
3Yttrium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium
4Although analyses differ in their classification of LREEs and HREEs, the classification of LREEs and HREEs is based
on the 4f shell electron’s spin direction. Starting with terbium, additional spinning electrons rotate counter-clockwise
as opposed to clockwise which desginates an element as an HREE (InvestorIntel Rare Earth Handbook, 2013).
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that the Chinese government pursue environmental and resource exhaustion taxes for their rare
earth industry. A detailed assessment of rare earth markets indicates that rare earths face a near-
term supply risk due to lack of substitutes, concentrated production, and growing demand (Massari
& Ruberti, 2013). Han et al. (2016) have evaluated the implications of the Chinese government’s
vertical integration efforts and assert that the Chinese government should seek vertical integration.
Ge et al. (2016), using a dynamic computable general equilbrium model, forecast that the tech-
nological improvements of substitution and recycling rare earths will decrease mining activities
in China by 2025. Past research has not incorporated the potential Chinese market power on an
international scale and has not portrayed production concentration among a small set of producers.
Our research adds to the current literature by providing a theoretical framework for coproduction
in a Stackelberg game, applying the model to REO markets to represent Chinese market power,
and evaluating this selected set of potential Chinese policies.
In this work, the influence of Chinese policies is evaluated while considering the market power
of legal Chinese producers. This is accomplished through developing and then calibrating a Stack-
elberg game of coproduction with three actors: legal Chinese producers, illegal Chinese producers,
and the Mount Weld mine in Australia. The Stackelberg setup allows us to demonstrate a leader
with two followers in the context of rare earth markets. A Stackelberg game is a strategic game
where the leader moves first through choosing its production quantity with knowledge of its com-
petitors’ responses. The leader-follower relationship in a game is appropriate when either the
leader is committed to an action, the leader was a monopolist before new entrants, or if the leader
holds excess production capacity. The Chinese government production quota symbolizes a com-
mitment to a production decision. Also, when Mount Weld began producing in relatively small
quantities in 2011, China was an incumbent monopoly in the rare earth markets. Furthermore, in
2016 China only used less than half of its rare earth production and refinement capacity (Adamas
Intelligence, 2015b).
Although there are numerous mines and processors within China, the Chinese government
imposes policy on a national level, making it reasonable to model legal Chinese production as a
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single actor from the perspective of non-Chinese users and producers. The Chinese government
has demonstrated its ability to impact rare earth markets, exert its control on producers through pro-
duction quotas, and is pursuing consolidation of firms which should further its domestic production
control. An important difference between this Stackelberg game and other Stackelberg games is
that we incorporate coproduction of multiple products (rare earths) from a single production vari-
able (ore) while calibrating costs to forecasted levels of production. Finally, we recognize that
Mount Weld’s concentrate is processed in Malaysia; although these geographical intricacies are
not explicitly represented in the model, additional costs are captured through the cost calibration.
Results indicate that a SRB stockpile purchase will only increase illegal Chinese and Mount
Weld production if the stockpiled REO represents a relatively large portion of their revenue. The
SRB stockpile purchase results in an increased price of the stockpiled REO due to a reduction in
the available supply to consumers and in turn incentivizes increased production from legal Chi-
nese producers. China’s increased production entails the additional supply of all non-stockpiled
rare earths through coproduction, reducing the prices of non-stockpiled rare earths. Thus, if the
increased revenue potential from the price increase of the stockpiled rare earth outweighs the rev-
enue losses from decreased prices of non-stockpiled rare earths, the second and third actors will
increase production and vice versa. Of the counterfactuals explored, the environmental tax is the
only one which reduces Chinese production and always increases production from the second and
third actors. A rare earth’s share of the second and third actors’ revenues increases relative impacts
of increased recovery capabilities. With increased recovery rates, China still increases produc-
tion but all rare earth prices decrease thus decreasing production from the second and third actors.
Finally, increased levels of illegal Chinese production exacerbate the illegal Chinese producers’
policy-driven production increases or dampen their production reductions. However, increased
levels of illegal Chinese production reduce Mount Weld’s policy-driven production increases and
further decrease production reductions.
This paper is structured as follows. First, the conceptual Stackelberg model is presented. Sec-
ond, the data sources, assumptions, and calibration method used to parameterize the model are
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covered. Third, we present the results from counterfactuals for each actor as well as variations in
the assumed illegal Chinese production rate. Finally, we discuss the implications of this work.
2.2 Model
The primary considerations of modeling rare earth markets are potential Chinese market power
and the joint production of multiple REOs from a single ore stream. Because of these consider-
ations and the aforementioned reasons on the appropriateness of a Stackelberg game, we choose
to model the market using a Stackelberg model of joint production. The derivation of the optimal
production functions can be found in Appendix A and the model’s code is presented in Appendix
G.
The model represents the portion of the REO supply chain from mining ore, concentration of
ore, and finally the separation and sale of REOs. The mine index, j, comprises three actors: legal
Chinese producers (k), illegal Chinese producers (l), and Mount Weld (m). Each actor produces an
amount of ore, X j, which results in the production of each REO, indexed by i. The amount of REO
produced from actor j’s ore is determined by each REO’s share in the concentrated rare earth ore,
θi, j (0 ≤ θi, j < 1 and
∑
i θi, j = 1 ∀ j). Note that this feature of the model is the heart of coproduction
in our Stackelberg game since the production of a single ore (X j) entails the coproduction of several
REOs.
The price for each REO (Pi) is determined on global markets (i.e., all actors receive the same
price for REOs) using a linear demand function. The removal of Chinese export quotas and tariffs
has converged the domestic Chinese and global prices and thus global prices computed through
the REOs’ inverse demand functions are used. Costs faced by the firms consist of overall ore
extraction and concentration costs (ζ j) as well as REO-specific separation costs (ci, j), both of
which are calibrated using least squares minimization to best match estimates of production from
Adamas Intelligence (2015b). Absent Chinese stockpiling or a Chinese environmental tax, the
profits of each actor (π j) can be computed as the sum of revenues from the production of each
REO less costs:
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π j = X j[(
∑
i
θi, j(Pi − ci, j))− ζ j] (2.1)
With an environmental tax (τ), an exogenous SRB stockpile purchase (κi) at a premium (δ)
over the exogenous price estimate (p̄i), or a production quota
5 (Q̄k) the objective function for the




θi,k(Pi − ci,k))− (ζk + τ)]+ (1+ δ)p̄κi]+ λ(Q̄k − Xk) (2.2)
In a Stackelberg game, each actor’s optimal production function is solved through backward
induction. First, the optimal production from Mount Weld (X∗m) is solved as a function of the
production from illegal and legal Chinese producers. Then the optimal production by illegal Chi-
nese producers (X∗
l
) is solved in terms of the legal Chinese producers’ production while replacing
Xm with X
∗




in terms of only exogenous parameters. The derivations of optimal production functions through
backward induction are algebraically laborious and presented in Appendix A.
Linear supply and demand curves are used to derive closed form optimal production functions;
these are defined such that they intersect the exogenous price and quantity determined by Adamas
Intelligence (2015b). With p̄i, a reference exogenous demand (q̄i), a price elasticity of demand
(ǫi), an exogenous stockpile purchase by the SRB (κi), and a supply elasticity (η j) assumed at 0.5,




















2.3 Data and calibration
The exogenous data for the model comes from a single source, Adamas Intelligence (Adamas
Intelligence, 2015b). The model requires four exogenous parameters: production by supplier (X̄ j),
5If enforced, the production quota remains constant at 105,000 tonnes throughout the 2015-2020 time period
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price of REO (p̄i), REO shares in ore by supplier (θi, j), and a price elasticity of demand for each
REO (ǫi). The price elasticity of demand for each REO is drawn in a Monte-Carlo fashion from
a uniform distribution from 0.5 to 1.5; the price elasticity of demand has not been estimated and
thus we choose this range to reflect elastic and inelastic possibilities. The costs of production for
either separation and additional processing individual REOs (ci, j) as well as ore extraction and
concentration (ζ j) are estimated through calibration. A summary of the parameters, their symbols,
their units, and their sources is presented in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1: Parameter characteristics
Parameter Symbol Units Source
Production X̄ j tonne Adamas Intelligence (2015b)
REO Price p̄i $ / tonne Adamas Intelligence (2015b)
Share of REO i in j’s Ore θi, j % Adamas Intelligence (2015b)
Price Elasticity of Demand ǫi – U(0.5,1.5)
Cost of Mining Ore ζ j $ / tonne Calibration
Additional Cost for Concentrating
and Separating REO i ci, j $ / tonne Calibration
The values of θi, j, adjusted for ore content by mine and thus reflecting share in concentrate
are presented in the first set of columns in Table 2.2. The second set of columns presents another
perspective of REO i’s contribution to revenue per unit of ore extracted6 using average reference
prices over the 2015-2020 period. The revenue share is more relevant to this model’s purpose as it
demonstrates that, for example, although neodymium is third in terms of legal Chinese and Mount
Weld distribution, it is the largest contributor to their revenue per unit of concentrate. Dyspro-
sium presents contrast across the three producers with 14.0% revenue share for the legal Chinese
producers, 35.8% for illegal Chinese producers, but only 2.9% for Mount Weld.
The reference levels of production (i.e. X̄ j) in the ‘Base’ scenario, detailed further in the next
section, as well as the calibrated production levels by producer are displayed in Figure 2.1. The
calibrated production levels are within a range of less than 5% (above or below) the reference pro-
duction data from Adamas Intelligence (2015b). The calibrated level of legal Chinese production
6i.e. Revenue Sharei, j =
θi, j p̄i
∑
i θi, j p̄i
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Table 2.2: Concentrate and revenue distribution by element and producer
Distribution Revenue
(% of Concentrate) (% of Total Revenue per Unit of Ore)
Legal Illegal Legal Illegal
Chinese Chinese Mount Chinese Chinese Mount
Producers Producers Weld Producers Producers Weld
La 25.4% 13.9% 45.7% 2.6% 0.9% 5.1%
Ce 40.5% 18.7% 25.6% 6.8% 2.0% 4.7%
Nd 16.7% 14.0% 18.6% 46.4% 24.6% 56.8%
Y 7.5% 35.8% 0.4% 2.9% 8.7% 0.2%
Pr 5.5% 4.0% 5.4% 15.8% 7.4% 17.1%
Sm 1.5% 3.3% 2.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3%
Gd 1.4% 5.0% 1.0% 2.3% 5.1% 1.8%
Dy 1.0% 4.1% 0.2% 14.0% 35.8% 2.9%
Eu 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 3.8% 3.5% 8.6%
Tb 0.2% 0.8% 0.1% 5.2% 11.8% 2.5%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
is less in the beginning years and greater in later years of the simulation; this can be primarily
attributed to reference REO price increases. Mount Weld’s reference production being flat after
2018 presents a challenge for the calibration procedure to match. The illegal Chinese producers’
calibrated production is greater than the reference level for all years except the first.
Table 2.3: Calibrated costs and average revenue per unit of ore by producer and assumed illegal
Chinese production rate, no production quota ($/KG total REO)
Illegal Production Level (1,000 tonnes) 20 40 60 80 Average Revenue
Legal Chinese Producers 20.1 20.9 21.5 22.3 25.8
Illegal Chinese Producers 34.9 33.2 31.4 29.8 41.9
Mount Weld 20.6 21.2 21.7 22.1 23.8
The two cost parameters, ζ j and ci, j, are calibrated such that endogenous production, com-
puted through the optimal production functions, most-closely matches reference production in a
least squares minimization7. The cost parameters are not indexed by year as there would be a
relatively small set of reference data points (annual production by producer) for several variables;






Figure 2.1: Reference and calibrated production by actor. Data source: Adamas Intelligence
(2015b)
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indexing costs by year also presented challenges for the calibration algorithm to reach a stable so-
lution. The costs resulting from this calibration should be considered economic8 costs as opposed
to accounting costs. The compiled costs (i.e. C̄ j +
∑
i θi, jc̄i, j) and average revenue (i.e.
∑
i θi, j p̄i)
per KG of concentrate are presented in Table 2.3. Although not directly comparable, the cali-
brated economic costs are close to reported accounting costs from Adamas Intelligence (2015a)
and Molycorp (2015). The weighted average revenue is computed as the product of ore content
and reference price averaged over 2015-2020. The highest per-kg profit ($12.1 / KG) is with ille-
gal Chinese producers when the reference illegal Chinese production level is 80 thousand tonnes.
Given their declining market share, legal Chinese producers and Mount Weld production costs
increase with greater assumed illegal Chinese production. The calibrated costs of illegal Chinese
producers fall with increased levels of assumed illegal Chinese production because they maintain
a greater share of reference market supply.
2.4 Assumptions and counterfactuals
The distinction between the ‘Base’ setup and the business-as-usual (BAU), no-policy case is
important for understanding results. The ‘Base’ setup consists of inputs - the set of assumptions
from which the counterfactuals deviate. The ‘BAU’ (no counterfactual) case provides a reference
point against which we can compare the effects of counterfactuals. The ‘Base’ setup has the fol-
lowing assumptions:
1. Mountain Pass REO production halted from 2016 onwards
2. Mount Weld REO production reaches 22,000 tonnes by 2018, flat thereafter
3. Rest of World REO production remains flat at 5,800 tonnes through 2020
4. Chinese illegal REO production is continuously reduced from approximately 20,000 tonnes
in 2015 to approximately 7,500 tonnes in 2020
The ‘Base’ rate of illegal Chinese production starts at 20 thousand tons per year in 2014, a rate
of production consistent with Adamas Intelligence (2015b), the primary source of data. The results
8Here ‘economic’ costs include additional costs such as hidden transaction and trade friction costs in addition to
accounting costs. Examples of hidden transaction and trade friction costs are the time spent to procure a purchaser
and the indirect costs of international trade, respectively.
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vary in the level of reference9 illegal Chinese production. However, Packey & Kingsnorth (2016)
indicate that ”the most recent and frequently quoted estimates [of illegal Chinese production] are
around 40,000 tonnes” and Argus Media (2016) indicates that illegal production could be as high
as 80,000 tonnes per year. Therefore, in alternative implementations we vary our assumption by 20
thousand tonne intervals from 20 thousand tonnes up to 80 thousand tonnes per year. The rate of
illegal Chinese production is still adjusted by the absolute difference in production levels, relative
to 2015, from Adamas Intelligence (2015b).
There is no production quota enforced in the ‘Base’ setup and this is to allow for the legal Chi-
nese producers to respond to market changes resulting from the actions of the Chinese government.
Since the legal Chinese annual production quota is not certain, the simulations and results cover
differences that occur from the lack or presence of the Chinese production quota. Other work by
Mancheri (2015) has evaluated the Chinese export restrictions which existed prior to the World
Trade Organization rulings and subsequent production quotas.
The BAU case, as opposed to the ‘Base’ setup, implies that no counterfactual is present. The
five counterfactuals entail:
1. A 10% SRB stockpile purchase of forecasted neodymium demand each year
2. A 10% SRB stockpile purchase of forecasted dysprosium demand each year
3. An environmental tax imposed on the aggregated Chinese producers based on 12% of their
average revenue
4. A 15% increase in neodymium recovery rates by aggregated Chinese producers
5. A 15% increase in dysprosium recovery rates by aggregated Chinese producers
The counterfactual adjustments begin in 2017 and persist through 2020. In stockpile counter-
factuals, the Chinese SRB purchases 10% of the exogenous reference demand at a 10% premium
(i.e. κi = 0.1q̄i and δ = 0.1) from the aggregated Chinese producers. The values of the stockpile
premium and purchased amount are consistent with previous examples of SRB stockpiling behav-
ior (Burns, 2014). The 12% environmental tax rate is consistent with the current resource tax (Ge
9To be specific, ‘Reference’ illegal production is the level to which we calibrate
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but all other θi, j remain the same. This increased recovery rate is roughly reflective of the upper
bound on potential increases in recovery from adoption of new technologies or adjusting produc-
tion techniques (Krishnamurthy & Gupta, 2015).
2.5 Results
This section first focusses on certiain relationships evident through the derivation of optimal
production functions. Then, we focus on the responses of each actor in turn to the various coun-
terfactual implementations. The counterfactuals are compared to the BAU case to gauge relative
change in production behavior. The fourth subsection presents results for the four different levels
of assumed illegal production rates (20, 40, 60, and 80 thousand tonnes per year) for the ‘Base’
setup and five counterfactuals. All results presented here are the average over 5,000 draws of
elasticity from a uniform distribution beween 0.5 and 1.5.
One can evaluate the producers’ optimal production functions in Appendix A to determine the
actors’ reactions to counterfactuals. The legal Chinese producers balance both the price response
from adjusting their own production and the competitors’ responses from their production adjust-
ment. All else equal, an increase in one of the legal Chinese producers’ REO recovery rates will
definitely increase their ore production. An environmental tax will reduce production from the
aggregated Chinese producers and increase production from illegal Chinese producers and Mount
Weld.
With a bolstering of prices from SRB stockpiling there is an increase in production from the
legal Chinese producers. However, as demonstrated in Table 2.4, the partial derivatives of illegal




) is directly related to their revenue shares. The signs of the legal Chinese producers’ partial
derivatives are always positive but the magnitude is correlated with their revenue share. REOs
that represent a higher portion of revenue per unit of concentrate for illegal Chinese Producers and
Mount Weld have positive partial derivatives but those that represent a small portion of revenue
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per unit of concentrate have negative partial derivatives. The signs of the second two actors’
partial derivatives can be mixed in that illegal Chinese producers may respond with an increase in
production to stockpiling of an REO whereas Mount Weld may reduce production and vice versa.
Note that some of the partial derivatives are too small to be represented in Table 2.4 with two
decimal points but the sign of the change is still indicated (e.g. 0.00 vs. -0.00).
Table 2.4: Partial derivative of optimal production function with respect to stockpiled REO by
producer, averaged over the elasticity distribution in the base case without production quota
Legal Illegal
Chinese Chinese Weld
i Producers Producers Weld
Ce 0.14 -0.06 0.03
La 0.18 -0.24 0.00
Nd 3.41 0.92 1.13
Yt 0.21 0.23 -0.17
Pr 1.03 0.18 0.20
Sm 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Gd 0.02 0.05 -0.00
Dy 1.14 1.36 -0.37
Eu 0.01 -0.05 0.08
Tb 0.06 0.21 -0.03
The results presented here are taken as the average over 5,000 elasticity draws for BAU and
counterfactual cases where all cases receive the same elasticity within draw. Independent of which
ǫi are taken from U(0.5,1.5), the sign of the change from the counterfactual implementation is the
same; additionaly, relative differences across assumed illegal Chinese production rates is always
the same within draws. For example, in the neodymium stockpiling counterfactual legal Chinese
producers will always increase production and will always increase production more than dys-
prosium stockpiling. Furthermore, the increases in legal Chinese production in the neodymium
stockpile counterfactual will be greater with reductions in assumed illegal Chinese production for
any draw of elasticities.
The following results subsections cover the responses of each actor in turn. A table of the
production values featured in the graphs by producer, presence of quota, and counterfactual is
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featured in Appendix B in Table B.1. Following the coverage of each actor, the results from
various assumed levels of illegal production are presented.
2.5.1 Production by actor
Production by actor in the ‘Base’ setup for each counterfactual and by presence of the legal
Chinese production quota is presented in Figure 2.2. The values in this graph are also featured in
Appendix B in Table B.1. Note that results do not differ under the environmental tax regardless
of the presence of the legal Chinese production quota and therefore the environmental tax coun-
terfactual can serve as a benchmark to compare over the presence of the legal Chinese production
quota.
All counterfactuals aside from the environmental tax increase the production from legal Chi-
nese producers. Related to the results presented in Table 2.4, the largest increase in legal Chinese
production, approximately 9% over the 2017-2020 time period, occurs when neodymium is stock-
piled. A neodymium stockpile entails an increase to the price of the legal Chinese producers’
highest revenue-per-KG product and thus increases production relatively more than a dysprosium
stockpile. An increase to the neodymium recovery rate results in a greater increase to legal Chinese
production than an increase to the recovery rate of dysprosium. Again, this rests in the revenue
share of the policy-impacted REO in that a higher revenue share will lead to a greater response
from policy. The presence of an environmental tax results in the same legal Chinese production
rates whether a production quota is present or not. When the production quota is present, any
counterfactual which results in an increase to production is bounded at the 105,000 tonnes per year
production quota but increases responses from illegal Chinese producers and Mount Weld.
In contrast to legal Chinese producers, illegal Chinese production is increased when an en-
vironmental tax is imposed on legal Chinese producers. Again in contrast to legal Chinese pro-
ducers, dysprosium stockpiling results in a greater increase in illegal Chinese production than a
neodymium stockpile given its greater revenue share. Indeed the dysprosium stockpiling results in
the greatest production from illegal Chinese producers when the legal Chinese production quota
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Figure 2.2: Annual production by presence of legal Chinese production quota, actor, and counter-
factual
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remains and is nearly tied with the environmental tax scenario when the quota is removed. Im-
provements to legal Chinese recovery rate result in a reduction in illegal Chinese production with
the greatest reduction occurring when dysprosium recovery rates are increased. The decline in
illegal Chinese production with recovery rate increases is the result of more of said REO being re-
leased to the market along with all other coproduced REOs from legal Chinese producers, bringing
down all prices.
Mount weld production is least when the neodymium recovery rate of legal Chinese producers
is increased. The increased release of neodymium that occurs when legal Chinese neodymium
recovery rates are improved causes a drop in neodymium price, reducing Mount Weld’s profits and
causing them to reduce production. A similar decrease in production, but to a much lesser extent,
occurs when legal Chinese dysprosium recovery rates are improved. Although dysprosium does
not maintain a large revenue share for Mount Weld, the increased coproduction from increased
legal and illegal Chinese production decreases the prices of the other, non-stockpiled REOs which
in turn decreases Mount Weld’s production. The environmental tax results in the greatest level
of production for the Mount Weld mine absent the legal Chinese producers’ production quota.
When the quota remains, stockpiling of neodymium results in the greatest level of Mount Weld
production over all counterfactuals.
The signs of changes for Mount Weld by counterfactual are the same as illegal Chinese produc-
ers except when a dysprosium stockpile is purchased. When a dysprosium stockpile is purchased,
both legal and illegal Chinese producers increase production and reduce the prices of the other,
non-stockpiled REOs. The increase in dysprosium does not make up for the lost revenue from
the reduction in prices of non-stockpiled REOs and thus Mount Weld decreases production when
dysprosium is stockpiled.
Comparing illegal Chinese and Mount Weld production with and without the presence of a
legal Chinese production quota, production from the second and third actors is always greater in
a counterfactual with the quota than without (as long as the quota remains binding). Additionally,
relative increases in illegal Chinese and Mount Weld production from Chinese policy are inten-
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sified when a production quota is enforced on legal Chinese producers. Conversely, decreases in
illegal Chinese production in response to the recovery rate increases of legal Chinese producers are
dampened when the production quota is present. Said differently, the effects of counterfactuals that
increase (decrease) legal Chinese and Mount Weld production lead to a greater increase (smaller
reduction) when the quota is present.
2.5.2 Reference illegal Chinese production rates
The relative changes over the 2017-2020 period to the BAU case by producer, counterfactual,
and assumed illegal Chinese production rate without a production quota are presented in Table 2.5.
A general conclusion from these results is that any counterfactual responses from legal Chinese or
Mount Weld production will be less positive or more negative given increases in assumed levels of
illegal Chinese production. For example, neodymium stockpiling increased production from legal
Chinese producers by 9.2% in the reference illegal Chinese production rate (20,000 tonnes) but
that increase is only 4.1% when annual legal Chinese production is assumed at 80,000 tonnes.
With the data in Table 2.5, it can be concluded that increased levels of illegal Chinese pro-
duction decrease the positive and increase the negative production responses of policy for legal
Chinese producers and Mount Weld. This is the result of increased competitiveness and market
responsiveness of illegal Chinese producers when they maintain a greater market share of REOs.
This is further exacerbated when dysprosium is affected by either stockpiling or increased recovery
rates, given its greater revenue share by illegal Chinese producers.
2.5.3 Prices
Prices for neodymium and dysprosium by counterfactual in the base case are presented in
Figure 2.3. Consequences of the coproduction nature are evident in both materials’ price responses
to policy. For example, the price of neodymium declines in counterfactuals where changes to the
dysprosium market increase production (Dy Rate and Dy Stock). The same is true for the price
of dysprosium with similar changes to the neodymium market (Nd Rate and Nd Stock). The
stockpiling of a rare earth increases the stockpiled rare earth’s price but decreases the prices of
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Table 2.5: Relative change in production from BAU case by counterfactual, producer, and illegal production rate
Stockpiling
Stockpiled Material Neodymium Dysprosium
Illegal Chinese Production Level (1,000 tonnes) 20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
Legal Chinese Producers 9.2% 8.3% 6.6% 4.1% 2.1% 2.0% 1.7% 1.1%
Illegal Chinese Producers 12.4% 12.7% 13.2% 14.0% 16.5% 17.2% 18.7% 20.5%
Mount Weld 10.0% 9.4% 8.2% 6.6% -5.0% -5.3% -6.1% -7.2%
Increased Recovery Rate
Material with Increased Recovery Neodymium Dysprosium
Illegal Chinese Production Level (1,000 tonnes) 20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
Legal Chinese Producers 5.1% 4.8% 4.0% 3.0% 1.6% 1.3% 0.8% 0.1%
Illegal Chinese Producers -4.4% -4.2% -3.6% -2.7% -7.8% -7.2% -6.3% -4.8%
Mount Weld -10.7% -10.9% -11.3% -12.0% -2.2% -2.4% -2.6% -2.9%
Environmental Tax
Illegal Chinese Production Level (1,000 tonnes) 20 40 60 80
Legal Chinese Producers -5.3% -5.4% -5.7% -6.1%
Illegal Chinese Producers 17.5% 17.7% 18.0% 18.4%
Mount Weld 17.9% 17.7% 17.4% 16.9%
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other rare earths. The environmental tax increases the prices of all rare earths. The price increases
of neodymium and dysprosium are generally found to be greater with stockpiling than with an
environmental tax.
The price of dysprosium is generally more responsive in relative terms than neodymium. For
example, the increase to the dysprosium recovery rate results in 44% reduction in dysprosium
price but an increase to the neodymium recovery rate only decreases neodymium price by 26%.
The same is true for relative differences given stockpiling scenarios but price responses under the
environmental tax are almost equal for neodymium and dysprosium. This difference in relative
price changes depends on the production responses of the various actors. Total rare earth pro-
duction changes greater in response to the neodymium-specific policies given its higher basket
revenue share for legal Chinese producers and Mount Weld. Therefore, the greater relative produc-
tion responses result in a dampened price effect. Said differently, because dysprosium represents
a smaller share of revenue for the majority of producers there is less producer response and the
resulting price is relatively more responsive than neodymium.
The price responses also demonstrate the uniqueness of each REO market’s producer concen-
tration. Neodymium, with relatively less producer concentration than dysprosium, faces a rela-
tively less price response given greater overall producer response capabilities. In this sense, each
REO has a separate market and their resulting price responses to Chinese policy depend on the
relative concentrations of each market.
2.6 Discussion
In this work we ask, “What influence could Chinese rare earth stockpiling, an environmental
tax on rare earth production in China, or increased rare earth recovery rates have have on global
rare earth oxide markets?” This research develops a three actor Stackelberg model of coproduction
and applies it to rare earth markets. The potential actions of the Chinese government explored here
have contrasting implications. The SRB stockpiling purchases increase the price of the stockpiled
REO but decrease prices of non-stockpiled REOs. The increased price of the stockpiled REO is
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Figure 2.3: Price of neodymium and dysprosium by counterfactual, ‘Base’ setup
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the intended consequence of the SRB’s actions but the decreased prices of non-stockpiled REOs
represent the coproduction nature of REO production. The second and third actors, modeled after
illegal Chinese producers and Mount Weld, increase production when neodymium is stockpiled
but Mount Weld decreases production when dysprosium is stockpiled. In stockpile cases, it is
shown that the marginal revenue gain from stockpiled REO price increases needs to outweigh the
marginal revenue loss from decreased non-stockpiled REO prices for it to cause an increase in
non-Chinese production. Mount Weld’s higher revenue shares of neodymium relative to other rare
earths entail that the neodymium stockpile increases their production but the opposite is true for
dysprosium as its price increase from stockpiling fails to compensate for the price decreases of
non-stockpiled REOs.
An increase in the recovery rate of specific REOs by the legal Chinese producers leads to in-
creased legal Chinese production given the implied increase in marginal revenue, decreased prices,
and ultimately decreased production from illegal Chinese producers and Mount Weld. As with
SRB stockpiling, the impacts on all actors’ production decisions are increased when the REO of
focus maintains a greater share of revenue. Contrasting with SRB stockpiling is that there is a
definite decrease in production from illegal Chinese producers and Mountain Pass when recovery
rates are increased whereas the sign of the change in the stockpiling counterfactuals depends on
revenue share. Of the three counterfactual types explored here, increasing recovery rates is the
only definite means by which the legal Chinese producers’ market share increases regardless of
the REO receiving treatment. Said differently, increasing recovery rates is the only counterfactual
that increases legal Chinese production but definitely decreases production from illegal Chinese
producers and Mount Weld.
The environmental tax implies a decrease in legal Chinese production since their costs of pro-
duction are increased. This decrease in Chinese production leads to an increase in REO prices and
thus increases the production from illegal Chinese producers and Mount Weld. The social, health,
and environmental costs of illegal rare earth production in China pose a large cost to Chinese cit-
izens (Ali, 2014; Packey & Kingsnorth, 2016). Not portrayed in this analysis is the possibility
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of intra-Chinese production shifting to other domestic, less-polluting operations which economic
inuition insists would occur under a pollution-based tax. This would alter the recovery rates of
specific REOs and in turn change the impact of the environemntal tax on the second and third
actors’ production responses. The production quotas currently in place limit the potential overall
pollution from legal production but encourage greater production from illegal Chinese producers
which have severe health consequences (Ali, 2014).
The selected Chinese policies simulated in this work have varying implications for the stated
goals of the Chinese government. A stockpile purchase helps to bolster prices but, if the purchase
is of high value to illegal Chinese producers, could increase illegal production. An environmental
tax imposed on legal Chinese producers could increase the prices of all REOs and production from
illegal Chinese producers and the Mount Weld mine. Increasing recovery rates could decrease the
prices of all REOs and decrease production from illegal Chinese producers and Mount Weld.
The export quota, which was removed in 2014 after the World Trade Organization (WTO)
ruling, was designed to increase prices for non-Chinese producers while encouraging domestic
consumption of rare earths. The Chinese response to the WTO ruling was to enact domestic pro-
duction quotas and consolidate the rare earth industry. Illegal Chinese production undermines the
intended purpose of the domestic production quotas and, as the simulations here show, can be
responsive to other Chinese rare earth-related policies and initiatives. The stockpiling motions of
neodymium and dysprosium as well as the environmental tax can encourage greater illegal Chinese
production. However, increasing recovery rates or removal of the production quota can decrease
production from illegal Chinese producers and Mount Weld.
As of 2017, several potential rare earth projects have released feasibility studies and are seek-
ing financial support for their operations. These rare earth projects would likely be at the mercy
of the Chinese producers and Chinese policy. The ability for the Chinese producers to thwart the
development of a potential competitor depends in part on the developer’s upfront costs. If the
upfront costs are low, the Chinese producers would find it more difficult to hinder the actual de-
velopment but could increase production and decrease rare earth prices thus dampening the new
29
entrant’s profitability. If the entrant’s upfront capital costs are high, Chinese producers can keep
the new entrant from entering the rare earth market by setting production (and thus prices) such
that the new entrant’s venture is not seen as profitable. New entrants should consider the lower
bounds on prices among a set of potential Chinese actions when evaluating their own profitability
given the potential for China to exert its control on rare earth markets.
REO consumption on a global level in this analysis abstracts from the fact that REO con-
sumption is concentrated with midstream manufacturers in China, Japan, and the USA (Adamas
Intelligence, 2015b). Indeed this is a producer-focused analysis and the full social costs are not
represented; theory suggests that greater REO prices benefit mines but would increase costs for
this concentrated set of midstream manufacturers which could reduce their profits or be passed
on to the less-concentrated downstream consumers. Which entities and income groups along the
supply chain experience benefit or detriment remains a question for future analysis.
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CHAPTER 3
CALIBRATION OF CONSTANT ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION TECHNOLOGIES TO
MEASURED ABATEMENT COST CURVES
This chapter was written in collaboration with Dr. Edward Balistreri‡
In this chapter, a method for calibrating an industry-level technology to engineering (bottom-
up) estimates of abatement opportunities is outlined. Using electricity generation as an example
industry, substitution elasticities are adjusted in the industry-wide nested cost function to best fit
a given target marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve derived from engineering assessments of
available technologies. This is unique because the elasticities are optimized over an entire relevant
range of the MAC whereas other techniques are local approximations. In the context of fitting
to a given MAC we evaluate alternative nesting structures. We find that, while complexity in
nesting improves the fit, even relatively simple nesting structures can reasonably approximate the
target MAC. In our preferred specification we find standard elasticities adopted in top-down models
moderately overstate abatement costs relative to the engineering targets. This conclusion, however,
is sensitive to our assumption about output-intensity abatement, which is not well-specified in the
engineering estimates.
3.1 Introduction
In order to translate emissions policy into useful cost estimates we need to have a reasonable
estimate of the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve as it represents available technologies. This
is particularly challenging in the context of large-scale models built to analyze carbon policy in
a general equilibrium setting. Typically the MAC curve is an implicit outcome of the assumed
energy-demand system combined with fuel-specific carbon coefficients. The complexity of fossil
‡Associate Professor, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business, Engineering Hall, 816 15th
Street, Golden, CO 80401
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energy’s role in the economy, as well as the unprecedented nature of a significant carbon-policy
shock, precludes a direct empirical estimation and validation of the implied MAC using historical
data. As an alternative, researchers often specify their models using a collection of piecemeal evi-
dence from econometric estimates of energy responses. The problem with these approaches is that
the resulting energy-demand system will imply a MAC that may be inconsistent with engineering
assessments of available abatement technologies. For example, Figure 3.1 is an engineering as-
sessment of available technologies as published by Bloomberg (2010), and this is likely different
from the implicit MAC derived from an economic model calibrated to econometric estimates of
fuel price responses. If large policy shocks move us significantly away from the benchmark, the
information in engineering assessments is potentially useful in calibration.
Figure 3.1: MAC curve as published by Bloomberg (2010)
In this paper we pursue a general method for systematically calibrating energy-demand systems
such that the implied MAC for carbon is consistent with engineering estimates over a broad range
of abatement opportunities. We develop a fitting procedure in which the parameters of the energy-
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demand system are chosen optimally to target the location and shape of an engineering based MAC.
We apply our technique to recalibrate and perform diagnostics on three energy-demand structures
adopted in the climate-policy literature. We find that any of these structures can reasonably ap-
proximate the engineering MAC when parameterized with that goal in mind.
Many economy-wide (top-down) models include cost functions that are parameterized purely
from a local (zero-carbon-abatement) perspective. An example of the traditional approach, which
focuses on the fuel demand system is given in Böhringer et al. (2016), who cite the econometric
work of Okagawa & Ban (2008) and Steinbuks & Narayanan (2014) to support their elasticity
assumptions. In a model with an even closer tie to the underlying econometrics, Jorgenson et al.
(2013) estimate translog unit-cost functions directly to calibrate their model. These approaches
are valid methods for establishing local price responses and even important efficiency and pro-
ductivity trends. In general, however, in application they will not imply a MAC that is consistent
with bottom-up studies of available abatement technologies. Our intent is not to suggest that the
econometric calibration techniques are inappropriate, nor that the implied MACs are invalid. We
simply argue that the implied MACs are different than the bottom-up MACs, and that it is useful
to explore a reconciliation of those differences.
Some authors have taken a different approach in an effort to consider economy-wide impacts in
general equilibrium while maintaining consistency with detailed bottom-up models of the energy
system. Hybrid models have emerged that link top-down and bottom-up models. Early hybrid
models, for example ETA-Macro (Manne, 1977), used highly stylized macroeconomic optimiza-
tion models to represent the general equilibrium. A number of more recent approaches are re-
viewed by Hourcade et al. (2006) in their introduction to a special issue of The Energy Journal.
The most promising and flexible approach seems to follow the mixed-complementarity formula-
tions of Böhringer (1998) and Böhringer & Rutherford (2005). These methods accommodate a
fully consistent top-down and bottom-up representation of the activity analysis of specific tech-
nologies in an equilibrium context (where second-best considerations might be made).
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Our approach only focuses on a top-down representation of technology yet we target a given
MAC. Our analysis and methodological objective is most closely related to another approach in-
troduced by Kiuila & Rutherford (2013). In Kiuila & Rutherford (2013) they consider fitting
an aggregate abatement-cost function, based on a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) tech-
nology, to a bottom-up MAC. Their approach relies on a specific factor (abatement capacity) to
generate an upward sloping abatement supply curve. This is potentially the preferred approach
when modeling criteria pollutants (e.g., SO2 or NOx) where abatement is linked to end-of-pipe
technologies. In the case of carbon abatement, however, there is a strong physical link between
the embodied carbon in fuel use and emissions (at least up to the point that carbon capture and
sequestration dominates as the abatement technology). The explicit representation of fuel demand
in most top-down models indicates an implicit MAC as opposed to the explicit MAC calibrated by
Kiuila & Rutherford (2013). Our contribution is to show how the basic proposal of MAC fitting
in Kiuila & Rutherford (2013) can be applied in a standard top-down setting that includes a full
energy demand system.
We develop a procedure for fitting any well-specified nested CES technology that includes
fuel inputs to an arbitrary MAC curve. The input-share parameters of the CES technology are
locked down to the observed input-output accounts and a set of substitution elasticities is chosen
to minimize the difference between the implied MAC and the target MAC. To demonstrate the
procedure we adopt three different nesting structures from the literature with varying degrees of
complexity. We fit the implied MAC for electricity generation in the U.S. to a bottom-up MAC
derived from Bloomberg (2010). We find that each of the nesting structures can be parameterized
in a way that accurately reflects the target MAC. There seem to be little gain from added nesting
structure complexity across the single criteria of approximating a given MAC. Relating specific
fitted elasticities to power-system responses, however, is most natural under the nesting suggested
by Böhringer et al. (2016) (which has an intermediate level of complexity). Our demonstrations
are over a limited set of structures, but we expect the tension between parsimony and complexity
in top-down representations to persist across other structures.
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In general, the Bloomberg (2010) MAC implies lower abatement costs relative to the implied
top-down MACs at the reference elasticities for all but the more extensive nesting structure. That
is with two of the three representations, the fitted elasticities are higher implying more flexibility in
the energy demand system than normally assumed in top-down models. This finding is sensitive,
however, to our assumption about output-intensity abatement. If we allow some electricity-demand
responses to escalate costs, the top-down implied MACs indicate lower abatement costs under
some treatments.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we establish the link between the top-down
representation of technology and the implied MAC. We outline our estimation strategy in Section
2.3 and Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we consider the specific nesting structures and our methods for
incorporating the Bloomberg (2010) information as a target MAC. Results of our fitting exercises
are presented in Section 2.6, and concluding remarks are offered in Section 2.7.
3.2 Cost functions and the implied MAC
Consider a general linearly-homogeneous nested CES technology for a given industry. We
represent this technology by the associated unit cost function. The arguments in the unit cost
function are a vector of input prices given by p, but the functional outcomes also depend on a
vector of parameters. The vector of parameters includes a set of substitution elasticities, which
we will denote σ. Finding an appropriate σ is the goal of our calibration exercise, where we
assume that the other parameters of the nested CES technology (share and scale parameters) are
measured accurately in a set of consistent input-output accounts. In its most general form the unit
cost function is given by
c(p,σ) ≡min
{
p′x s.t. y(x,σ) = 1
}
, (3.1)
where x is the vector of inputs and the function y(x,σ) is a general CES technology for the industry.
Denoting industry output Y = y(x,σ) the cost function is
C(p,σ,Y) = c(p,σ)Y, (3.2)
and in a competitive equilibrium the price of output, py, equals marginal cost [py = c(p,σ)].
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Let us partition the vector of elasticities into a set to be estimated, σ̂, and an exogenously-
specified set, σ̄. The reason for partitioning is that some of the elasticities might be informed
from information that is independent of the MAC calibration. For example, one might specify
an elasticity of substitution of unity for the value-added nest to maintain the capital-labor value
shares.
A convenient way of introducing carbon emissions is to specify a set of Leontief nests for
each fuel, indexed by f ∈ F = {COL,GAS,OIL}, where the fuel input (coal, natural gas, and
refined petroleum) is combined with an emissions allowance at a maintained zero substitution rate
(σ̄ f = 0 ∀ f ∈ F). Denoting the allowance price for carbon emissions pE and the fuel price p f we
would have a set of gross fuel-input costs (denoted with an uppercase P f ) given by the Leontief
unit cost function
P f (p f , pE) = p f + γ f pE , (3.3)
where γ f is a fuel-specific carbon coefficient. Marginal abatement cost in this setup is given by
pE , which might be zero under no abatement. Emissions from the sector are a function of the
parameters, prices, and output: E(p, σ̂, σ̄,Y). This function is identified by applying Shephard’s
Lemma:










Where the right-hand term applies the chain rule to show that emissions are simply given by the
sum of fuel inputs weighted by their respective carbon coefficients.
Paired combinations of pE and E(p, σ̂, σ̄,Y) indicate the implied MAC. This relationship is
conditional on a full set of prices, the elasticities, and a given level of output. For exposition,
partition the input price vector into p̄, which includes all prices except pE . Thus emissions are given
by E( p̄, pE , σ̂, σ̄,Y), and abatement is given by the difference E( p̄,0, σ̂, σ̄,Y) − E( p̄, pE , σ̂, σ̄,Y).
This draws a clear link between the calibration of the cost function and the implied MAC in a
typical top-down formulation. Notice that the implied MAC is conditional on fixed input prices
(other than carbon) and a fixed level of output. The implied MAC is a partial equilibrium concept,
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but this is desirable to the extent that the construction of the target (bottom-up) MAC failed to
consider general-equilibrium responses.
Representing the technology with the unit-cost function is convenient for exposition but in
application the c(p,σ) that represents a typical nesting structure will be complex. We can add
variables to represent the sub-activity level at a node and the unit cost at that node to simplify the
formulation. For example, consider an assumed structure that includes a separable energy nest that
is a child to the top-level nest that combines all other inputs. We can represent the unit cost of the
energy composite as a function of the gross fuel costs plus the cost of electricity. Let us denote the
composite energy input quantity ENG, which has a price (marginal cost) of PENG. Adding these
two endogenous variables to the system requires the addition of two equilibrium conditions. First,





and second, the unit cost will be the minimum marginal cost of supplying a unit of ENG:
PENG =CENG(Pcoal,Poil,Pgas, pele). (3.6)
Emissions are still derived by applying Shephard’s Lemma, but now it is applied to the cost func-
tion for ENG, which is simply the product of ENG and its unit cost (CENG(Pcoal,Poil,Pgas, pele)).
An arbitrary nesting structure can be represented in this way, by adding two endogenous variables
(a quantity and a price) at each node. For exposition, consider collecting all of these endoge-
nous variables in the vector x, and collect all of the equilibrium conditions into the vector-valued
function
F(x, p,σ) = 0, (3.7)
which implicitly maps from the set of exogenous input prices and elasticities into the endogenous
quantities and composite prices, where the set of composite prices includes the fuel prices gross of
the emissions charge.
In our application we consider two extensions to the basic partial equilibrium system repre-
sented by F(x, p,σ) = 0. First, we add an internally consistent input-price adjustment for the
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industry’s own use of its output. In a typical set of input-output accounts a member of p will be py.
Abatement escalates the unit cost of producing Y , and this should be reflected in the price that the
industry pays for it own inputs. Second, we might also consider abatement that results from out-
put reductions. This allows us to consider that engineering estimates of MACs could include the
output-intensity abatement channel. In order to fit the CES abatement cost curve to estimates that
include output-intensity abatement we need to have a measure of output at each point on the MAC.
Adding structure to this notion we specify output demand such that Y changes as py = c(p,σ) is





where η is the demand elasticity and α is set such that we replicate benchmark output at bench-
mark marginal cost. For the central analysis in this paper we assume η = 0, but one could adopt
alternative perspectives. For example, in a set of sensitivity runs we set η = 0.5 considering that the
bottom-up MAC considers the fact that the quantity demanded falls with higher output prices.10
3.3 Non-linear estimation strategy
With the system F(x, p,σ) = 0 and output levels (Y) well-specified for changes in pE we can
proceed to estimate a set of σ̂ that fit the implied MAC to a target. Let Ê indicate emissions
from the fitted system (the implied MAC), which depends on choices over σ̂. Now consider a
target MAC, usually derived by a rank ordering of engineering estimates of available abatement
technologies, which maps allowance prices onto abatement levels over an empirical domain. From
this target MAC we can generate a set of paired observations for the vectors E0 and p0
E
. The
estimation strategy is to minimize the deviations between the E0 and Ê by choosing an appropriate
10The system defining the structural model could be generalized to includes additional flexibility in terms of incor-
porating other potential considerations in construction of the bottom-up MAC. If, for example, the engineering
estimates account for the increased cost of capital as capital is substituted for fuel, this is easily accommodated by
an added capital supply schedule. We do not include these extensions because we do not think these issues are
generally considered in the engineering assessments of the available technologies. Implicitly, by holding their prices
fixed, we are assuming a perfectly elastic supply of all inputs other than emissions allowances and the industry’s
own intermediate inputs.
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set of σ̂. Setting up the non-linear least squares problem we have:
min{σ̂} ||Ê− E
0||2
subject to: F(x, p,σ) = 0
and Y = αp
−η
y ,
where, in general, some subset of elasticities (σ̄) and input prices ( p̄) are assumed fixed.
3.4 Empirical nesting structures and the target MAC
To illustrate our fitting method we adopt three different nested CES structures previously used
in the analysis of climate and energy policy. We apply our method to the electricity generation sec-
tor of the U.S. economy. We choose electricity generation because of its prominence in emissions
generation and because there are good bottom-up engineering assessments of potential abatement
technologies. We consider multiple top-down structures that are increasing in complexity to ex-
plore their respective flexibility in accurately reflecting the target MAC.11 The three structures and
the corresponding models are as follows
• ‘Basic’ from an early version of the G-Cubed Model (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 1995).
• ‘Standard’ from a GTAPinGAMS climate-policy application (Böhringer et al., 2016).
• ‘Extended’ from the WorldScan model (Lejour et al., 2006).
Starting with the least complex ‘Basic’ nesting, illustrated in Figure 3.2, we have an output
nest at the top that combines Capital, Labor, Energy, and Materials (often denoted as KLEM)
at a constant elasticity of substitution equal to σK,L,E,M, where a comma in the subscript indicates
separable inputs in the nest. The inputs of energy and materials, however, are CES composites. The
energy composite is a CES aggregation of the fuels plus electricity, and the materials composite is
a CES aggregation of all other intermediate inputs. The elasticities in these subnests are σE and
σM, respectively.
11We only consider separable nested CES functions, which dominate the climate and energy policy literature. For a
nested CES cost function to be a true flexible functional form non-separabilities would be added (Perroni & Ruther-
ford, 1995).
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Figure 3.2: Basic nesting structure (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 1995)
Under our ‘Standard’ nesting structure, illustrated in Figure 3.3, additional complexity is added.
A value-added composite of capital and labor trades off with the energy composite directly at a
CES of σKL,E . This composite then combines with materials at the top level at a CES of σKLE,M.
Additional complexity is again added under the ‘Extended’ nesting adopted in the WorldScan
model (Figure 3.4). Under the ‘Extended’ structure a Coal and Gas-Oil nest is added to the energy
nest, which allows for a different elasticity of substitution between the various fuels. A generalized
algebraic representation of the system F(x, p,σ) = 0 for each nest is presented in Appendix C along
with calibration methods for non-scarce inputs and factor demand derivations. The code for the
partial equilibrium models and calibration exercises is available in Appendx H.
The outlined nesting structures are calibrated to the U.S. electricity-generation factor and in-
termediate input demands in the GTAPinGAMS database used in the paper by Balistreri et al.
(2015). These data are aggregated from the original GTAP9 data (Narayanan & Walmsley, 2008).
The GTAP data establish the CES scale and distribution parameters. GTAP also provides a set of
default response (elasticity) parameters, but we do not use these. Rather we adopt those elasticities
assumed by the authors associated with each nesting structure.
The target MAC for the U.S. electricity sector is derived from Bloomberg (2010). We use
Bloomberg’s compiled assessment of the 2030 U.S. MAC curve with current policies. We filter
out those technologies that are specific to electricity generation to generate the target MAC. The
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Figure 3.3: Standard nesting structure (Böhringer et al., 2016)
Figure 3.4: Extended nesting structure (Lejour et al., 2006)
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technologies that we consider are presented in the derived MAC for electricity generation, Fig-
ure 3.5. Typical of a bottom-up assessment of available technologies notice that there are some
technologies that are measured to have negative or zero cost. This is inconsistent with optimiza-
tion in the benchmark. To reconcile the target with the structural model we employ alternative
scaling methods following Kiuila & Rutherford (2013). The scaling methods are as follows:
• ‘A’ shifts the MAC upward by the absolute value of the minimum price,
• ‘B’ treats negative costs as zero but retains their abatement quantities,
• ‘C’ removes all negative costs and their associated abatement quantities.
The bottom-up target MAC represents a step function as each additional abatement technology,
at a higher cost, is employed. We select the midpoint of the step as the cost associated with
abatement as each new technology is adopted. The constructed target MACs are presented in
Figure 3.6. Specific measures of abatement costs are taken as digital measurements off of the
Bloomberg (2010) graphics.
Figure 3.5: Filtered abatement cost curve, original data from Bloomberg (2010)
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Figure 3.6: Target abatement cost curves
3.5 Results
We solve the non-linear least squares problem presented in section 2.2 where the system
F(x, p,σ) = 0 is specified to represent the proposed nesting structures. Observations on the fit-
ted and target levels of abatement are made by applying alternative CO2 prices (given by the price
points in Figure 3.6). Initially we assume no electricity-output demand response (η = 0). Table 3.1
shows the reference and optimized elasticities across the different nesting structures and scaling
methods for the Bloomberg MAC. The reference elasticities are taken from literature applications
of the corresponding nesting structure. In general we find that the reference elasticities are some-
what lower than the optimized elasticities with the Basic and Standard nesting structures. However
the opposite is true in the Extended nesting structure. This indicates that the top-down applications
assume higher implied abatement costs relative to the bottom-up target, a point generally illustrated
in Figure 3.7 where the dotted curves are the implied CES MACs at the reference elasticities (’Un-
fitted’) and the dashed curves are best fit (’Fitted’) curves. Figure 3.8 focuses on scaling method B
to illustrate the reference and fitted curves.
The different nesting structures indicate elasticity escalation at different nodes. For example,
in the Basic nesting structure elasticity expansion is at the KLEM level, but in the Standard nest-
ing structure the elasticities are expanded at the substitution between value added (KL) and the
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Figure 3.7: Target (solid black), unfitted (dotted blue), and fitted (dashed red) MACs across struc-
tures and scaling methods
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Table 3.1: Reference and fitted elasticities across structures and scaling methods
Basic Scaling Method
Reference A B C
σE 0.20 0.51 0.71 0.55
σK,L,E,M 0.76 4.30 4.96 4.63
Standard
Reference A B C
σE 0.50 0.51 0.71 0.55
σKL,E 0.26 4.48 5.26 4.92
σKLE,M 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.02
Extended Nesting
Reference A B C
σGO 0.50 4.08 4.65 4.49
σC,GO 0.70 0.32 0.48 0.35
σE 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
σKL,E 0.50 0.00 0.09 0.00
σKLE,M 0.00 2.79 3.15 0.05
energy nest. In the case of the Basic structure, however, the only parameter available to increase is
σK,L,E,M, and when this is increased the rate of substitution with materials must also increase. This
may be cast as an unappealing property of the restrictive nesting structure, if the actual technology
does not include significant substitution into materials (as opposed to capital) in response to carbon
pricing.
With the Extended nesting structure we also see significant differences in where the technology
becomes more responsive. Unlike the Basic and Standard structures, the location of elasticity
expansion under the Extended structure is sensitive to the particular MAC scaling method. With
scaling methods A and B we see that the bottom and top nests of the Extended nesting structure
(σGO and σKLE,M) increase dramatically whereas all the nests in-between become more inelastic.
With scaling method C, however, we see that only the bottom nest elasticity increases whereas all
other decrease.
We see trade offs between the level of parsimony in the nesting structure and the actual tech-
nology in the power sector. To the extent that we focus on top-down representations this tension
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Figure 3.8: Similarity in fitted MACs across structures (scaling method B)
is not resolved by our fitting procedure. Regardless of how well we may fit the overall MAC it is
not clear that we pick the correct margins for adjusting the CES technology. That said, accurately
representing the overall MAC might be quite useful in communicating how different structures
generate different outcomes. It is useful in this context to measure the gains from complexity.
Table 3.2 reports the level of the least-squares objectives across the estimations. In general, there
seems to be little relative gains, in terms of fit, to added complexity. In these estimations we are
optimizing over a set of elasticities. As a lesson, freeing the full set of elasticities (in the structures
that we consider) results in some elasticities being adjusted such that the target MAC is reasonably
approximated. It remains a judgment call as to whether the correct elasticities are adjusted.
Table 3.2: Minimized objective (sum of squared errors) across structures and scaling methods
A B C
Basic 0.4841 0.1169 0.0659
Standard 0.4838 0.1168 0.0657
Extended 0.4685 0.1078 0.0632
Looking at Table 3.2 we see that the non-convexities implied by scaling method A make it
significantly more difficult for the CES technology to represent the target MAC. Recall that scaling
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method A shifts the target MAC up by an amount equal to the most negative-cost technology. This
is apparent in the first column of graphs in Figure 3.7. Under scaling methods B and C, where
the negative-cost technologies are either set to zero or ignored, the MAC is more convex and the
overall CES fit is better. Figure 3.8 focuses on scaling method B to illustrate the reference and
fitted curves. Again the key take away is that the optimized curves are almost identical, although
in Table 3.2 we do see that more complexity does offer a slightly better fit (in terms of a smaller
sum of squared errors).
In Table 3.3 we report a set of diagnostics on the component contributions of each estimated
parameter. We again focus on scaling method B and consider sequentially freeing up different
combinations of elasticities while other elasticities are held at their reference values. In a given row
of the table an elasticity embellished with a ‘bar’ is held at its reference value, while an elasticity
embellished with a ‘hat’ is optimized and the optimized value of the elasticity is in boldface type.
Notice that significant improvement in fit is available by simply freeing up the energy elasticity
(σE) which allows for fuel substitution as well as some electricity substitution. This is not very
appealing, however, relative to cases where both σE and σKL,E are optimized because this includes
the opportunity for energy to substitute more freely with value added inputs.
Table 3.3: Component contributions of elasticities to the overall fit (standard nesting structure with
scaling method B)
Elasticity ObjVal Optimal as % of Reference
σ̄E=0.50 σ̄KL,E=0.26 σ̄KLE,M=0.10 0.52 100.0%
σ̂E=0.74 σ̄KL,E=0.26 σ̄KLE,M=0.10 0.12 23.7%
σ̄E=0.50 σ̂KL,E=∞ σ̄KLE,M=0.10 0.42 80.1%
σ̄E=0.50 σ̄KL,E=0.26 σ̂KLE,M=40.03 0.52 99.99%
σ̂E=0.71 σ̂KL,E=5.25 σ̄KLE,M=0.10 0.12 22.4%
σ̂E=0.74 σ̄KL,E=0.26 σ̂KLE,M=12.13 0.12 23.7%
σ̄E=0.50 σ̂KL,E=∞ σ̂KLE,M=0.00 0.42 80.1%
σ̂E=0.71 σ̂KL,E=5.26 σ̂KLE,M=0.04 0.12 22.4%
We now turn to a set of fitting exercises where we consider elastic electricity demand. In
particular we set η = 0.5. This has two main impacts. First, our ability to fit the target MAC is
improved because output-intensity based abatement is available. Second, relative to the reference
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elasticities the fitted elasticities imply very little input flexibility in the production structure. The
fitted optimal elasticities across nesting structures and scaling methods are presented in Table 3.4.
With elastic demand we find that under the reference substitution elasticities the implied top-down
MAC greatly understates abatement costs relative to the target with the Basic and Standard nesting
structures. This is opposite of the case under inelastic demand (and this is at a modest demand
elasticity of 0.5). While fit is improved, the fitted elasticities are unstable due to the reliance on
output-intensity abatement. In each of the nesting structures we see that the optimal fit is with very
low input substitution elasticities. This drives the technology to escalated abatement costs that are
dominated by output reductions.
Table 3.4: Reference and fitted elasticity values by nesting structure and MAC scaling method with
elastic demand (η = 0.5)
Basic Scaling Method
Reference A B C
σE 0.20 0.06 0.39 0.19
σK,L,E,M 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard
Reference A B C
σE 0.50 0.08 0.40 0.20
σKL,E 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
σKLE,M 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10
Extended Nesting
Reference A B C
σGO 0.50 2.82 5.12 4.99
σC,GO 0.70 0.00 0.22 0.04
σE 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
σKL,E 0.50 0.00 0.36 0.00
σKLE,M 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Figure 3.9 shows the reference and fitted MACs when we have elastic electricity demand.
In terms of overall fit we do not see a great deal of variation across structures, again because
of the heavy reliance on output reductions for abatement. The accuracy of the fitted curves to
the MAC data does not vary greatly by nesting structure, regardless of MAC scaling method.
48
Table 3.5 presents the values of the objective functions (sum of squared errors) under the different
treatments. Comparing these values to those presented in Table 3.2 we see significant improvement
in the overall fit. Our read, however, is that there is less useful information in the estimates of
substitution elasticities. First, most abatement is through the output channel. Second, it is not
clear to us that the engineering assessments of abatement technologies actually considers output
changes. So, although output reductions are a real economic response, it may not be appropriate
to consider these when targeting a MAC derived from engineering assessments.
Figure 3.9: Target (solid black), Reference (dotted blue), and Fitted (dashed red) MACs across
structures and scaling methods with elastic demand (η = 0.5)
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Table 3.5: Minimized objective (sum of squared errors) across structures and scaling methods with
elastic demand (η = 0.5)
A B C
Basic 0.2791 0.0988 0.0300
Standard 0.2085 0.0947 0.0219
Extended 0.1940 0.0942 0.0172
3.6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates a method by which bottom-up engineering assessments of abatement
technologies can be incorporated into a standard CES representation. This method is useful for
reconciling the MACs implied in a standard top-down model with beliefs about future technolo-
gies. Contemporary methods for calibrating nested CES technologies might be quite appropriate
in their examination of fuel demand responses to variation in prices. The danger, however, is that
significant carbon abatement might pull us considerably away from historical price changes. Fur-
thermore, price variability as observed in the data is not the same as a simultaneous escalation of
fuel prices based on their carbon coefficients. The tools developed here have significant potential
as an alternative calibration method.
While we find the method sound it is only useful to the extent that we have an accurate target
MAC that is well understood. We found it challenging to understand and adopt an ‘off-the-shelf’
MAC as published. Negative abatement costs are generally inconsistent with the behavioral as-
sumptions built into any equilibrium model. We dealt with negative abatement costs with various
scaling methods as proposed by Kiuila & Rutherford (2013). This is not entirely satisfying, how-
ever, because it would be better to know how these negative costs were estimated and how they
might be reconciled with economic behavior. We also found ourselves questioning the specific
input-pricing and output demand conditions under which a given target MAC is appropriate. Our
suspicion is that these issues were simply not considered in the development of the target MAC.
This lead to our central assumption that demand is perfectly inelastic and input prices are fixed.
Given their application in policy debates it is troubling that bottom-up MAC assessments do not
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consider that consumers respond to prices, but that is our current read. In our application we found
that the CES calibration was very sensitive to our assumption about output demand responses.
Under our central assumptions we found that the best fit elasticities were generally larger than
those adopted in general-equilibrium models. In particular, the evidence suggests that the bottom-
up technologies imply more substitution between energy (fuel inputs) and value added. This is
not surprising given that bottom-up MACs are specifically focused on new technologies, while the
typical CES calibration relies on local responses to changes in fuel prices. While there is nothing
wrong with using evidence on local price changes to inform the CES calibration, there is potentially
other information available that could yield more accurate responses to large policy changes. Our
contribution is to develop and illustrate a method by which a CES technology can be fitted to a
target MAC over an entire relevant range.
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CHAPTER 4
ELECTRICITY STORAGE EXACERBATES THE INEFFICIENCY OF TRADABLE
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
This chapter was written in collaboration with Dr. Jared Carbone††
In this chapter, we demonstrate that electricity storage exacerbates the inefficiency of a trad-
able performance standard (TPS) imposed on carbon emitted through electricity generation. In the
first-best policy, removing limits on intertemporal generation through the introduction of electric-
ity storage is beneficial. However, a TPS represents a second-best scenario and storage exacerbates
its inherent inefficiency. The inherent inefficiency of a TPS results from the combination of price-
responsive demand and the implicit subsidy on low carbon generators, resulting in greater amounts
of low carbon generation relative to the first-best policy. Electricity storage increases the supply
elasticity of low carbon generation and therefore allows for a greater demand response12 and fur-
ther inefficiency. To estimate the loss in social surplus from the introduction of storage under a
TPS, we model hourly electricity dispatch in 2030 for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT) with and without storage over twelve representative days that vary in season (spring,
summer, autumn, winter) and load (low, average, and peak). We find that including electricity stor-
age decreases the benefits of a TPS relative to a TPS without storage where benefits are measured
here as increases in electricity consumption or in electricity generators’ profits. We demonstrate
that the distribution between consumers and producers of social surplus losses from introducing
storage under a TPS depends on the change in the TPS permit price from the introduction of stor-
age. Through aggregating the representative days, we estimate that introducing 5 GW of storage
††Associate Professor, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business, Engineering Hall, 816 15th
Street, Golden, CO 80401
12Note that in our context demand response is the response of consumption to changes in prices. In the context of a
TPS the demand response will typically focus on the increase in low carbon generation beyond the first-best level
given its implicit subsidy. This does mean to convey demand response technologies that curtail consumption during
peak periods.
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in 2030 under a 800 lbs CO2 per Mwh TPS target results in 5.3 million 2015 dollars of lost annual
ERCOT social surplus. Losses in representative days range from 0.1% to 7% in the low winter and
peak summer days, respectively, which amount to an annual loss in the change in social surplus
of 3.8% when storage is introduced under a TPS relative to when storage is not available. The
reduction of social surplus is robust across a range of fuel price, generation capacity, and storage
capacity assumptions. Under all combinations of assumptions, introducing storage under a 800 lbs
CO2 per MWh TPS target leads to a range of lost annual ERCOT social surplus between 2.4 to
16.5 million 2015 dollars, or between 1.4% and 7.9% of the change in social surplus when storage
is not included under a TPS.
4.1 Introduction
In this work, we ask: “Does electricity storage increase or decrease the efficiency of a tradable
performance standard?” From 2010 to 2015, the levelized cost of lithium ion batteries intended for
grid-scale electricity storage decreased by 50% and a survey of industry experts indicated it could
drop a further 47% from 2015 levels by 2020 (Lazard, 2015). Tradable performance standards
(TPS) have recently been considered in various forms for reducing pollution, examples being the
US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Power Plan (CPP), the EPA’s lead phaseout
program, and California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (CA LCFS). To the best of our knowledge,
the interactions of the quickly-emerging grid scale electricity storage and a TPS have yet to be
explored.
As Burtraw et al. (2012) explain, with a TPS the regulator chooses a target rate as an amount
of pollution per unit of output. Sources that pollute below the target rate earn an implicit subsidy
through the credits they generate and sell; sources that pollute above the target rate face an implicit
tax through the necessity of purchasing credits to meet the standard. A TPS encourages substitution
from high-emitting to low-emitting sources but the implicit subsidy on output leads to an efficiency
loss with price-responsive demand when compared to the equivalent carbon tax or aggregate emis-
sions limit. In a seminal work on the economics of a TPS, Holland et al. (2009) indicate that a
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TPS cannot achieve the first-best outcome unless the low carbon fuel has zero emissions. Multiple
studies have demonstrated this inefficiency and have found that, although distributional impacts
may vary, the TPS results in less social benefit than the first-best alternative (Burtraw et al., 2014;
Bushnell et al., 2015; Fischer, 2003; McKibbin et al., 2015; Paul et al., 2014).
The purpose of this paper is to develop and test hypotheses on the conditions which lead to
decreased social surplus when electricity storage is introduced under a TPS. To do this, we expand
on the social planner’s problem from Holland et al. (2009) by adding a second period as well as
the ability to store electricity. From the social planner’s problem we develop three propositions on
the interaction of a TPS and electricity storage. We then present a simulation model of electricity
market equilibrium focusing on hourly generation for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT) in 2030. The model simulates electricity dispatch for twelve separate days that vary
by season (spring, summer, autumn, and winter) as well as demand day type (average, peak, and
low). The simulations vary in the stringency of the TPS target, electricity storage capacity, the
relative price of the low carbon generation technology (natural gas) to the high carbon generation
technology (coal), and the level of low carbon generation capacity.
The contribution of this paper is the demonstration of a counterintuitive relationship between
electricity storage and a TPS. Electricity storage is beneficial without an emissions policy or un-
der the first-best policy (a Pigouvian tax or equivalent aggregate emisisons limit) but is harmful
when introduced under a TPS with price-responsive demand. Note that the combination of price-
responsive demand and the implicit subsidy on low carbon generation leads to overproduction of
low carbon generation and is the source of the inherent inefficiency of the TPS. Introducing stor-
age is demonstrated to increase the supply elasticity of low carbon generation in peak periods and
further exacerbate the inherent inefficiency of a TPS by allowing a greater level of the inefficient
low carbon generation. We simulate a wide array of conditions under which the benefits to society
are reduced when storaged is introduced under a TPS. The distributional impacts from introducing
storage under a TPS are shown to depend on the change of the TPS permit price.
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The propositions and results indicate that a TPS with electricity storage will result in less
social benefit. The distributional impacts depend on the change in the permit price when storage is
introduced. When the introduction of storage reduces the TPS permit price, consumers gain, high
carbon producers gain, but low carbon producers lose. However, the opposite is true when the TPS
permit price increases with the introduction of storage. When storage is introduced under a TPS,
the social surplus losses always outweigh the benefits but the distributional impacts vary across
representative days, electricity storage capacity, and TPS target rates. Low natural gas prices and
increased renewable availability both contribute to a lesser-binding TPS and decrease the losses
associated with introducing storage under a TPS.
The paper is structured as follows. First, the social planner’s problem and accompanying propo-
sitions are presented. Second, the hourly model of ERCOT dispatch with storage is presented.
Third, we present the data used in the simulation model. Fourth, the results are presented. Finally,
we discuss the implications of these results.
4.2 Theory and propositions
This section serves to compare the theoretical outcomes of the first-best and TPS policies. First,
we present the assumptions for consumption benefits, generation costs, and the general model setup
followed by the first-best policy with storage. Next, we present a representative, price-taking firm
facing a TPS and vary the assumption on whether storage is available or not. Finally, we include
elastic demand in a consumer and producer surplus maximization problem to demonstrate the
increase inefficiency when storage is introduced under a TPS and demand is price-responsive. The
proofs of the propositions are presented in Appendix D.
4.2.1 First-best with storage
Consider the social planner’s problem from Holland et al. (2009) with the addition of a second
time period. The first-best outcome without storage has been demonstrated by several other analy-
ses and therefore we focus on the first-best outcome with storage. Our social planner’s problem is
to maximize net benefits computed as benefits less costs of generation and less costs of pollution
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damages. A dollar measure of benefits from electricity consumption, U, is a function of generation
consumed in time t yet occuring in time tt from different technologies f , X f ,t,tt. The benefits func-
tion is assumed to maintain diminishing marginal benefits (i.e. U′ > 0 and U′′ < 0) while being dif-
ferentiable, concave, and additive in a specific time period; for example U(At,Bt) = U(At)+U(Bt).
The technology set consists of low (L) and high (H) carbon generation technologies such that
f ∈ {L,H}. Each technology has its associated emissions intensity, β f (with βL < βH) and emis-
sions cause τ dollars of damage. Next we describe the method of allowing generation to move
across time periods, followed by the assumptions behind generation costs, and finally we set up
the social planner’s problem.
In the simulation model there are 24 time periods to represent an entire day but in these the-
oretical representations there are only two periods such that t, tt ∈ {1,2}. Only generation in the
first period can be used in the second period. This assignment of intertemporal feasibility provides
three generation variables for each technology: 1) generation occurring and consumed in the first
period, X f ,1,1 2) generation stored in the first period and consumed in the second period X f ,2,1
and 3) generation occuring and consumed in the second period (X f ,2,2). The amount of stored
generation from all technologies is limited by the capacity of electricity storage, Ē.
Marginal costs for each technology category are based on the level of output, c f (X f ,t,tt), and as-
sumed to be increasing and convex (i.e. c′
f
> 0 and c′′
f
> 0). Total costs of generation, C f ,t,tt(X f ,t,tt),
that is contemporaneously generated and consumed (i.e. t = tt) is the integral from zero to the
generation level for each generation technology:
C f ,t,tt(X f ,t,tt) =
∫ X f ,t,tt
0
c f (X)dX ∀ t = tt, f (4.1)
The costs of stored generation (i.e. X f ,2,1) are computed from the portion of the marginal cost
curve above generation that occurred and was consumed in the first period (i.e. X f ,1,1). The costs
of generation for the electricity that is stored are therefore computed as:
C f ,2,1(X f ,2,1) =
∫ X f ,2,1
X f ,1,1
c f (X)dX ∀ f (4.2)
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The marginal costs of electricity stored will begin where marginal costs of electricity generated and
consumed in the first period end. Therefore, given the assumption of increasing marginal costs, we
know that13 c f (X f ,1,1 + X f ,2,1) > c f (X f ,1,1)
With the social cost per unit of emissions (τ) and the emissions factors (βF), we can compute
total damages from emissions from electricity generation as
∑
f ,t,tt τβ f X f ,t,tt. This framework allow
us to set up the following social planner’s problem for the first-best policy with storage as the
maximization of a dollar measure of benefits from electricity consumption (U) less the total costs
of electricity generation (C f ) and less total damages from emissions:
max
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X f ,2,1 ≥ 0 (4.4)










C f ,t,tt(X f ,t,tt)−
∑
f ,t,tt
τβ f X f ,t,tt + λE(Ē −
∑
f
X f ,2,1) (4.5)
For brevity, we denote the resulting marginal costs of generation for each generation technol-
ogy, time consumed, and time generated combination as MC f ,t,tt = c f (X f ,t,tt) and given the as-
sumption of additive benefits we can denote ∂Ut
∂X f ,t,tt
as MU f ,t,tt. Therefore, our first order conditions
in the first-best social planner’s problem are:
∂L
∂X f ,1,1
= MU f ,1,1 −MC f ,1,2 − τβ f = 0 ∀ f (4.6)
∂L
∂X f ,1,2
= MU f ,1,2 −MC f ,1,2 − λE − τβ f = 0 ∀ f (4.7)
∂L
∂X f ,2,2
= MU f ,2,2 −MC f ,2,2 − τβ f = 0 ∀ f (4.8)
13More specifically, given two different production levels, A and B, c f (A) < c f (B) over the range 0 ≤ A ≤ X f ,1,1 ≤ B ≤
(X f ,1,1 + X f ,1,2
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From Equations 4.7 and 4.8, the shadow value of the electricity storage capacity constraint
will equalize the marginal costs between generation consumed in the second period (i.e. λE +
MC f ,1,2 = MC f ,2,2). We can generalize Equations 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 such that the first-best outcome,
presented in Equations 4.9 and 4.10, is apparent. To elaborate, the first-best first order condition
for generation indicates that the marginal utility from consumption equates the marginal costs of
generation plus the generation’s marginal damages to society from its emissions.
MU f ,t,tt = MC f ,t,tt + τβ f ∀ f , t = tt (4.9)
MU f ,2,1 = MC f ,2,1 + λE + τβ f ∀ f (4.10)
In a competitive market where firms ignore the damages to society from emissions, firms over-
produce and equate marginal costs to price, pt (i.e. pt = MC f ,t,tt). With τ set at the appropriate
level of social damage per output of carbon, whether through a Pigouvian tax or equivalent cap-
and-trade policy, pt = MUt = MC f ,t,tt + τβ f and the socially-efficient outcome prevails.
4.2.2 Representative price-taking firm with a TPS
Similar to Holland et al. (2009), we now demonstrate the inefficiency associated with a TPS
with a single, price-taking, representative firm. Expanding on Holland et al. (2009), we compare a
firm that has storage capabilities with one that does not.
Consider a price-taking firm in a competitive market with the same cost assumptions as those
in the social planner’s problem. The firm sells electricity generation consumed in each period at
the market price, pt. We assume
14 p2 > p1 to represent the difference between the peak period
price (p2) and off-peak period prices (p1). Revenue is computed as the product of the quantity of
electricity consumed and the market price for each period. As opposed to an emissions tax in the
previous problem with the first-best outcome, the firm must now have its average emissions rate
(carbon intensity) meet the TPS target, Φ, where βL < Φ < βH:
14Note that this is a price-taking firm and price is not yet endogenous. However, in the following section we will
denote a demand curve as Qt(Pt) and for Q1(P1) = Q2(P2), P2 > P1; that is, for the same quantity across periods the
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(4.11)
Rearranging terms we can express the TPS constraint such that the total emissions at the TPS target




X f ,t,tt ≥
∑
f ,t,tt
β f X f ,t,tt (4.12)
In order to compare the difference between a firm lacking or having storage, we develop a
general form of the firm’s profit maximization problem devoid of intertemporal generation feasi-
bility designations, presented in Equation 4.13. Now, under a TPS, the social costs of pollution
(
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X f ,2,1 ≥ 0 (4.15)




ptX f ,t,tt −
∑
f ,t,tt
C f ,t,tt(X f ,t,tt)− φ(Φ
∑
f ,t,tt
X f ,t,tt −
∑
f ,t,tt
β f X f ,t,tt)+ λE(Ē −
∑
f
X f ,2,1) (4.16)
Without storage, the set of first order conditions for the firm’s profit optimization pertain to
generation that is contemporaneously generated and consumed (i.e. X f ,t,tt∀t = tt) as presented in
Equation 1. Note that this first order condition indicates that the firm equates price of electricity
(pt) with the marginal costs of generation plus the implicit tax (when the emissions factor exceeds
the TPS target rate, i.e. βF > Φ) or minus the implicit subsidy (when the generator’s emissions
factor is less than the TPS target rate, i.e. βF < Φ):
∂L
∂X f ,t,tt
= pt −MC f ,t,tt + φ(Φ− β f ) = 0 ∀ f , t = tt (4.17)
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When the representative firm has the capability to utilize storage, Equation 4.18 is added to the set
of first order conditions. This is the same as the first order condition for contemporaneous gen-




= p2 −MC f ,2,1 − λE + φ(Φ− β f ) = 0 ∀ f (4.18)
Rearranging Equations 4.17 and 4.18, respectively:
pt = MC f ,t,tt + φ(β f −Φ) ∀ f , t = tt (4.19)
p2 = MC f ,2,1 + λE + φ(β f −Φ) ∀ f (4.20)
Equations 4.19 and 4.20 present the inherent inefficiency of a TPS. Since βL < Φ, the low
carbon generation is implicitly subsidized even though its emissions produce the same damage
as the high carbon technology albeit at a lower rate. As Holland et al. (2009) indicate, as long
as βL > 0 the first best outcome is impossible since 0 < βL < Φ and thus φ(βL − Φ) < 0 < τ.
The derivation of the representative, price-taking firm’s first order conditions leads to our first
proposition.
Proposition 1: Assuming no change in the TPS permit price and infinite storage capacity, a
price-taking firm’s low carbon generation will be greatest when storage is introduced under a TPS
relative to either the first-best policy with storage, a TPS without storage, or absent any policy.
Proposition 1 follows since a TPS presents the ideal conditions for stored low carbon generation
consumed. Because the second period offers the highest marginal revenue (p2) with the implicit
subsidy under a TPS for low carbon generation, a TPS with storage offers the most-advantageous
combination of marginal revenue and least marginal costs for stored low carbon generation. By
assuming the increase in stored low carbon generation does not affect the second period price, we
can be certain the stored low carbon generation doesn’t simply displace contemporaneous second
period generation. The infinite storage capacity assumption is necessary in this proposition because
we cannot be certain that the TPS with storage would increase more than the first-best with storage
if both are bounded by storage capacity. The potential for the TPS permit price to change with the
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increase in low carbon generation is explored further below.
4.2.3 TPS with elastic demand
Similar to Fell et al. (2015), we denote a price-responsive inverse demand curve as the function
Pt(
∑
f ,tt≥t X f ,t,tt, pt) where pt now refers to a reference price. To reflect the relationship of peak
period to low period demand, for the same quantity across periods the market clearing price is
always higher in the peak period. The equilibrium in a competitive market can be solved as the
maximization of net benefits, computed as consumer surplus less producer costs. Simplifying the
equations by designating the quantity consumed as Qt =
∑
f ,tt≥t X f ,t,tt, net benefits are computed
as the integral of the inverse demand curve from zero to Qt less costs of generation. The social
planner’s problem still aims to maximize the dollar measure of benefits from consumption (U) less
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= −MC f ,t,tt + λt − φ(Φ− β f ) = 0 ∀ f , t = tt (4.27)
∂L
∂X f ,2,1
= −MC f ,2,1 + λ2 − λE − φ(Φ− β f ) = 0 ∀ f (4.28)
From Equation 4.27 it is straightforward that λt = Pt(Qt, pt). Recalling that Qt =
∑
f ,tt≥t X f ,t,tt,








X f ,2,tt, p2) = MC f ,2,1 + λE + φ(β f −Φ) ∀ f (4.30)
The derivation of the first order conditions allows us to graphically represent the demand re-
sponse of low carbon generation and inherent inefficiency of including storage under a TPS in
the low carbon market. We present the logic behind the increased inefficiency in the low carbon
generation market15 from the introduction of storage under a TPS with elastic demand graphically
in Figure 4.1. The graph presents the logic behind our findings with linear marginal cost and in-
verse demand curves. In Figure 4.1, any function, price (PL,t, represented on the vertical axis),
or quantity of low carbon fuel supplied (qL,t, represented on the horizontal) marked with an apos-
trophe (′) represents the outcome with storage whereas the absence of an apostrophe indicates the
outcome without storage. The point of divergence of the marginal cost curves, z, is determined
by the intersection of the first period demand curve (P(Q1, p1)) and the marginal cost curve. After
the point of divergence, the marginal costs without storage (MCL(qL)) continue on a straight path.
The marginal costs with storage (MC
′
L
(qL)) diverge as generation can simulatenously occur in the
first and second period at the same marginal cost, increasing the supply elasticity of low carbon
generation available for consumption in the second period. Therefore, marginal costs with storage
beyond the level of first period consumption represent the horizontal sum of the first and second
period marginal costs of generation.
15For brevity and to avoid repetition, any mention of marginal costs, price, or quantity in this and the next two para-
graphs will be in reference to the low carbon generation market
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Figure 4.1: Graphical depiction of low carbon generation market under a TPS with and without
storage
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). With storage and without a TPS, the price decreases and the quantity




), designated by point a′. Low carbon generators
under a TPS increase production to c and c′ while receiving prices PL,2 and P
′
L,2
. However, the low
carbon generators receive the implicit subsidy16 of φ(Φ−βL) due to overcompliance and therefore
without storage would sell qL,2φ(Φ− βL) and q
‘
L,2
φ(Φ− βL) worth of carbon permits. Low carbon
producer surplus would increase by areas abde and a′b′d′e′. In this graph of only the low carbon
generation market, the portion of lost consumer and producer surplus (excluding changes in the
high carbon generation market) without storage is represented by areas abc and a′b′c′, the latter
being larger and representing a greater loss in producer and consumer surplus with storage under
a TPS. This representation with elastic demand and its associated diagram lead to the next four
propositions.
Proposition 2: With price-responsive demand, a TPS with storage will have greater low carbon
generation relative to a TPS without storage. All else equal, the availability of stored low carbon
generation will decrease the TPS permit price thereby reducing the implicit tax on high carbon
generation and increasing high carbon generation.
There are two mechanisms through which generation increases under a TPS with storage, the
second is discussed in the next paragraph. The first mechanism is a demand response. The price
in the first period determines the starting point of the marginal costs of stored generation and is
assumed to be less than the price in the second period, given the relative locations of the demand
curves. Since marginal costs of stored generation are less than the equilibrium price without stor-
age, the stored electricity will decrease the second period price in a competitive market. This price
decrease causes a demand response and represents the first mechanism through which storage in-
creases generation. The inherit subsidy of low carbon generation furthers the competitiveness of
stored generation and results in a greater demand response than if a TPS were not enforced.
16We have kept the implicit subsidy amount, indicated by lengths bc = b′c′, equal with and without storage but this
could change based on the change in permit price from the introduction of storage. This is discussed further in the
Proof of Proposition 2.
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The second potential mechanism through which storage could increase generation is through
the effect of increased low carbon generation on the TPS permit price. As is shown in the ac-
companying proof, an increase in stored low carbon generation, all else equal, will decrease the
TPS permit price. However, a definitive decrease in the TPS permit price relies on: 1) stored low
carbon generation not entirely displacing second period low carbon generation and 2) the response
of high carbon generation to an increase in stored low carbon generation. This is detailed more in
the Proof of Proposition 2 presented in Appendix D.
Note that there are two types of prevailing demand responses. The first is the demand response
for low carbon generation in particular given the implicit subsidy under the TPS which, as (Holland
et al., 2009) indicate, will always be non-negative. The second type of demand response results
from changes in the equilibrium electricity price. As we demonstrate in Proposition 5, the demand
response to the resulting equilibrium electricity price typically depends on the change to the TPS
permit price with the introduction of storage.
Proposition 3: With price-responsive but inelastic demand and an equal or reduced TPS permit
price with the introduction of storage, the gains to the low carbon generator’s producer surplus
under a TPS will be less with storage than without.
As Holland et al. (2009) indicate, unless the supply of low carbon generation is perfectly in-
elastic, low carbon generators will be better off under a TPS. If low carbon generation supply is
perfectly inelastic, low carbon generators will neither gain nor lose under a TPS. The gains to low
carbon generators’ producer surplus, represented by areas dbae without storage and d′b′a′e′ with
storage in Figure 4.1, will be less with the increased supply elasticity given inelastic demand and
no change or a reduction in the TPS permit price. The decrease in gains for low carbon producers
with the introduction of storage under a TPS is due to two factors. First, second period revenue has
decreased due to price-responsive but inelastic demand and an increase in quantity demanded. Sec-
ond, the total costs of generation must also increase. This is detailed further in the accompanying
proof.
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Proposition 4: With price-responsive demand, a TPS with storage will be increasingly more
inefficient than a TPS without storage the greater the difference between peak and low period
demand.
The incentive for generators to produce more in the first period for use in the second period
is given by the relative difference in electricity prices. The difference in electricity price will
be further increased the greater the peak demand is relative to the off-peak demand. As the two
periods’ prices separate, the incentive for utilizing the first period’s generation in the second period
is increased along with the demand response through decreased price. The opposite is true as well,
a smaller difference between the two period’s demand will bring about less of a demand response
in low carbon generation from the first period used in the second period.
Proposition 5: When low carbon generation is constrained by its capacity, demand is not fully
satiated with low carbon generation, and marginal costs for high carbon generation are greater
than the marginal costs for low carbon generation for the same quantity generated, an increase in
the TPS permit price with the introduction of storage will increase low carbon generators’ profits
but consumers will be worse off.
This proposition is generalizable to any electricity system change that increases the TPS permit
price under the same marginal cost assumptions and not just the introduction of electricity storage.
The market price is determined by the intersection of the marginal cost and the inverse demand
curves. If low carbon generation is bounded by its capacity, demand is not fully satiated with
low carbon generation, and if marginal costs for high carbon generation are greater than marginal
costs of low carbon generation, the market price will be determined by the high carbon generator’s
marginal costs. If the TPS permit price increases, the equilibrium market price will increase given
the increased implicit tax on high carbon generation. The increases to market price and TPS
permit price both serve to increase the profits of low carbon generators through increased revenue
and increased implicit subsidies, respectively. The higher price entails reduced quantity demanded
and will leave consumers worse off.
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Although the assumptions in Proposition 5 seem extensive, they are typically seen in our sim-
ulations of the electricity generation market. With the falling prices of natural gas from 2012-2017
which are expected to continue falling and the low marginal costs of wind and solar, less carbon
intensive generation is cost-effective but bounded by its capacity. As demonstrated by the sim-
ulations below, reference demand in peak hours is often above the cumulative capacity of low
carbon generation. Therefore, the simulation model’s market price is frequently determined by the
marginal costs of high carbon generators. An increase in the TPS permit price, with this set of
assumptions all and else equal, will increase the marginal costs of high carbon generation and thus
increase price and reduce quantity demanded.
4.3 Simulation model
The simulation model is similar to the social planner’s problem with some differences. First,
the simulation expands the time period set from two periods to 24 hours over 12 separate days
representative of ERCOT demand. The 12 days vary in season (spring, summer, autumn, winter)
and load (low, average, peak). Second, in the simulation model all generating units are represented
which leads to further disaggregation than if we were to only represent low and high carbon gen-
erators through two distinct supply curves such as Holland et al. (2009). Finally, although supply
costs are monotonically increasing, the typical assumption of convex supply costs does not hold
with the simulation model’s implicit merit curve.
The disconnects between the simulation model and the social planner’s problems primarily
involve the supply of electricity. In the simulation model the individual generating units separately
acquire capacity rents whereas in the social planner’s problem the capacity of either technology is
assumed to be unconstrained by capacity limits. This leads to a less clear translation of producer
benefits as well as responses to policy as the implicit supply curve is non-smooth and its elasticity
varies along different sections. The social planner’s problems are developed to demonstrate and
provide proofs of economic theory. The simulation model is used to approximate a value for the
further exacerbation of inefficiency when storage is introduced under a TPS. The representation
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of individual units in electricity modeling is generally practiced but still presents a disconnect
between our conveyance of economic theory and modelling practice.
The model is set up as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) which allows for represen-
tation of second-best solutions as it computes the market equilibrium as opposed to maximizing a
social surplus function. An MCP consists of constraints paired with variables, if the constraint is
binding then the paired variable is non-zero. There are generally two types of constraints: 1) mar-
ket clearance conditions which dictate that supply must meet or exceed demand and their paired
variables which represent shadow values and 2) zero profit conditions which dictate that marginal
revenues equal marginal costs and their paired variables representing an activity level. An example
of a market clearance condition is that supply must equal demand and if the constraint is bind-
ing the shadow value of demand (the constraint’s paired variable) is positive. An example of a
zero profit condition is that a generator’s revenue equals or exceeds marginal costs and, if so, that
generator’s generation is positive.
The demand constraint implies that generation at time t from unit i, Xt,i, plus net storage, ES t,tt,
must meet or exceed demand. Electricity storage is expressed similar to the previous section’s
model in that the first subscript (t) represents the time it is used and the second subscript (tt)
represents when it is generated. For example, ES 20,5 would indicate electricity storage that is
released in hour 20 yet enters into storage in hour 5. In the simulation model we do not track
individual generator’s decisions to store electricity as was done in the theory section and instead
aggregate across all generators through an electricity storage inventory variable; tracking individual
generator’s storage decisions across the entire 24 hour period proves to be too computationally
burdensome. The efficiency of electricity storage, θ is assumed at 99%17. Demand response to
price is represented through a calibrated, constant elasticity demand function that is parameterized
with the reference quantity (Q̄t), reference price (P̄t), the price elasticity of demand (ǫ), and the
endogenous price (Pt). The market clearance condition of the demand constraint and its paired
17The estimates for battery efficiency vary greatly. Here we assume highly-efficient Li-ion or superconducting mag-
netic energy storage are deployed in ERCOT. The effect of energy storage efficiency is being explored. We expect









(θES t,tt − ES tt,t) ≥ Q̄t(
Pt
P̄t
)−ǫ ⊥ Pt (4.31)
Generation of each unit is bound by the product of its nameplate capacity (k̄i) and capacity
factor (αi). The generation capacity constraint is paired with the shadow value of capacity (PKt,i):
αik̄i ≥ Xt,i ⊥ PKt,i (4.32)
The total amount of electricity storage utilized in the 24 hour period cannot exceed electricity
storage capacity (Ē); said differently, it is assumed that storage cannot be released and the newly-
spare capacity subsequently refilled within the same 24 hour period. This constraint is paired with




ES t,tt ⊥ PS (4.33)
With a TPS the endogenous emissions rate must be less than or equal to the TPS target. The
paired variable of this constraint will be the TPS permit price, φ. Given each unit’s carbon intensity,







Under this set of constraints, the zero profit condition for generation can be represented by in-
cluding the marginal costs of generation for each unit (MCi) which include operation and mainte-
nance costs, fuel costs, as well as transmission and distribution costs. The marginal cost parameter
is discussed further in the Data section. The zero profit condition indicates that a unit’s generation
will increase until marginal costs equal marginal revenue:
MCi + PKt,i + φ(Φ−CIi) ≥ Pt ⊥ Xt,i (4.35)
The electricity storage zero profit condition has an intuitive relationship similar to that of the
social planner’s problem. The marginal cost associated with electricity storage is the lost rev-
enue from the period in which it is generated (Ptt) plus the shadow value of the storage capacity
constraint. The marginal revenue for stored electricity is the price in which storage is used (Pt)
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weighted by the efficiency factor (θ). Revenue earned from stored electricity is therefore only
through electricity that is released to the market after accounting for efficiency losses. Therefore,
the zero profit condition for electricity storage is:
Ptt + PS ≥ θPt ⊥ ES t,tt (4.36)
An important consideration for this work is the calculation of welfare change. The change in
social surplus (S S ) is computed as the change in consumer surplus (CS ), the change in producer
surplus (PS ), and the change in emissions (CO2) multiplied by the social cost of carbon (SCC),
assumed at $50 /MT CO2 from EPA (2017):
∆S S = ∆CS +∆PS + S CC∆CO2 (4.37)
To maintain a consistent baseline and perform a fair comparison of changes to social surplus
components, the welfare changes are always computed with respect to the no storage, business-
as-usual (BAU) case. The reference prices (P̄t) by representative day are the result of solving the
no storage BAU case with inelastic demand. Note that the demand curve’s functional form with
ǫ < 1 does not allow for computing reference consumer surplus but only the change in consumer
surplus. The change in consumer surplus is calculated as the sum over each hour of the integral18




















∀ 0 < P̄t < Pt (4.38)
Profits are computed as the sum over hour of revenue less costs where revenue is acquired from
the sale of electricity sold. Electricity sold is the amount generated in the period, plus electricity
released from storage, and less electricity entered into storage. Costs of generation are the sum of
generation costs plus the policy costs or benefits. Utilization of electricity storage is assumed to be
costless; however, generators sacrifice the revenue from the period that electricity enters storage
and earn the prevailing price at the hour the stored electricity is sold. Therefore, producer surplus
can be computed as:











ES t,tt − ES tt,t)−
∑
t,i
Xt,i(MCi + φ(Φ−CIi)) (4.39)
In this analysis it is important to explicitly summarize the scope of welfare componenets.
Hence, producer surplus is the revenue from all electricity sold at its time of consumption less
the costs of all electricity generation. Consumer surplus is the difference in the amount that con-
sumers are willing to pay for electricity and the equilibrium electricity price. A change in consumer
surplus is thus the gain or loss in electricity consumption benefits given changes to the equilibrium
electricity price. Finally, carbon benefits are computed as the total amount of carbon reduced from
the no-policy and no-storage case multiplied by the social cost of carbon. Inefficiency here is de-
fined as a greater reduction of total benefits (or increase in total costs) for electricity consumers,
electricity producers, or from the reduction of carbon damages from electricity generation.
4.4 Data
Table 4.1 presents parameter symbols, descriptions, and sources. The primary source of unit ca-
pacity and operating data is ABB (2015), formerly Ventyx, with new capacity from EIA’s database
of planned additions (US EIA, 2016a) as well as the 2016 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) (US
EIA, 2016b). Hourly demand for 2030 is assumed to increase from the 2015 hourly demand data
from ABB (2015) by 13.2%, based on the ratio of 2030 to 2015 ERCOT electricity consumption
from US EIA (2016b). Fuel prices are from US EIA (2016b) and described further below. The
price elasticity of demand is assumed to be 0.5, an average of values estimated by Ros (2015). All
prices featured in graphs and tables are in 2015 US dollars.
As mentioned prior, the marginal costs of generation absent policy entail the operations and
maintenance (ONM) costs, fuel costs, as well as the transmission and distribution costs:
MCi = onmi + td + hri f p f (4.40)
ONM costs for existing units are from ABB (2015) whereas the operating costs and heat rates for
new units are from the National Energy Modeling System (US EIA, 2016a). Transmission and
distribution costs are from the 2016 AEO’s ‘Reference Case’ and are assumed to be 25.3 dollars
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Table 4.1: Parameter symbols, descriptions, and sources
Symbol Description Source
Q̄t Reference hourly demand ABB (2015); US EIA (2016b)
ki Generating unit capacity (MW) ABB (2015); US EIA (2016b, 2017)
αi Unit capacity factor ABB (2015); US EIA (2016a)
hri Unit heat rate (mmBTU/MWh) ABB (2015); US EIA (2016a)
onmi Unit operation costs ($2015 /MWh) ABB (2015); US EIA (2016a)
td Transmission costs ($2015/MWh) US EIA (2016b)
f p f Fuel price ($2015/mmBTU) US EIA (2016b)
f ci f Fuel carbon intensity (1000lb CO2/mmBTU) EPA (2016)
ǫ Price elasticity of demand Ros (2015)
per Mwh.
Fuel prices in the business-as-usual (BAU) price scenario are from the 2016 AEO’s ‘Refer-
ence Case’ and adjusted in sensitivity analyses. All fuel prices used in the model from the 2016
AEO reflect those delivered to the ERCOT electricity sector. The fuel prices in our ‘High’ fuel
price scenarios are from the 2016 AEO’s ‘High Oil Price’ scenario whereas the fuel prices in our
‘Low’ price scenario are from the 2016 AEO’s ‘High Oil and Gas Resource Technology’ scenario.
These scenarios offer the upper and lower bounds on fuel prices from US EIA (2016b). The fuel
prices by scenario and fuel are featured in Table 4.2 and are adjusted independently as well as
simultaneously.





Emissions factors are the average of the range used in the US Environmental Protection Agency’s
Regulatory Impact Analysis for the CPP (EPA, 2016) and presented in Table 4.3. Combining these
emission factors with the capacity in the ‘Expected Expansion’ scenario, we arrive at the data
presented in Figure 4.2 which presents the carbon intensity of each generating (x-axis) by the
cumulative capacity over each generating unit (y-axis). A TPS target can be represented with a
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vertical line in Figure 4.2 and any unit to the left of that line (i.e. with a carbon intensity lower than
the standard) would receive an implicit subsidy and any unit to the right would face an implicit tax.
Figure 4.2: 2030 ERCOT cumulative capacity in the expected expansion scenario by carbon inten-
sity by generation technology
We have added a vertical line at the 800 lbs CO2 TPS target rate to portray our reference TPS
target. Assuming a plant’s carbon intensity reflects its costs19, approximately 20% of generation
capacity faces an implicit tax during the average hour over all days and therefore approximately
80% of generation receives an implicit subsidy. During the peak hour demand, over 55% of the
capacity faces an implicit tax.
Noting that the simulations occur in 2030, we retire units based on the retirement date indicated
by ABB (2015). If no retirement date is available, a coal or gas unit has a maximum life of 60
years, an average of values from Short et al. (2011). New capacity is added based on the capacity
additions from 2015 to 2020 from the EIA’s database of planned capacity additions (US EIA, 2017)
19Note that fuel costs are the primary component of marginal costs for fossil fuel fired generating units. Fuel costs are
directly related to the heat rate and thus more efficient plants use less fuel while emitting less per unit of generation.
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Table 4.3: Emissions factor by generation technology from EPA (2016)
CO2 Emissions Factor







Distillate Fuel Oil 161.4
Residual Fuel Oil 167.7
Tire-derived Fuels 189.5
and from 2020 to 2030 based on the forecasted capacity additions of the 2016 AEO (US EIA,
2016b). Available capacity is varied by assuming there is no change to capacity (i.e. reference,
2015 capacity), the expected capacity additions occur as forecasted by US EIA (2016b), or there
is an arbitrary doubling of expected wind and solar capacity additions over the 2015-2030 time
period. The doubling of renewable capacity serves to compare the interaction of renewables and
electricity storage in the sensitivity analysis in Appendix E. The aggregated20 capacity adjusted
with units’ capacity factors by generation technology and expansion assumption is presented in
Figure 4.3.
There are no planned coal capacity additions for ERCOT, therefore our combination of data and
assumptions indicates a decrease in coal capacity. Generators utilizing natural gas have enough
capacity addition to cover retirements and increase overall available capacity by approximately
4GW over the 2015-2030 time period. Solar and wind see the largest relative increases in available
capacity whereas hydropower and nuclear remain fairly constant over the 2015-2030 time period.
With our data and assumptions, overall capacity is expected to increase by 16% over the 2015-2030
time period in the ‘Expected Expansion’ scenario.
Reference hourly demand for the average, low, and peak days by season is presented in Fig-
ure 4.4. Reference demand from ABB (2015) is increased by 13.2%, the expected increase in
20For example, ‘Coal’ is comprised of lignitic, subbituminous, and bituminous capacities
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Figure 4.3: Generation capacity by technology and expansion case (ABB, 2015; US EIA, 2016b)
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annual ERCOT demand from the 2016 AEO’s forecasted demand in 2030 relative to 2015. The
average day is computed as the average demand over the season excluding peak and low days. The
peak (low) demand day is computed using the average of the five highest (lowest) demand days
over the season. The number of days in each season of each day type is determined by the closest
match of demand from ABB (2015) to each representative day through the minimum of the least
squares difference. The resulting number of days in the annual calculation by the representative
day is presented in Table 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Reference demand by 2030 day and season (ABB, 2015; US EIA, 2016b)
For the results section, we establish a reference scenario with default assumptions. The default
assumptions for the reference scenario and the range of alternatives in the sensitivity analysis are
presented in Table 4.5. In the reference scenario, we establish a TPS target rate of 800 lbs CO2
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Table 4.4: Weight of representative days in annual approximation
Average Peak Low
Spring 80 5 7
Summer 77 7 7
Autumn 79 5 6
Winter 80 6 6
per MWh; for reference, the CPP21 rate target for Texas in 2030 is 791 lbs CO2 per Mwh (EPA,
2016). The reference TPS target rate is arbitrary but chosen at the 800 lbs CO2 per MWh level
because it offers a middleground of being binding in all representative days while still reducing
the carbon intensity of generation but without being overly burdensome. The reference amount
of electricity storage of five GW is taken from a report delivered to Oncor (the largest electricity
utility company in Texas) by Chang et al. (2016) which indicates that five GW of grid-integrated,
distributed electricity storage would be cost-effective in 2020 at a cost of approximately $350/kWh.
All assumptions presented in Table 4.5 are varied in the sensitivity analysis presented in Appendix
E.
Table 4.5: Reference scenario assumptions and variations
Reference Scenario Variations in Appendix E
TPS target 800 lbs CO2 per Mwh 600-1000 lbs CO2 per Mwh
Storage capacity 5GW 0-10GW
Fuel prices BAU All permutations of Table 4.2
Generation capacity Expected Expansion 2015 capacity, double wind and solar expansion
4.5 Results
In this section, we present the results and demonstrate the relationship of theoretical proposi-
tions to simulation outcomes. A sensitivity analysis is presented in Appendix E and demonstrates
that the loss in efficiency with the introduction of storage under a TPS is robust to fuel price, gen-
eration capacity, storage capacity, and rate target assumptions. Not directly related to our research
21Note that we are representing a hypothetical and less complicated rate based standard than states’ rate based option
under the CPP which considers unit vintages, fuel categories, size, and efficiency crediting among other intricacies.
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question but still of interest, Appendix F contains an overview of the model’s resulting prices,
generation profiles, and electricity storage dynamics.
To be explicit, this analysis compares the social surplus components composed of producer
surplus, consumer surplus, and carbon benefits/damages between a TPS with storage and a TPS
without storage. Therefore, ‘losses’ indicate that producer surplus, consumer surplus, or the benefit
from carbon reduction is less when storage is available under a TPS. In every simulation in the
reference scenario, the introduction of storage under a TPS leads to a loss in social surplus relative
to the TPS without storage. However, storage benefits society when no TPS is present. Therefore,
it is the interaction of a TPS and electricity storage that leads to reduced social benefits and greater
inefficiency.
Table 4.6 summarizes the daily social surplus losses with the introduction of storage under a
TPS for each representative day. Every representative day in the reference case experiences a loss
in social surplus when storage is introduced under a TPS. Indicative of Proposition 4, losses are
greatest on the peak summer and peak autumn days when peak hour demand is greatest relative
to low hour demand and lowest on the peak winter day. On the peak winter day, the gains to
consumers and losses to producers are almost equal and total social surplus doesn’t change by a
large amount relative to other representative days. The peak winter day has a higher base load
but less of a difference between peak demand and low demand than the average or low winter
days. The summer peak day, followed closely by the autumn peak day, has the greatest difference
between peak hour demand and low hour demand and consequently faces the largest losses with
the introduction of storage. By summing over the product of losses and number of representative
days, annual 2030 social surplus loss for ERCOT with the introduction of storage under a TPS
is estimated to be $5.3 million under the reference case. This represents 3.8% of the total social
surplus change from introducing a TPS without storage.
Table 4.7 presents a breakdown of welfare component changes under a TPS by the availability
of storage and representative day. The change to consumer surplus is negative and the change
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Table 4.6: Reference scenario daily social surplus loss through introduction of storage under a TPS
($1000)
Average Peak Low
Spring 11 10 4
Summer 29 65 17
Autumn 10 49 8
Winter 5 2 7
to producer surplus22 is positive under every TPS scenario. Although the profit of high carbon
generation decreases with a TPS, the profit gains to low carbon generators outweigh the high
carbon generators’ losses. The low carbon generators are those utilizing wind, solar, hydro, or
nuclear technologies as well as the more efficient natural gas fired generators. There are no coal
generating units that qualify as low carbon under the 800 lbs CO2 per MWh TPS target rate.
Overall the change in social surplus through the introduction of storage under a TPS is not
dramatic in the reference case. The gain in social surplus (i.e. the positive total change) from
introducing a TPS are reduced when storage is added from 0.1% in the low winter day up to 7%
in the peak summer day. The changes in producer surplus from introducing storage under a TPS
to a TPS without storage range between -0.4% in the low winter day to % in the peak winter day.
Changes in consumer surplus losses from when storage is introduced under a TPS range between
-2.5% in the peak summer day and 0.8% in the average spring day. Of all cases presented in
the sensitivity analysis that assume expected expansion and the 800 lbs CO2 per MWh target, the
largest daily loss to TPS social surplus gains with the introduction of storage is 16.6% with high
gas and low coal prices on the peak summer day.
22By summing over the product of producer surplus and number of representative days, the 2030 annual profit for
ERCOT is estimated at $7.4 billion in the reference, no storage, BAU scenario. Although we are unable to find a
recent ERCOT profit estimate for comparison, 2015 revenue is reported at $34 billion (ERCOT, 2015) and our 2030
revenue is estimated at $39 billion in the reference, no storage, BAU scenario.
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Table 4.7: Reference case change in social surplus components under a TPS by storage availability and representative day ($ million)
Average Peak Low
Spring Summer Autumn Winter Spring Summer Autumn Winter Spring Summer Autumn Winter
Consumer Surplus
No Storage -2.43 -5.98 -2.78 -2.33 -7.60 -13.03 -12.22 -13.57 -3.38 -2.77 -3.31 -3.42
With Storage -2.41 -6.04 -2.80 -2.37 -7.60 -13.35 -12.45 -13.90 -3.34 -2.83 -3.31 -3.37
Producer Surplus
Reference Profit 18.22 23.13 19.28 18.74 23.60 30.98 29.35 26.52 14.09 19.14 14.19 14.06
No Storage 0.49 2.87 0.60 0.27 4.05 8.50 7.82 9.12 2.12 0.62 2.01 2.14
With Storage 0.46 2.90 0.60 0.30 4.04 8.73 7.99 9.43 2.08 0.67 2.00 2.09
Carbon Benefits
No Storage 3.74 4.47 3.84 3.74 4.66 5.46 5.30 5.34 3.64 3.85 3.74 3.70
With Storage 3.74 4.48 3.84 3.75 4.66 5.48 5.32 5.36 3.64 3.85 3.74 3.70
Total Change
No Storage 1.80 1.37 1.65 1.68 1.11 0.92 0.91 0.89 2.38 1.70 2.44 2.42
With Storage 1.79 1.34 1.64 1.68 1.10 0.86 0.86 0.89 2.37 1.69 2.43 2.41
Change from Introduction of Storage
Consumer Surplus 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.32 -0.23 -0.33 0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.04
Producer Surplus -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.23 0.17 0.31 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.05
Carbon Benefits 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Total -0.011 -0.029 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.065 -0.049 -0.002 -0.004 -0.017 -0.008 -0.007
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The profit gain of low carbon producers under a TPS is attributable to the large subsidy given to
renewable generators, a substantial amount given their large portion of the merit curve at low costs
and high supply elasticity. Table 4.8 presents the profits23 of low carbon generators by day, policy,
and storage availability. Due to some profit changes under a TPS not being evident without several
decimal points, Table 4.8 also presents the sign of the change of profits with the introduction of
storage. Indicative of Proposition 3, any reduction in the TPS permit price through the introduction
of storage results in a decrease to the low carbon generators’ profits. Alternatively and indicative of
Proposition 5, any increase to the TPS permit price results in an increase in low carbon generators’
profits but a loss in consumer surplus. Note that the assumptions of Proposition 5 remain true for
all representative days in the reference scenario but the implications depend on the change in the
TPS permit price.
Pertaining to Proposition 3 and Proposition 5, the distributional impacts depend on changes to
the TPS permit price resulting from the introduction of storage. The daily changes in consumer
and producer surplus by the change in the TPS permit price through the introduction of electricity
storage is plotted in Figure 4.5. Indicative of Proposition 5, a higher TPS permit price with storage
increases the equilibrium price of electricity consumption to the detriment of consumers and benefit
of low carbon producers. Indicative of Proposition 3, when the permit price decreases through the
introduction of storage, the price of electricity decreases to the benefit of consumers and detriment
of low carbon generators through a reduction in implicit subsidies.
23Since unit-specific storage dynamics are not tracked in the simulation model, the generation entering storage is
computed as the generation that occurs above the prevailing price in each period in which storage is filled. The low
and high carbon generators are assumed to split the revenue of storage sold based on their proportion of generation
that entered storage. Low carbon generation accounts for 100% of the electricity entering storage under the TPS
in all representative days. Without a TPS, only the low demand spring, autumn, and winter days see high carbon
generation entering storage at 3%, 38%, and 40% of the total amount stored, respectively.
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Table 4.8: Daily low carbon generation profit and TPS permit price change through the introduction of storage by representative day,
policy, and storage availability ($ million)
BAU Sign in Profit TPS Sign in Profit ∆ TPS Permit Price
No Storage With Storage Difference No Storage With Storage Difference (With Storage - Without)
Average
Spring 13.7 14.0 (+) 17.7 17.7 (-) -0.000
Summer 15.6 16.0 (+) 22.1 22.0 (-) -0.142
Autumn 14.2 14.5 (+) 18.5 18.5 (+) 0.003
Winter 13.9 14.3 (+) 17.9 18.0 (+) 0.042
Peak
Spring 15.8 16.2 (+) 23.0 23.0 (+) 0.000
Summer 18.1 18.4 (+) 29.0 29.2 (+) 0.432
Autumn 17.6 18.0 (+) 27.8 27.9 (+) 0.170
Winter 16.8 17.0 (+) 27.1 27.3 (+) 0.263
Low
Spring 11.6 11.8 (+) 15.7 15.7 (-) -0.016
Summer 14.1 14.4 (+) 18.4 18.5 (+) 0.0657
Autumn 11.6 11.9 (+) 15.7 15.6 (-) -0.071
Winter 11.5 11.8 (+) 15.3 15.2 (-) -0.097
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Figure 4.5: Change in consumer and producer surplus by change in TPS permit through introduc-
tion of storage
The disconnect between the theoretical and simulated models’ representations of firms and
storage availability make it difficult to present Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 from the simulation
model’s results. Proposition 1 is based on a single, price-taking firm with infinite generation and
storage capacity whereas the simulation model represents price response from disaggregated firms
with bounds on both generation and storage capacity. We do see, however, that total low carbon
generation (aggregated over all representative firms) in the simulation model is always greater or
equal (if bounded by capacity) under a TPS with storage relative to any other case.
A means to convey the inefficiency exacerbation when adding storage under a TPS is a compar-
ison of the marginal abatement costs per unit of carbon reduced. In our simulation, we find that the
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weighted average (over representative days) annual marginal abatement cost point estimates under
the reference scenario TPS are $25.58 per MT CO2 without storage and $25.68 per MT CO2 with
storage. This indicates that it is more expensive per unit of abatement (by 10.2 cents per metric ton
of CO2) under a TPS when storage is available as compared to when storage is unavailable.
In the theoretical model with continuous marginal cost functions for low and high carbon gen-
eration, we would experience a blend of stored low and high carbon generation. In the simulation
model, low carbon generators are the sole users of electricity storage in all but the BAU low de-
mand days in spring, autumn, and winter. Therefore, an increase in stored low carbon generation
under a TPS relative to the BAU scenario is only seen when a TPS is enforced on the low spring,
autumn, and winter days. On other days, further storing of low carbon generation when a TPS
is introduced is bound by storage capacity. On all three of these days the credit price is reduced,
profits from low carbon generation are reduced, and high carbon generation increases relative to
a TPS without storage. These three consequences on these specific days when stored low carbon
generation increases are indicative of Proposition 2.
To summarize the relationship of the simulation model’s results to the theoretical propositions:
• Proposition 1: Although difficult to portray given the disconnect between the theoretical and
simulation models, a TPS with storage in the simulation model has a greater or equal amount
of low carbon generation relative to all other scenarios
• Proposition 2: On days where stored low carbon generation increases, the credit price de-
creases resulting in less profits for high carbon generators and increased high carbon gener-
ation
• Proposition 3: Any reduction in the TPS permit price through the introduction of storage
results in a reduction of the low carbon generator’s profit
• Proposition 4: Losses to social surplus are greatest on days with the greatest difference in
peak to low period demand (spring and summer peak days)
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• Proposition 5: In all cases where the TPS permit price increases with the introduction of
storage, consumers are worse off and profits of low carbon generators are increased when
the assumptions hold true
4.6 Discussion
In this work, we ask ”Does electricity storage increase or decrease the efficiency of a tradable
performance standard?” We have demonstrated that electricity storage reduces the social surplus of
a TPS and thus further decreases the efficiency of a TPS. The distributional impacts of introducing
storage under the TPS primarily depend on the change in the TPS permit price. If the TPS permit
price increases with the introduction of storage, producer surplus increases but consumer surplus
decreases and vice versa. If producers benefit, emissions increase and the benefits of abatement
are reduced. We develop five propositions and present simulation results supporting those propo-
sitions. The majority of these propositions depend on the change to the TPS permit price with the
introduction of storage. When the TPS permit price increases, low carbon generators who maintain
a majority share of producer surplus, benefit through increased equilibrium price of electricity and
incresed implicit subsidies. This comes at the expense of the consumer given that the marginal
producers are typically high carbon generators who now face an increased implicit tax.
Recall that the inefficiency of a TPS results from the implicit subsidy on low carbon generation.
With electricity storage, the supply elasticity of low carbon generation is increased. Therefore, the
intuition behind our results is that the TPS inefficiency depends on demand for electricity that is
responsive to a reduction in price of low carbon generation given its implicit subsidy under a TPS.
When electricity storage is introduced, the price elasticity of supply for low carbon generation
increases and results in a further response of low carbon generation. Although the paper presents
electricity storage in an unfavorable light, it is only the interaction of electricity storage and a TPS
that creates a further inefficiency. Electricity storage absent a TPS is beneficial but its interaction
with a TPS furthers the latter’s inefficiency. It is therefore the nature of the TPS policy, and not
electricity storage in itself, that is to blame for the increased inefficiency when storage is intro-
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duced. Similar to the assessment of the interaction between a TPS and energy efficiency crediting
from Fell et al. (2015), the demand response of a TPS from a reduction in price leads to further
inefficiency under a TPS when demand is not perfectly inelastic.
The simulation model does not represent ramping or startup costs for fossil fuel-fired generators
as well as the additional costs of transmission congestion. Electricity storage could help to prevent
startup costs for fossil fuel-fired generators in the peak periods as some generators may not need to
come online. Electricity storage could also help in avoiding ramping costs when demand increases
greatly from one hour to the next. Congestion costs would likely decrease with the introducion of
storage and would depend on the grid’s structure. Therefore, we may be understating net benefits
of electricity storage by understating cost reductions given the lacking portrayal of either ramping,
startup, or congestion costs.
As of 2016, nine US states have introduced or signed policies promoting utility and/or dis-
tributed scale energy storage (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2016).While policy makers
consider rate based emissions targets, they should also take steps to avoid the undesirable interac-
tion of electricity storage and rate based emissions policies. The mechanisms to avoid or reduce
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RARE EARTH STACKELBERG MODEL DERIVATION
This appendix presents the derivation of the actors’ optimal production functions through backward induction. Recall the mine indices denote
the first (k, legal Chinese producers), second (l, illegal Chinese producers), and third (m, Mount Weld) actors in the game. The ore itself has a cost of
extraction and refinement (c j) which is based on a calibrated, linear
24 supply curve computed with a supply elasticity (η j), a reference cost (c j), and
a reference quantity of ore production (x j). Each REO (indexed by i) has a constant cost of additional processing for each mine (ci, j). The market
price of each ore, Pi, is determined on a calibrated, linear demand curve and is based on the REO’s elasticity (ǫi), reference price (pi), and reference
quantity demanded (qi). In counterfactual cases, an exogenous SRB stockpile purchase (Ki) is included. Finally, each mine’s ore contains a specific
percentage of REO (θi, j,
∑
i θi, j = 1 ∀ j). Suppressing the index of time, t, each mine’s profit, π j, can be represented as the sum of profits from
individual REOs multiplied by their percentage in the mine’s ore less ore extraction costs:









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































l = θi,lΨ+ Xkα































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RARE EARTH STACKELBERG MODEL PRODUCTION RESULTS
Table B.1: Annual production (metric tonnes) by producer, quota presence, and counterfactual
case
Year Producer Case BAU Nd Stock Dy Stock Enviro Tax Nd Rate Dy Rate
2015 Legal Chinese Yes 98930 98930 98930 98930 98930 98930
2016 Legal Chinese Yes 101377 101377 101377 101377 101377 101377
2017 Legal Chinese Yes 103963 105000 105000 97195 105000 105000
2018 Legal Chinese Yes 105000 105000 105000 100267 105000 105000
2019 Legal Chinese Yes 105000 105000 105000 102428 105000 105000
2020 Legal Chinese Yes 105000 105000 105000 103112 105000 105000
2015 Illegal Chinese Yes 15988 15988 15988 15988 15988 15988
2016 Illegal Chinese Yes 14356 14356 14356 14356 14356 14356
2017 Illegal Chinese Yes 12981 16792 17614 15401 12685 12025
2018 Illegal Chinese Yes 12202 14255 14967 13048 11734 11180
2019 Illegal Chinese Yes 11494 13281 13896 12128 11103 10622
2020 Illegal Chinese Yes 11449 12784 13312 11899 10934 10476
2015 Mount Weld Yes 9252 9252 9252 9252 9252 9252
2016 Mount Weld Yes 12501 12501 12501 12501 12501 12501
2017 Mount Weld Yes 17501 22189 17039 21001 16879 17291
2018 Mount Weld Yes 21132 24407 20477 22413 20498 20921
2019 Mount Weld Yes 22209 25651 21521 23884 21543 21987
2020 Mount Weld Yes 23340 26958 22617 24733 22640 23106
2015 Legal Chinese No 98930 98930 98930 98930 98930 98930
2016 Legal Chinese No 101377 101377 101377 101377 101377 101377
2017 Legal Chinese No 103963 107757 105670 97195 105918 105131
2018 Legal Chinese No 106113 115878 108318 100267 111468 107793
2019 Legal Chinese No 107390 117260 109700 102428 112850 109175
2020 Legal Chinese No 108011 117986 110531 103112 113576 109901
2015 Illegal Chinese No 15988 15988 15988 15988 15988 15988
2016 Illegal Chinese No 14356 14356 14356 14356 14356 14356
2017 Illegal Chinese No 12981 14665 15236 15401 12376 11922
2018 Illegal Chinese No 11098 12569 13065 13198 10573 10179
2019 Illegal Chinese No 10138 11403 11826 11928 9691 9355
2020 Illegal Chinese No 9901 10960 11310 11699 9531 9216
2015 Mount Weld No 9252 9252 9252 9252 9252 9252
2016 Mount Weld No 12501 12501 12501 12501 12501 12501
2017 Mount Weld No 17501 19251 16626 21001 15526 17081
2018 Mount Weld No 19234 21157 18272 22413 17172 18814
2019 Mount Weld No 20196 22215 19186 23884 18086 19776
2020 Mount Weld No 21205 23326 20145 24733 19045 20785
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APPENDIX C
MARGINAL ABATEMENT COST CURVE MODEL DOCUMENTATION
In this appendix, we first detail the generalized form of zero profit and market clearance con-
ditions in our partial equilibrium setup. As the foundation for the equilibrium conditions is similar
for all nests within all nesting structures, this is not an exhaustive list of equations used in the
model. Then, we present the method of calibrating an input that is non-scarce in the benchmark
(carbon emissions) but becomes scarce in counterfactuals (a carbon cap). Finally, we present the
calculation of factor input demand in the energy nests, used to compute endogenous emissions
in the objective function. Note that the code for the MAC calibration chapter can be found in
Appendix H.
General form of zero profit and market clearance conditions
List of symbols:
• Pi: Endogenous price
25
• P̄i: Reference price
• Xi: Endogenous supply
• X̄i: Reference supply
• θi, j: Value share of factor i in the j nest
• C j(Pi): Cost of j nest with inputs i
• σ j: Elasticity of substitution in the j nest
Note that the index i contains factors used in the production of the j nest. As Rutherford (1995)
indicates, the calibrated share unit cost function can be expressed as:
25For brevity, prices in this appendix embed taxes and subsidies. Because our model does not endogenously determine











Note that when prices are normalized to unity and in a competitive market, C(P̄i) = 1. The zero
profit condition states that each nest’s marginal revenue equals marginal costs and is paired with









1−σ j ≥ P j ⊥ X j (C.2)
Denoting the the nest above j as k and recalling that costs are normalized to unity, the compen-
sated factor demand for nest j can be expressed as:






)σk ⊥ P j (C.3)
In our partial equilibrium representation, this market clearance condition is true for all but the
top nest (electricity demand, Y). The top nest market clearance condition is represented through a





where α is set to replicate benchmark output at benchmark prices and η is the price elasticity of
demand, assumed at zero with inelastic demand and 0.5 with elastic demand.
Calibration with non-scarce input in the benchmark
With zero carbon costs, carbon emissions are non-scarace in the benchmark (no policy) market.
Therefore, we need our algebraic representation to replicate counterfactual in which carbon emis-
sions become scarce under the carbon cap. Denote the activity level for a sector as Y with inputs Xi
where the i index is comprised of a non-emitting factor L and an emitting resource F with an initial
emissions level γ. With a near-zero price of the non-scarce input used in the benchmark denoted
as ǫ, the benchmark value share of L used in Y , θL, can be computed as:
θL =
X̄L
X̄L + X̄F + γǫ
(C.5)
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When the input becomes scarce, the associated price (akin to the price of an emissions permit)
is β. A composite Leontief price index, A, of the input of the emitting resource and the associated














A1−θL ⊥ Y (C.7)
An example of this procedure is featured in the calibexamp.gms code in Appendix H.
Derivation of factor demand in fossil fuel nests
Denote the activity level of the energy nest as E. Since E has factor inputs f with Leontief unit
cost functions and non-scarce inputs in the benchmark (carbon emissions absent a carbon cap), we
can leverage the previous calibration example to help derive the factor demand functions. Taking
note of the previous example, we can compute the relevant value shares of inputs to the E nest, θi,




i Xi + ǫγi
(C.8)
Leveraging the previous example, the associated calibrated Leontief unit cost functions, Ai for




















The factor demands, F f , can be computed using Shephard’s lemma on the energy nest’s ex-




























Proof of Proposition 1
To demonstrate that Proposition 1 is correct, we demonstrate that the marginal revenue for
stored low carbon generation is greater under the TPS than under the first-best policy. Given the
assumption of price-taking firms, the price in the second period does not change and thus we simply
need to compare the implicit subsidy to the first-best tax. Given φ(βL −Φ) < 0 < τβL and with
infinite storage capacity (λE = 0), we can be certain that low carbon generation from a price-taking
firm will be greater under the TPS with storage than the first-best policy. Because φ(βL −Φ) < 0,
low carbon generation under the TPS has a benefit relative to when no policy is present and thus,
under these conditions, we can be certain low carbon generation from a price-taking firm will be
greatest out of all scenarios explored here given the previously-stated conditions.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proving the first mechanism of a demand response requires that the marginal costs of stored
generation when X f ,2,1 = 0 are less than the equilibrium price of electricity in the second period
without storage. By assumption, the first period demand curve sits below the second period demand
curve (i.e. for Q(P1) = Q(P2), P2 > P1 such that for the same quantity demanded the price in the
peak period will be greater). Because the marginal costs of stored generation are assumed to begin
after generation in the first period has been met, the marginal costs of X f ,2,1 when X f ,2,1 = 0 are p1
which by assumption is less than p2 given the relative locations of the periods’ demand curves.
The second mechanism depends on whether the increase in stored low carbon generation de-
creases the endogenous emissions rate and thereby decreases the TPS permit price. The endoge-
nous emissions rate, R, is computed26 as:
R =
∑
f ,t,tt β f X f ,t,tt
∑







f ,t,tt X f ,t,tt
(D.1)
26The final representation of this equation helps to decipher the derivation of the total derivative
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f ,t,tt X f ,t,tt)
2
(D.2)
Knowing βH > βL and X f ,t,tt ≥ 0∀ f , t, tt, then all else equal the stored low carbon generation will
decrease the TPS permit price. All else equal, in this instance, is a convoluted assumption. Totally


























f ,t,tt X f ,t,tt)
2
(D.3)
This relationship can be simplified into its two parts. The first part pertains to the derivative of





> −1, the first portion of the equation will be negative and, absent changes in the high
carbon market, stored low carbon generation will decrease the permit price. Low carbon produc-
tion in the first period would decline if the TPS permit price is reduced through the introduction of
storage given the increase in marginal costs from reduced implicit subsidies. Second period low
carbon generation faces the same potential consequence with the addition of the potential for dis-
placement (stored low carbon generation replacing second period low carbon generation). Unless
demand is perfectly inelastic, stored low carbon generation will not fully displace second period
low carbon generation.
The second part of the total derivative equation pertains to the interaction of stored low carbon
generation and all high carbon generation variables. The trouble with assessing the impact on high
carbon generation is that there is a balancing of the TPS permit price between low and high carbon
generation. If low carbon generation increases, all else equal the TPS permit price decreases and
high carbon generation increases. Therefore, in order to be certain of a decrease in TPS permit
price, the high carbon generation needs to remain constant or decrease. Combining the logic from
both parts of the total derivative equation, stored low carbon generation will certainly decrease the
TPS permit price iff 1) It does not reduce the TPS permit price sufficiently to reduce first period






) 2) it does not fully displace low carbon
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generation in the second period which is not possible if demand is downward sloping and 3) it
decreases all high carbon generation. The TPS permit price could still decrease if the effects that
reduce the TPS permit price outweigh the effects that increase the TPS permit price but the opposite
is true as well, making the assumption that all else is equal necessary for this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
We prove Proposition 3 similar in method to the proof for Proposition 2 from Holland et al.
(2009). Specifically, we construct a hypothetical, linear supply curve but now compare the low
carbon producer surplus gains from the introduction of a TPS for a market lacking or having access
to electricity storage. The areas of producer benefit from the TPS in Figure 4.1, dbae and d′b′a′e′,
are computed as revenue (including the implicit subsidy) less costs of generation. Revenue is the




and the quantity produced under the TPS (qL,2 and q
′
L,2
). The costs of generation are the integral
under the marginal cost curve with the marginal cost curve for the low carbon generation with
storage being more elastic. Using the same notation as in Figure 4.1, the difference in producer
surplus gain from not having storage versus having storage, w, can be computed as:
















Therefore, if w > 0 there is more of a gain to the low carbon generator’s producer surplus without
storage.
Constructing a linear supply curve of the form MCL(qL) = α+0.5qL for low carbon generation






for low carbon generation with storage, we can compute27
w as:












With downward sloping but inelastic demand the revenue must decrease with an increase in

















. Also, terms have been rearranged such that the difference in revenues is presented first
followed by the difference in costs.
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Note too that the difference between the equilibrium prices without a TPS and with a TPS is
greater when storage is not available, indicating less ‘height’ in the producer surplus gain polygon.
Combining terms and knowing that q′
L
> qL (that is, low carbon generation under a TPS is greater
with storage than without), we know that α(q′
L
− qL) > 0 and q
′
L
− 0.25qL > 0. Therefore, we know
w > 0 and the gains to low carbon generators under a TPS are greater without storage than with
storage under the assumption of downward sloping but inelastic demand and no change in TPS
permit price.
Proof of Proposition 4
Denoting the change in the second period’s price from the reference demand level to an in-
creased demand level as ∆P2, the change in the equilibrium price relationship can be expressed as
P1 + λE = P2 + ∆P2. Recall that P1 + λE = MCL,2,1 + φ(Φ − βL). This implies that P2 + ∆P2 =
MC1,L + φ(Φ − βL). Therefore, we know that the producers of low carbon fuel in the first period
will respond more and a greater demand response will occur when the price difference between the
two periods is greater.
Proof of Proposition 5
If low carbon generation is constrained by its capacity and the conditions expressed in Propo-
sition 5 remain, the market price of electricity will be determined by the marginal costs of high
carbon generators. Denoting the positive change in the TPS permit price as ∆φ, the equilibrium
of marginal costs and market price can be expressed such that Pt = MCt,tt,H + (φ + ∆φ)(βH −Φ).
Knowing that ∆φ > 0 and βH −Φ > 0, as long as supply of high carbon generation is not perfectly
inelastic, there will be an increase in price and with it a reduction in quantity demanded.
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APPENDIX E
HOURLY ELECTRICITY DISPATCH MODEL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the results to variations in the reference scenario’s assumptions. The
first set of variations focuses on varying the TPS target and demonstrates that social losses incurred
by introducing storage increase with increasing policy stringency. Second, the level of available
storage capacity is varied from 0GW to 10GW in increments of 1GW to show that the loss in
social benefits with the introduction of storage increases with increasing storage capacity. Third,
we vary fuel prices and TPS targets and demonstrate that although low gas prices and high coal
prices reduce the TPS permit price, as long as the policy remains binding following the assumption
changes then the introduction of storage results in less social surplus. Finally, we vary generation
capacity and find that increasing low- and zero-carbon generation capacity leads to reduced losses
with the introduction of storage under a TPS.
To demonstrate the effect of adjusting the TPS target, we vary the TPS target from 600 to 1000
lbs CO2 per Mwh for all representative days. Figure E.1 presents the change in total and individual
social surplus components for all combinations of representative days. There is a gain to social
surplus with the introduction of storage when the policy is not binding under the 1000 lbs CO2 per
Mwh TPS target. We present these results because they detail the beneficial nature of storage when
a TPS is not affecting equilibrium. After the policy becomes binding for the majority of weighted
representative days, there is always a loss to social surplus with the introduction of storage. The
distributional changes are not consistent due to the non-smooth merit curve and the shifting of TPS
permit prices. As is evident in Table E.1, annual social surplus losses increase with the introduction
of electricity storage as the TPS stringency increases.
The change in social surplus as well as its components by day, season, and now storage capacity
level are presented in Figure E.2. Social surplus loss is monotonically increasing with increased
storage capacity for every representative day.
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Figure E.1: Change in welfare components with the introduction of storage under the reference
case by season, day, and TPS target
112
Figure E.2: Change in welfare components with the introduction of storage under the reference
case by season, day, and storage capacity
113
Table E.1 presents the annual change in social surplus when storage is introduced under a TPS
by fuel price assumptions and by TPS target. Any scenario that does not have a binding TPS
policy (i.e. φ = 0) for the majority of weighted days sees an increase in social surplus through the
introduction of storage. However, any case that has a binding TPS policy experiences a loss in
social surplus. As the stringency increases, the benefits are reduced (or the losses increased) in a
monotonic trend. All cases have a non-binding policy for the majority of weighted days at the 1000
lbs CO2 per Mwh TPS target rate. The high coal price and low gas price scenario in particular still
has benefits with storage under a TPS up to and including the 700 lbs CO2 per Mwh TPS target
rate. The only other case that sees a gain in social surplus with the introduction of storage under a
TPS beyond the 1000 lbs CO2 target rate is the BAU coal price and low gas price scenario under a
900 lbs CO2 per Mwh TPS target.
Table E.1: Change in 2030 social surplus through introduction of storage in reference case by fuel
price assumption and TPS target ($ million)
TPS Target (lbs CO2 /Mwh)
Coal Price Gas Price 1000 900 800 700 600
BAU BAU 28.4 -4.0 -5.3 -6.0 -11.1
BAU High 11.1 -7.1 -10.7 -10.4 -16.5
BAU Low 31.8 5.2 -2.4 -4.1 -6.8
High BAU 31.8 -3.9 -4.0 -5.5 -11.2
Low BAU 27.9 -4.2 -4.7 -6.2 -11.6
Low High 5.7 -6.9 -10.8 -10.5 -16.3
High Low 30.2 25.5 12.1 4.5 -6.4
Low Low 27.9 -4.2 -4.7 -6.2 -11.6
High High 28.7 -7.4 -9.7 -9.7 -15.7
Finally, generation capacity additions are varied to estimate social surplus losses with no ca-
pacity expansion, expected capacity expansion, and double renewable capacity expansion. The
results of social surplus loss by representative day and season are presented in Table E.2. In every
day and season combination, the addition of low carbon capacity and especially renewable gener-
ation capacity leads to a less-binding TPS and, as we have previously shown, decreases the social
surplus loss inherit with the introduction of storage. By not expanding or retiring 2015 plants, the
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annual losses are more than three times the estimated annual losses when expected capacity expan-
sion occurs. By doubling renewable expansion, the annual losses are reduced by approximately
40% relative to the expected expansion case.
Table E.2: Change in social surplus under the reference scenario with the introduction of storage
by day and capacity expansion($1000)
None Expected Double Renewables
Average
Spring -20 -11 -10
Summer -109 -29 -23
Autumn -15 -10 -9
Winter -27 -5 -2
Peak
Spring -17 -10 -7
Summer -247 -65 -39
Autumn -183 -49 -29
Winter -54 -2 6
Low
Spring -13 -4 30
Summer -10 -17 -5
Autumn -7 -8 12
Winter -12 -7 77
Weighted Total: -16,536 -5,349 -3,840
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APPENDIX F
HOURLY ELECTRICITY DISPATCH SIMULATION DIAGNOSTICS
This section serves to present results that are not directly related to the focus of this work but
relate to the underlying performance of the model. This section will present the wholesale prices
of electricity, generation profiles under the reference case, and HPS usage in various scenarios.
Wholesale price by representative day, policy, and storage availability is presented in Fig-
ure F.1. The highest wholesale prices are simulated in the summer and autumn peak days under a
TPS which reach approximately $90 per Gwh. The largest wholesale price difference is approx-
imately $22 per Gwh in the peak summer day with a TPS. This does, however, change prices in
other periods as is indicated in the low periods of the summer average and peak days. The winter
months face a unique situation when storage is filled and released in two different periods. Some
representative days have reference demand near the sharply-increasing but lower portion of the
demand curve and thus see sharp changes across demand levels.
Figure F.2 and Figure F.3 demonstrate the generation by technology for average summer and
spring days, respectively, by policy and storage availability. The TPS most noticeably substitutes
coal for lesser amounts of gas in the peak period. Most of the reduction in overall generation,
without storage, is simulated to occur in the low periods where coal generation is reduced. Storage
increases generation in the low demand periods when storage is being filled but then results in less
generation in the peak periods when storage is being released.
Electricity entering storage (represented as a negative number) and electricity being released
from storage (represented as a positive number) by electricity storage capacity are featured in Fig-
ure F.4. The filling and releasing of storage follows the dynamics of the social planner’s problem in
that it is filled in the low-price periods and released in the high-price periods. Uniquely, winter has
two periods of filling and two periods of releasing with higher levels of electricity storage capacity.
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Figure F.1: Price in the reference case by representative day, policy, and storage availability
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Figure F.2: Summer generation profile in the reference case by policy and storage availability
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Figure F.3: Spring generation profile in the reference case by policy and storage availability
119
Figure F.4: Storage use by representative day and storage capacity
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APPENDIX G
RARE EARTH STACKELBERG GAME R CODE
1 #Rare Earth Coproduction Stackelberg Game
2 #Maxwell Brown
3 #Contact: Maxwell.L.Brown@gmail.com
4 #Last revised: 20170419 (cleaning/annotation)
5
6 #libraries needed for installation




11 #turning off warnings from summation length mismatch
12 #for example x_j = sum_i (y_i * z_j) would throw up a warning
13 #no longer needed with model updates on 20160512
14 #options(warn=-1)
15
16 #change your working directory to where the files are located
17 #files needed: import1.csv and import2.csv
18 setwd("C:\\work\\cmi\\reepres\\")
19
20 #boolean to indicate whether we want to solve or not
21 solve = 1
22
23 ##
24 ##Begin data import and assumption assignments
25 ##
26
27 #Import share, price, and refq data
28 #as follows:
29 #dat1$i == element symbol (e.g. Ce, La,...)
30 #dat1$chi == legal chinese theta
31 #dat1$ill == illegal chinese theta
121
32 #dat1$aus == mt weld theta
33 #dat1$qi == reference quantity demanded
34 #dat1$pi = reference price
35 #dat1$cagr = compound average growth rate 2015-2020
36 dat1 = as.data.frame(read.csv("import1.csv"))
37
38 #supply elasticity, eta
39 eta = 0.5
40
41 #demand elasticity distribution range
42 delo = 0.5
43 deup = 1.5
44
45 #import annual data
46 #as follows
47 #dat2$year == year
48 #dat2$chi == reference annual legal chinese production
49 #dat2$ill == reference annual illegal chinese production
50 #dat2$aus == reference annual mount weld production
51 dat2 = as.data.frame(read.csv("import2.csv"))
52
53 #here we can assign a value to the k_i (the stockpiled REO)
54 #this gets changed for individual i’s in the model solve
55 dat1$ki = 0
56
57 #delta = proportion stockpiled in this model
58 delta = 0.10
59
60 #rateadj = rate increase for chinese Nd or Dy
61 #default 0.15
62 rateadj = 0.15
63
64 #costs per MT for china, illegal china, and mount weld
65 costchi = 201000
66 costill = 349000
67 costaus = 206000
68
69 #tax on legal chinese production, tau ($/MT)
70 #default for paper is 0.15*costchi
122
71 tau = 0.12*costchi
72
73 #how many times to loop over the elasticity set?
74 #results for paper took 5000 runs which took ˜2 days
75 #can get OK results with ˜100-200 runs
76 loopelas = 100
77
78 #compute the thetaˆ2 values to simplify model calculations
79 dat1$chi2 = dat1$chiˆ2
80 dat1$ill2 = dat1$illˆ2
81 dat1$aus2 = dat1$ausˆ2
82
83 #compute product of theta and price (helps with calculations later)
84 dat1$pchi = dat1$chi * dat1$pi
85 dat1$pill = dat1$ill * dat1$pi
86 dat1$paus = dat1$aus * dat1$pi
87
88 #calculate products of the thetaˆ2 and price parameters
89 dat1$pchi2 = dat1$chi2 * dat1$pi
90 dat1$pill2 = dat1$ill2 * dat1$pi
91 dat1$paus2 = dat1$aus2 * dat1$pi
92
93
94 #initialize parameters to avoid creating them in for loop
95 #since these are part of dat2, they are initialized for each year
96 dat1$eps = 1.5
97 dat2$phi = 0
98 dat2$psi = 0
99 dat2$Phi = 0
100 dat2$Psi = 0
101 dat2$gam = 0
102 dat2$kap = 0
103
104 #placeholders for XK* calculations are xk1-xk3
105 #final xk calculation is through dat2$xk
106 #xktot holds the values for averaging after all loops
107 dat2$xk1 = 0
108 dat2$xk2 = 0
109 dat2$xk3 = 0
123
110 dat2$xk = 0
111 dat2$xktot = 0
112
113 #same logic for XK except now with XL
114 dat2$xl1 = 0
115 dat2$xl2 = 0
116 dat2$xl3 = 0
117 dat2$xl = 0
118 dat2$xltot = 0
119
120 #same logic for XK and XL except now for XM
121 dat2$xm1 = 0
122 dat2$xm2 = 0
123 dat2$xm3 = 0
124 dat2$xm = 0
125 dat2$xmtot = 0
126
127 ##
128 ## End data initialization
129 ## Begin model setup
130 ##
131
132 #store original price
133 dat1$pi0 = dat1$pi
134
135 #store original thetas
136 dat1$chi0 = dat1$chi
137
138 #store original chinese costs
139 costchi0 = costchi
140
141 #switches for counterfactuals
142 SwDyRate = 0
143 SwNdRate = 0
144 SwDyStock = 0
145 SwNdStock = 0
146 SwEnvTax = 0
147 SwQuota = 0
148
124
149 #if we want to solve
150 if(solve==1){
151 #loop over the elasticity parameters
152 for(i in seq(from=1,to=loopelas,by=1)){
153
154 #reset potentially-altered parameters before each run
155 dat1$chi = dat1$chi0
156 dat1$ki = 0
157 costchi = costchi0
158
159 #drawn an elasticity from a uniform distribution
160 #10 here represents the numbers drawn (1 for each REO)
161 dat1$eps = runif(10, min=delo, max=deup)
162
163 for(j in seq(from=1,to=6,by=1)){
164
165 #adjust chinese dysprosium theta if switch calls for it
166 if(SwDyRate == 1 & j == 3){
167 dat1[dat1$i=="Dy",]$chi = dat1[dat1$i=="Dy",]$chi * (1+rateadj)
168 }
169
170 #adjust chinese neodymium theta if switch calls for it
171 if(SwNdRate == 1 & j == 3){
172 dat1[dat1$i=="Nd",]$chi = dat1[dat1$i=="Nd",]$chi * (1+rateadj)
173 }
174
175 #impost environmental tax if switch calls for it
176 if(SwEnvTax == 1 & j == 3){
177 costchi = tau+costchi0
178 }
179
180 #stockpile dysprosium if switch calls for it
181 if(SwDyStock == 1 & j == 3){
182 dat1[dat1$i=="Dy",]$ki = dat1[dat1$i=="Dy",]$qi * delta
183 }
184
185 #stockpile neodymium if switch calls for it
186 if(SwNdStock == 1 & j == 3){




190 #if(j>1){dat2[j,]$chi = dat2[j,]$chi0*ˆj}
191 dat1$pi = dat1$pi0 * dat1$cagrˆ(j-1)
192
193 #calculation of individual parameters takes multiple steps, indicated by parX
194 #calculation of phi
195 dat1$phi1 = dat1$paus2 / (dat1$eps * dat1$qi)
196 dat2[j,]$phi = 2 * sum(dat1$phi1) + costaus / (eta * dat2[j,]$aus)
197
198 #note the sign changes given negative denominators
199 dat1$psi1 = dat1$paus - dat1$aus * dat1$pi * dat1$ki / dat1$eps +
200 dat1$aus * dat1$pi *dat1$qi / dat1$eps
201
202 dat2[j,]$psi = sum(dat1$psi1) - costaus * (1-dat2[j,]$aus / (eta * dat2[j,]$aus))
203
204 #calculation of psi
205 dat1$Phi1 = dat1$pi * dat1$aus * dat1$ill / (-dat1$eps*dat1$qi)
206 dat1$Phi2 = dat1$eps*dat1$qi
207 dat2[j,]$Phi = 2 * (sum(dat1$pi * dat1$ill * (dat1$ill + dat1$aus * dat1$Phi1 /
208 dat2[j,]$phi)/dat1$Phi2 )+costill / (eta*dat2[j,]$ill))
209
210 #calculation of Psi
211 dat2[j,]$Psi = (sum(dat1$ill * (dat1$pi)*(1+(dat2[j,]$psi-dat1$qi-dat1$ki)
212 /(-dat1$eps*dat1$qi))) -costill * (1-1/eta))/ dat2[j,]$Phi
213
214 dat1$gam = dat1$aus * (( dat1$pill * dat1$aus) / (dat1$eps * dat1$qi)) / dat2[j,]$phi
215
216 #calculation of kappa
217 #note that this will be zero if k_i = 0 forall i
218 dat1$kap1 = dat1$aus * sum(dat1$pi * dat1$chi * dat1$aus/(-dat1$eps*dat1$qi)) / dat2[j,]$phi




223 dat1$kap = dat1$kap1 * (1+dat1$kap2)
224
225 #dat2[j,]$kap not used (kappa is indexed by i)
226 #summed here for observation only
126
227 #should be a relaively small negative number since
228 dat2[j,]$kap = sum(dat1$kap1)
229
230 #calculation of alpha
231 #note this is indexed by i as well
232 dat1$alp1 = sum(dat1$pi * dat1$chi * dat1$aus / (-dat1$eps * dat1$qi)) / dat2[j,]$phi
233




238 #calculation of optimal k (legal chinese) production
239 #first portion of the numerator:




244 #second portion of the numerator
245 dat2[j,]$xk2 = - costchi * (1-1/eta)+sum(delta*dat1$ki*dat1$pi*(dat1$chi+dat1$alp+dat1$kap)
246 /(-dat1$eps*dat1$qi))
247
248 dat2[j,]$xk3 = 2*(sum(dat1$pi *(dat1$chi+dat1$alp+dat1$kap)/(dat1$eps*dat1$qi))+costchi
249 /(eta*dat2[j,]$chi))
250
251 dat2[j,]$xk = (dat2[j,]$xk1 + dat2[j,]$xk2) / dat2[j,]$xk3
252 if(SwQuota = 1){dat2[j,]=105000}
253 dat2[j,]$xktot = dat2[j,]$xktot + dat2[j,]$xk
254
255 #scalar to simplify xl1 calculation
256 xltemp = sum(dat1$pi * dat1$chi * dat1$aus / (-dat1$eps*dat1$qi))/dat2[j,]$phi
257
258 #numerator of xl equation
259 dat2[j,]$xl1 = sum(dat1$ill*dat1$pi*(1+dat2[j,]$xk*(dat1$chi+dat1$aus*xltemp)
260 +dat1$aus*dat2[j,]$phi - dat1$ki - dat1$qi)/(-dat1$eps*dat1$qi)) #end sum
261 -costill*(1-dat2[j,]$ill/(eta*dat2[j,]$ill))
262
263 #denominator of xl equation
264 dat2[j,]$xl2 = 2 * (sum(dat1$pi * dat1$ill *(dat1$ill + dat1$pi * dat1$ill*dat1$aus
265 / (-dat1$eps*dat1$qi) / dat2[j,]$phi)/(dat1$eps*dat1$qi))+costill / (eta*dat2[j,]$ill*dat2[j,]$Phi))
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266
267 dat2[j,]$xl = dat2[j,]$xl1 / dat2[j,]$xl2
268
269 dat2[j,]$xltot = dat2[j,]$xltot + dat2[j,]$xl
270
271 #calculation of XM
272 #scalar calculations to simply the numerator of the XM equation
273 #these represent, in turn, the second through fifth elements
274 #in the XM* equation in the appendix
275 xmtemp1 = sum(dat1$chi*dat1$aus*dat2[j,]$xk / (-dat1$eps*dat1$qi))
276 xmtemp2 = sum(dat1$ill*dat1$aus*dat2[j,]$xl / (-dat1$eps*dat1$qi))
277 xmtemp3 = -sum(dat1$pi*dat1$aus*dat2$ki / (-dat1$eps*dat1$qi))
278 xmtemp4 = -sum(dat1$pi*dat1$aus*dat2$qi / (-dat1$eps))
279
280 dat2[j,]$xm1 = sum(dat1$aus*dat1$pi) + xmtemp1 + xmtemp2
281 + xmtemp3 + xmtemp4 - costaus*(1-dat2[j,]$aus / (eta*dat2[j,]$aus))
282 dat2[j,]$xm2 = 2*sum(dat1$aus2 * dat1$pi / (dat1$eps * dat1$qi)) + 2*costaus/(eta*dat2[j,]$aus)
283 dat2[j,]$xm = dat2[j,]$xm1 / dat2[j,]$xm2
284 dat2[j,]$xmtot = dat2[j,]$xmtot + dat2[j,]$xm
285 #
286
287 }#end elasticity sensitivity loop
288 }#end year loop
289 }#end solve conditional
290
291 dat2$xktot = dat2$xktot / loopelas
292 dat2$xltot = dat2$xltot / loopelas
293 dat2$xmtot = dat2$xmtot / loopelas
294
295 #extract final data columns from dat2
296 fdat = dat2[,c("Year","xktot","xltot","xmtot")]
297 colnames(fdat) = c("Year","Legal Chinese","Illegal Chinese","Mount Weld")
298
299 print("Production from each mine")
300 fdat
301
302 #melt the data
303 mdat = melt(fdat,id=c("Year"))
304
128
305 colnames(mdat) = c("Year","Producer","Production")





311 ylab("Production (1000 MT)")+
312 xlab("Year")+
313 ggtitle(paste("Production by Producer,",loopelas,"runs"))
314
315
316 #export tables for graphing script
317 #create a filename
318 fname = paste("out_",loopelas,"_",SwDyRate,SwNdRate,SwDyStock,SwNdStock,SwEnvTax,".csv",sep="")




MACC CALIBRATION GAMS CODE
MasterPC.gms wraps the code together. It calls, in order and with description:
1. init.inc: set up the GTAP data set
2. macc.inc: sets up the MAC target data table based on SwMACC
3. gtapingams.inc: sets up the default (indicated by ’de’) gtap-in-gams structure (Standard) structure. Also replicates the results from
the default nesting structure
4. mckwil.inc: sets up the mckibben and wilcoxen (indicated by ’mw’) nesting structure (basic)
5. worldscan.inc: sets up the worldscan (indicated by ’ws’) nesting structure (extended)
6. cases.inc: adjusts which elasticities are variable and solves each model in turn
7. caseseq.inc: secondary set of cases that solves the standard model’s set of variable elasticity permutations
8. calibexamp.gms: an example of calibrating an input that is non-scarce in the benchmark
MasterPC.gms
1




6 *last updated: 20170418 (Cleaning and annotation)
7




11 Scalar swlobnd "Switch to have lower bounds on all variables (1) or not (0)" /1/;
12 *//default 1, helps solver but not binding
13 Scalar fixrow "Switch to not fix (0) or fix (1) all ROW variables" /0/;
14 *//doesn’t matter -- used in testing
15 Scalar SwYFX "Switch to fix Y (i.e. assume inelastic demand)" /1/;
16 *//default 1
17 Scalar SwMATCHCase "Switch to have the WS match cases for DE and MW structures" /0/;
18 *//default 0 -- See MB b4 running
19 Scalar SwPRecurse "Switch to have the price of PA.L(ELE,USA) equal to P(ELE,USA)" /1/;
20 *//default 1
21 Scalar SwMACC /4/; //default 4-6, see note below
22 Scalar SwExtend "Switch to extend [1] or keep simple [0] objective function" /0/;
23 *//default 0
24 *objective function is extended by the difference of each fossil fuel’s emissions
25 *relative to that fossil fuel’s emissions in the base case
26
27 $ontext
28 0: McKinsey first-cut
29 1: McKinsey power cluster
30 2: Bloomberg
31 Specifically: 2030 US MAC curve (accounting for improving carbon
32 intensity, key recent polciies, and sector specific discount rates)
33 3: Bloomberg
34 Specifically: 2020 MAC curve (scenario 4 -- accounting for improving
35 carbon intensity, key recent poliies, and sector-specific discount rate
36 adjustments
37 4: Scaling Method A
38 5: Scaling Method B
39 6: Scaling Method C
40 $offtext
41
42 *set switches based on global definitions
43 SwMACC = %swmaccext%;
44 SwYFX = %swelasext%;
45
46 *Define upper and lower limits for elasticities
47 Scalar lolim "Lower limit for elasticity values" /0/; //default 0




51 *bounds on the variables (not elasticities)
52 scalar loval "lower bound on endogenous prices and quantities" /1e-3/; //default 1e-3, stable except DE to 1e-7
53 scalar hival "upper bound on endogenous prices and quantities" /1e7/; //doesn’t matter beyond 1e4
54
55 scalar mu "elasticity of electricity demand WRT price" /-0.5/; //default -0.5
56
57
58 *Include the file which holds all the information in the GTAP dataset
59 *this also solves a model based on the JE structure
60 *The JE structure was chosen since it contains all the information for
61 *all the models; that is, it replicates the GTAP dataset but also
62 *has the parameters necessary to compute the CO nest
63 *Since it replicates the GTAP dataset, the other level values used




68 set z "index of MACC curve points, could contain many more than data contains" /1*30/;
69 set zfeas(z) "feasible carbon price scenarios";
70 set pq "set of values on the MACC, price and quantity" /p,q/;
71
72
73 PARAMETER EMITELE "REFERENCE LEVEL OF CARBON EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRICITY SECTOR";
74 EMITELE(R) = SUM((FE,EEE),REFCO2(FE,EEE,R)*Y.L(EEE,R));
75
76
77 *Retrive the information from the MACC curve based on the selected cases data in the MACC parameter.




82 *the first feasible set is set as sometimes MACC("1","Q") equals zero
83 zfeas("1") = yes;
84 ZFEAS(Z)$((MACC(Z,"Q")>0)$(MACC(Z,"P")>0)) = yes;




88 *MACC Q must be taken as a reduction from the baseline
89 MACC(Z,"Q")$zfeas(z) = emitele("usa")-macc(z,"q");
90 display zfeas, MACC;
91
92 *Set up the model (SSEMPEC_DE) from the default nesting structure
93 *this also tests to see if the algebraic representation matches the MPSGE model (1st solve)
94 $include gtapingams.inc
95
96 *the de model includes the gtap representation from which we take the
97 *reference amount of carbone missions. The MACC ’Q’ , as used in the model,
98 *is the amount of aggregate emissions
99
100 *Set up the model (SSEMPEC_JE) from the Jorgensen et al. nesting structure
101 $include mckwil.inc
102
103 *Set up the model (SSEMPEC_MW) from the McKibbin and Wilcoxen nesting structure
104 $include worldscan.inc
105
106 *Fix input prices to output values:
107 PA.FX(I,R) = PA.L(I,R);
108 RK.FX(EEE,R) = RK.L(EEE,R);
109 PL.FX(R) = PL.L(R);
110
111 *include the file which changes settings depending on switches defined above (excluding SwMACC)
112 $include switchcalc.inc
113
114 parameter res_pq_DE,res_pq_MW, res_pq_WS, res_elas_DE, res_elas_MW, res_elas_WS, res_obj;
115
116 display macc;
117 parameter res_elas_all, res_obj_mod;
118 parameter res_pq, res_elas, res_obj;
119 parameter res_elas_fe, res_pq_fe;
120
121 ESUB_KLE_M_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.1;
122 esub_m_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.391;
123 esub_k_l_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.460;
124 esub_kl_e_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.256;






130 1 1E-04 2.549334
131 2 10 2.269493
132 3 20 2.107244
133 4 30 1.994301
134 5 40 1.907772
135 6 50 1.83754
136 7 60 1.778333
137 8 70 1.727083
138 9 80 1.681856
139 10 90 1.641358
140 11 100 1.604677
141 12 110 1.57115
142 13 120 1.540276
143 14 130 1.511666
144 15 140 1.485017
145 16 150 1.460081
146 ;
147
148 If((SwMATCHCASE = 1),
149 macc(z,"p") = macc_de_op(z,"pb");
150 macc(z,"q") = macc_de_op(z,"qb");
151 zfeas(z) = no;






158 1 1e-4 1e-2
159 2 10 0.22
160 3 20 0.54
161 4 30 0.83
162 5 40 1.01
163 6 50 1.12
164 7 60 1.17
165 8 70 1.22
134
166 9 80 1.23
167 10 90 1.25





173 1 1e-4 1e-2
174 2 10 0.268
175 3 20 0.540
176 4 30 0.798
177 5 40 0.897
178 6 50 0.994
179 7 60 1.042
180 8 70 1.089
181 9 80 1.102
182 10 90 1.119
183 11 100 1.132
184 ;
185 MAC_CPP(z,"ABA") = MAC_cpp2(z,"aba");
186
187 MAC_CPP(z,"ABA") = emitele("usa") - MAC_CPP(z,"ABA");
188
189 If((SwMATCHCASE = 2),
190 macc(z,"p") = MAC_CPP(z,"TAX");
191 macc(z,"q") = MAC_CPP(z,"ABA");
192 zfeas(z) = no;
193 zfeas(z)$((macc(z,"q")>0)$(macc(z,"p")>0)) = yes;
194 );
195
















211 execute_unload "res_pq_DE_4.gdx" res_pq_DE;
212
213 execute_unload "res_pq_MW_4.gdx" res_pq_MW;
214
215 execute_unload "res_pq_WS_4.gdx" res_pq_WS;
216
217 execute_unload "res_ELAS_DE_4.gdx" res_ELAS_DE;
218
219 execute_unload "res_ELAS_MW_4.gdx" res_ELAS_MW;
220
221 execute_unload "res_ELAS_WS_4.gdx" res_ELAS_WS;
222
223 execute_unload "res_OBJ_4.gdx" res_OBJ;
224
225 execute_unload "res_OBJ_MOD_4.gdx" res_OBJ_MOD;
226
227 execute_unload "res_ELAS_ALL_4.gdx" RES_ELAS_ALL;
228
229 Execute ’GDXXRW.EXE res_ELAS_ALL_4.gdx O=MACC_Export.xls par=res_elas_all rng=res4!A1:K30 rdim=2 cdim=1’;
230







238 execute_unload "res_pq_DE_5.gdx" res_pq_DE;
239
240 execute_unload "res_pq_MW_5.gdx" res_pq_MW;
241
242 execute_unload "res_pq_WS_5.gdx" res_pq_WS;
243
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244 execute_unload "res_ELAS_DE_5.gdx" res_ELAS_DE;
245
246 execute_unload "res_ELAS_MW_5.gdx" res_ELAS_MW;
247
248 execute_unload "res_ELAS_WS_5.gdx" res_ELAS_WS;
249
250 execute_unload "res_OBJ_5.gdx" res_OBJ;
251
252 execute_unload "res_OBJ_MOD_5.gdx" res_OBJ_MOD;
253
254 execute_unload "res_ELAS_ALL_5.gdx" RES_ELAS_ALL;
255
256 Execute ’GDXXRW.EXE res_ELAS_ALL_5.gdx O=MACC_Export.xls par=res_elas_all rng=res5!A1:K30 rdim=2 cdim=1’;
257







265 execute_unload "res_pq_DE_6.gdx" res_pq_DE;
266
267 execute_unload "res_pq_MW_6.gdx" res_pq_MW;
268
269 execute_unload "res_pq_WS_6.gdx" res_pq_WS;
270
271 execute_unload "res_ELAS_DE_6.gdx" res_ELAS_DE;
272
273 execute_unload "res_ELAS_MW_6.gdx" res_ELAS_MW;
274
275 execute_unload "res_ELAS_WS_6.gdx" res_ELAS_WS;
276
277 execute_unload "res_OBJ_6.gdx" res_OBJ;
278
279 execute_unload "res_OBJ_MOD_6.gdx" res_OBJ_MOD;
280
281 execute_unload "res_ELAS_ALL_6.gdx" RES_ELAS_ALL;
282
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283 Execute ’GDXXRW.EXE res_ELAS_ALL_6.gdx O=MACC_Export.xls par=res_elas_all rng=res6!A1:K30 rdim=2 cdim=1’;
284









294 execute_unload "res_elas_seq_4.gdx" res_elas_de_seq;
295 execute_unload "res_obj_seq_4.gdx" res_obj_seq;
296
297 Execute ’GDXXRW.EXE res_elas_seq_4.gdx O=MACC_Export.xls par=res_elas_de_seq rng=resseq4!A1:K30 rdim=1 cdim=1’;







305 execute_unload "res_elas_seq_5.gdx" res_elas_de_seq;
306 execute_unload "res_obj_seq_5.gdx" res_obj_seq;
307
308 Execute ’GDXXRW.EXE res_elas_seq_5.gdx O=MACC_Export.xls par=res_elas_de_seq rng=resseq5!A1:K30 rdim=1 cdim=1’;






315 execute_unload "res_elas_seq_6.gdx" res_elas_de_seq;
316 execute_unload "res_obj_seq_6.gdx" res_obj_seq;
317
318 Execute ’GDXXRW.EXE res_elas_seq_6.gdx O=MACC_Export.xls par=res_elas_de_seq rng=resseq6!A1:K30 rdim=1 cdim=1’;







2 $Title Read GTAP 9 Basedata and Replicate the Benchmark in MPSGE
3
4
5 $if not set ds $set ds trade
6 $include gtap9data
7
8 scalar hot Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Model /0/,
9 arm Armington trade model /0/;
10
11 parameter pcarb0(r) "initial price of carbon";
12
13
14 set row(r) "all countries that are not the USA" /CHN, IND, RUS, EUR, RA1, EEX, ROW/;
15 pcarb0(r) = 1e-6;
16
17 $if not set mdl $set mdl arm
18
19 $if %mdl%==hot hot=1;
20 $if %mdl%==arm arm=1;
21
22 * Accounts needed for alternative trade formulation:
23
24 parameter
25 vafm(i,g,r) Composite Armington demands,
26 rtfa(i,g,r) Interm-ediate input tax on Armington demands,
27 rtfa0(i,g,r) Benchmark intermediate input tax on Armington demands,
28 rta(i,r) Tariffs on Armington imports,
29 vam(i,r) Aggregate Armington supply to all demand categories,
30 vxm(i,r) Exports,
31 vtc(j,i,r) Transport service inputs,
32 rtm(i,r) Import tax rate,
33 rtx(i,r) Export tax rate,
34 phit(j,i,r) Transportation service input coefficient,
35 phim(g,r) Import productivity coefficient,
139
36 phix(i,r) Export productivity coefficient,
37 vhm(i,r) Value of H-O imports,
38 vhx(i,r) Value of H-O exports,
39 vhchk H-O trade balance check,
40 mktchk H-O market clearance check;
41
42
43 vafm(i,g,r) = vdfm(i,g,r) + vifm(i,g,r);
44 rtfa(i,g,r)$vafm(i,g,r) = (rtfd(i,g,r)*vdfm(i,g,r) + rtfi(i,g,r)*vifm(i,g,r)) / vafm(i,g,r);
45 rtfa0(i,g,r) = rtfa(i,g,r);
46 vxm(i,r) = sum(s, vxmd(i,r,s));
47 vam(i,r) = vim(i,r) + vom(i,r)-vst(i,r)-vxm(i,r);
48 vdm(i,r) = vom(i,r)-vst(i,r)-vxm(i,r);
49 vtc(j,i,r) = 0;
50 rta(i,r) = 0;
51 rtm(i,r) = 0;
52 rtx(i,r) = 0;
53 phit(j,i,r) = 0;
54 phim(g,r) = 0;





60 = sum(s, (vxmd(i,s,r)+sum(j,vtwr(j,i,s,r)))*(1-rtxs(i,s,r))*rtms(i,s,r)) /
61 sum(s, (vxmd(i,s,r)+sum(j,vtwr(j,i,s,r)))*(1-rtxs(i,s,r)));
62
63 rtx(i,r)$sum(s, vxmd(i,r,s)) = -sum(s, vxmd(i,r,s)*rtxs(i,s,r))/sum(s, vxmd(i,r,s));
64
65 phit(j,i,r)$sum(s, vxmd(i,s,r)*(1-rtxs(i,s,r)))
66 = sum(s, vtwr(j,i,s,r)) / sum(s, vxmd(i,s,r)*(1-rtxs(i,s,r)));
67
68 phim(i,r) = 1;
69 phix(i,r) = 1;
70
71 vhm(i,r) = -min(0, sum(s, vxmd(i,r,s)*(1-rtxs(i,r,s))) -
72 sum(s, vxmd(i,s,r)*(1-rtxs(i,s,r))));
73




77 phim(i,r)$vhm(i,r) = (1+sum(j,phit(j,i,r)))*(1+rtm(i,r));
78 phix(i,r)$vhx(i,r) = 1+rtx(i,r);
79
80 phix(i,r)$vhm(i,r) = min((1 + rtx(i,r))*0.95,1/phim(i,r));
81 phim(i,r)$vhx(i,r) = min((1+rtm(i,r))*(1+sum(j,phit(j,i,r)))*0.95,
82 1/phix(i,r));
83
84 * If there are no gross exports, then the net export activity
85 * is omitted from the model. If there are no gross imports in the
86 * benchmark, then net import is omitted.
87 *
88 phix(i,r)$(sum(s, vxmd(i,r,s))=0) = 0;
89 phim(i,r)$(sum(s, vxmd(i,s,r))=0) = 0;
90
91 vtc(j,i,r) = sum(s,vtwr(j,i,s,r)) - phit(j,i,r)*vhm(i,r);
92 rta(i,r) = sum(s, rtms(i,s,r)*((1-rtxs(i,s,r))*vxmd(i,s,r)+sum(j,vtwr(j,i,s,r))) -
93 rtxs(i,r,s)*vxmd(i,r,s));
94 vim(i,r) = 0;
95 *. vdm(i,r) = vam(i,r) - sum(j,vtc(j,i,r)) - rta(i,r);
96
97 vdm(i,r) = vom(i,r) - vst(i,r) - vhx(i,r) + vhm(i,r)*phim(i,r);
98 rta(i,r)$vdm(i,r) = (vam(i,r) - sum(j,vtc(j,i,r)) - vdm(i,r))/vdm(i,r);
99
100 esubd(i) = 0;
101 vhchk(i) = sum(r, vhx(i,r)*phix(i,r) - vhm(i,r));
102 display vhchk;
103




108 parameter bmkreport Summary of benchmark dataset;
109 bmkreport(i,r,"vom") = vom(i,r);
110 bmkreport(i,r,"vst") = vst(i,r);
111 bmkreport(i,r,"vhx") = vhx(i,r);
112 bmkreport(i,r,"vhm*phim(i,r)") = vhm(i,r)*phim(i,r);
113 bmkreport(i,r,"vdm") = vdm(i,r);
141
114 bmkreport(i,r,"rta") = rta(i,r)*vdm(i,r);
115 bmkreport(i,r,"vtc") = sum(j, vtc(j,i,r));
116 bmkreport(i,r,"vtc/vam")$vam(i,r) = sum(j, vtc(j,i,r))/vam(i,r);
117 bmkreport(i,r,"vam") = vam(i,r);
118 bmkreport(i,r,"sum(j,vafm(i,j,r))") = sum(j,vafm(i,j,r));
119 bmkreport(i,r,"vafm(i,c,r)") = vafm(i,"c",r);
120 bmkreport(i,r,"vafm(i,g,r)") = vafm(i,"g",r);
121 bmkreport(i,r,"vafm(i,i,r)") = vafm(i,"i",r);
122
123 * Subsets of energy commodities for nesting or specific references
124 * N.B.: Crude oil is rather treated as material input
125 set fe(i) Fossil fuels /col, oil, gas/,
126 co(i) Only coal and oil for JW /col,oil/,
127 fco(i) Not coal and oil /gas/
128 ele(i) Electricity /ele/,
129 e(i) Energy inputs /col,oil,gas,ele/,
130 xe(g) Fossil fuels /cru, gas, col/;
131
132 set eee(g) electricity as a subset of g /ele/;
133
134 * Re-assign labels for capital and labor inputs
135 parameter
136 vlm(g,r) Labor inputs,
137 vkm(g,r) Capital inputs,
138 vrm(g,r) Resource inputs for fossil fuel production,
139 etas(xe,r) Fossil fuel supply elasticities,
140 thetar(g,r) Value share of resource-specific input
141 esubr(g,r) Cross-price elasticity of substitution in resource production;
142
143 vlm(g,r) = vfm("lab",g,r);
144 vkm(g,r) = vfm("cap",g,r);
145 vrm(xe,r) = vkm(xe,r);
146 vkm(xe,r) = 0;




151 * Fossil fuel calibration to exogenous supply elasticities
152 * etas = Elasticity of supply
142
153 * esubr = Elasticity of substitution
154 * thetar = Value share of variable input
155
156 * esubr = etas * thetar/(1-thetar)
157
158
159 * Elasticities of fossil fuel supply:
160 etas("cru",r) = 1; etas("gas",r) = 1; etas("col",r) = 4;
161
162 parameter vshare Benchmark value shares;
163 vshare(xe,r)$(vom(xe,r) *(1-rto(xe,r))) = vrm(xe,r)*(1+rtf("cap",xe,r))/(vom(xe,r)*(1-rto(xe,r)));





169 scalar ssk Flag for sector-specific capital /0/;
170 * By default we assume region-specific capital
171 ssk = 1;
172
173 parameter
174 esub_kle_m(g) Elasticity of substitution between KLE and M,
175 esub_m(g) Elasticity of substitution within material composite,
176 esub_kl_e(g) Elasticity of substitution between KL and E,
177 esub_k_l(g) Elasticity of substitution between K and L,
178 esub_e(g) Elasticity of susbstituion within energy composite,
179 esub_co(g);
180
181 * Assign default mapping
182 esub_e(g) = 0.5;
183 esub_co(g) = 0.5;
184 esub_k_l(g) = esubva(g);
185 esub_kle_m(g) = 0.5;
186 esub_m(g) = 0.3;
187 esub_kl_e(g) = 0.5;
188




192 * Impose Leontief-fixed production for investment and public demand
193 set fixed(g) /G, I/;
194
195 loop(g$fixed(g), esub_e(g) = 0; esub_m(g) = 0; esub_kl_e(g) = 0;
196 esub_kle_m(g) = 0; esub_k_l(g) = 0;esub_co(g) = 0);
197
198
199 * Armington elasticities are provided by GTAP (with adjustments if
200 * values are too high -- e.g. this is the case for gas)
201 esubm(i) = min(esubm(i),10);
202 esubd(i) = min(esubd(i),esubm(i)/2);
203
204
205 * Extensions for CO2 emission control policies
206 parameter
207 refco2(i,g,r) Base-year energy- and sector-specific emission flows (billion tons of CO2),
208 co2_bmk(r) Cumulative base-year CO2 emissions (billion tons of CO2),
209 co2lim(r) Carbon emission limits,
210 cc(i,s,r) Embodied carbon
211 globaltarget Global emission target (if positive we enact a global emission ceiling);
212
213 set rtax(r) Countries with a regional carbon market,
214 ttax(r) Countries with international carbon trading,
215 tariff(i,s,r) Flag for optional imposition of bilateral tariffs on embodied carbon,
216 tariff_ho(i,r) Flag for optional imposition of tariff on embodied carbon;
217
218
219 * Convert CO2 emission units in billion tons of CO2 -- then the CO2 price
220 * in the model will be readily available as USD per ton of CO2:
221
222 refco2(fe,g,r) = (eco2d(fe,g,r) + eco2i(fe,g,r))/1e+3 ;
223 co2_bmk(r) = sum((fe,g), refco2(fe,g,r));
224 co2lim(r) = sum((fe,g), refco2(fe,g,r));
225 globaltarget = 0;
226 cc(i,s,r) = 0;
227 rtax(r) = no;
228 ttax(r) = no;
229 tariff(i,s,r) = no;
230 tariff_ho(i,r) = no;
144
231










242 Y(g,r)$vom(g,r) ! Supply
243 X(i,r)$phix(i,r) ! Homogeneous exports
244 A(i,r)$vam(i,r) ! Armington supply
245 M(i,r)$(vim(i,r)+phim(i,r)) ! Imports
246 YT(j)$vtw(j) ! Transportation services
247 EMIT(r) ! Regional emission flows







255 PW(i)$hot ! World Market Price (HO model)
256 P(g,r)$(vom(g,r) or phim(g,r)) ! Domestic output price
257 PA(i,r)$vam(i,r) ! Armington composite price
258 PM(j,r)$(arm and vim(j,r)) ! Import price
259 PT(j)$vtw(j) ! Transportation services
260 PL(r) ! Wage rate
261 RK(g,r)$(ssk*vkm(g,r)) ! Return to sector-specific capital
262 PR(g,r)$vrm(g,r) ! Resource-specific factor price
263 PCARB(r) ! Price of CO2
264 PTCARB$card(ttax) ! Price of tradable CO2
265 PRCARB(r)$rtax(r) ! Price of regional CO2









274 RA(r) ! Representative agent
275
276 $auxiliary:
277 TAU(i,s,r)$tariff(i,s,r) ! Embodied carbon tariffs
278 TAU_HO(i,r)$tariff_ho(i,r) ! Embodied carbon tariffs on HO goods
279 PHI$globaltarget ! Global carbon accounting
280
281
282 $prod:Y(g,r)$(vom(g,r) and (not xe(g)) and (not eee(g))) s:esub_kle_m(g)
283 + m(s):esub_m(g) kle(s):esub_kl_e(g) kl(kle):esub_k_l(g)
284 + e(kle):esub_e(g) fe.tl(e):0
285 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:RA(r) t:rto(g,r)
286 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) p:(1+rtfa0(i,g,r)) a:RA(r) t:rtfa(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i)
287 +m:$(not e(i)) e:$(e(i) and (not fe(i)))
288 i:PCARB(r)#(fe) q:refco2(fe,g,r) p:pcarb0(r) fe.tl:
289 i:PL(r) q:vlm(g,r) p:(1+rtf0("lab",g,r)) a:RA(r) t:rtf("lab",g,r) kl:
290 i:RK(g,r)$ssk q:vkm(g,r) p:(1+rtf0("cap",g,r)) a:RA(r) t:rtf("cap",g,r) kl:
291
292 $prod:Y(eee,r) s:esub_kle_m(eee)
293 o:P(eee,r) q:vom(eee,r) a:RA(r) t:rto(eee,r)
294 i:PVM(eee,r) q:(sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r))))






301 V:SY(eee,r) o:P(eee,r) prod:y(eee,r)
302
303 $prod:VKLE(eee,r) s:esub_kl_e(eee)
304 o:PKLE(eee,r) q:((vlm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) + vkm(eee,r)*
305 (1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)))+(sum(i$e(i),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))+sum(fe,refco2(fe,eee,r)*pcarb0(r))))






311 o:PVM(eee,r) q:(sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r))))
312 i:PA(i,r)$(not e(i)) q:vafm(i,eee,r) p:(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)) a:RA(r) t:Rtfa(i,eee,r)
313





319 i:PA(i,r)$((e(i))$(not co(i))) q:vafm(i,eee,r) p:(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r))
320 a:RA(r) t:rtfa(i,eee,r) i.tl:$fco(i)
321 i:pcarb(r)#(fco) q:refco2(fco,eee,r) p:pcarb0(r) fco.tl:
322
323
324 $prod:VCO(eee,r) s:esub_co(eee) fe.tl(s):0
325 o:PCO(eee,r) q:(sum(i$co(i),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))
326 +sum(i$co(i),refco2(i,eee,r)*pcarb0(r)))
327 i:PA(i,r)$(co(i)) q:vafm(i,eee,r) p:(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)) a:RA(r)
328 t:rtfa(i,eee,r) i.tl:$co(i)
329 i:pcarb(r)#(co) q:refco2(co,eee,r) p:pcarb0(r) co.tl:
330
331 $report:
332 V:DPVA(eee,r) i:PVA(eee,r) prod:Y(eee,r)
333 V:DPVE(eee,r) i:PVE(eee,r) prod:Y(eee,r)
334 V:DPVM(eee,r) i:PVM(eee,r) prod:Y(eee,r)
335 V:DPVKLE(EEE,R) i:PKLE(eee,r) prod:y(eee,r)
336
337 $Prod:VA(eee,r) s:esub_k_l(eee)
338 o:PVA(eee,r) q:(vlm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) + vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)))
339 i:PL(r) q:vlm(eee,r) p:(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) a:RA(r) t:rtf("lab",eee,r)
340 i:RK(eee,r)$ssk q:vkm(eee,r) p:(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)) a:RA(r) t:rtf("cap",eee,r)
341
342 $prod:Y(g,r)$xe(g) s:esubr(g,r) id:0
343 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:RA(r) t:rto(g,r)
344 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) p:(1+rtfa0(i,g,r)) a:RA(r) t:rtfa(i,g,r) id:
345 i:PCARB(r)#(fe) q:refco2(fe,g,r) p:pcarb0(r) id:
346 i:PL(r) q:vlm(g,r) p:(1+rtf0("lab",g,r)) a:RA(r) t:rtf("lab",g,r) id:



























373 i:PT(j) q:phit(j,i,r) a:RA(r) t:rtm(i,r)
374 i:PW(i) q:1 a:RA(r) t:rtm(i,r)




379 $prod:M(i,r)$(vim(i,r) and arm) s:esubm(i) s.tl:0$vxmd(i,s,r)
380 o:PM(i,r) q:vim(i,r)
381 i:P(i,s) q:(vxmd(i,s,r)) p:pvxmd(i,s,r) s.tl:
382 + a:RA(s) t:(-rtxs(i,s,r)) a:RA(r) t:(rtms(i,s,r)*(1-rtxs(i,s,r)))
383 + a:RA(r) n:TAU(i,s,r)$tariff(i,s,r) m:cc(i,s,r)$tariff(i,s,r)
384
385 i:PT(j)#(s) q:vtwr(j,i,s,r) p:pvtwr(i,s,r) s.tl:







392 i:P(i,r) q:vdm(i,r) a:RA(r) t:rta(i,r)
393
394 $report:










405 e:PRCARB(r)$rtax(r) q:co2lim(r) r:phi$globaltarget




410 globaltarget =e= sum(r, EMIT(r));
411
412 $constraint:TAU(i,s,r)$tariff(i,s,r)
413 P(i,s)*TAU(i,s,r) =e= PCARB(r);
414
415 $constraint:TAU_HO(i,r)$tariff_ho(i,r)
416 PW(i)*TAU_HO(i,r) =e= PCARB(r);
417
418 $offtext
419 $sysinclude mpsgeset gtap
420
421 if (hot,
422 X.L(i,r) = vhx(i,r);




426 display phix, phim;
427 parameter phixphim;




432 PCARB.l(r) = 0;
433 PTCARB.l = 0;
434 PRCARB.l(r) = 0;








443 gtap.optfile = 1;
444 gtap.iterlim = 0;
445 $include gtap.gen
446 solve gtap using mcp;









5 Table MCK1(Z,pq) "MACC data points"
6 P Q
7 1 1 0.80
8 2 9 0.818
9 3 20 0.938
10 4 29 0.968
11 5 44 1.358
150




16 1 1 0.06
17 2 9 0.13
18 3 20 0.25
19 4 29 0.3
20 5 44 0.59
21 6 50 0.77
22 *derived from: http://www.mckinsey.com/˜/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/
23 * Sustainability/cost%20curve%20PDFs/US_ghg_final_report.ashx





29 1 2 0.02
30 2 25 0.18
31 3 46 0.27
32 4 58 0.30
33 5 69 0.40
34 6 73 0.47
35 ;





41 1 5.90 0.10
42 2 23.29 0.33
43 3 56.52 0.63
44 4 73.29 0.72
45 5 81.99 0.81
46 6 90.99 0.95
47 ;




51 Table MACC_FIN(Z,pq) "Final data points for MACC, from BNEF’s 2030 MACC"
52 P Q
53 1 1e-4 1e-4
54 2 6 48
55 3 16 86
56 4 23 178
57 5 31 201
58 6 38 220
59 7 41 254
60 8 43 293
61 9 52 378
62 10 63 447
63 11 65 516
64 12 78 743
65 13 90 785
66 14 95 896
67 15 102 935
68 16 105 1022
69 17 113 1036
70 18 126 1129





76 * P Q
77 *1 -42.79 48.18
78 *2 -30.82 37.76
79 *3 -22.30 92.45
80 *4 -16.89 22.14
81 *5 -7.21 19.53
82 *6 -3.28 33.85
83 *7 -1.04 39.06
84 *8 1.00 84.64
85 *9 19.02 69.01
86 *10 20.82 69.01
87 *11 22.95 27.86
88 *12 46.56 71.67
89 *13 47.05 20.68
152
90 *14 56.72 39.06
91 *15 61.80 87.24
92 *16 63.61 14.32
93 *17 77.38 92.45
94 *18 89.18 76.82





100 1 -30.82 37.76 //Smart grid -- Automated residential systems
101 2 -22.30 92.45 //Smart grid -- AMI with visual display
102 3 -7.21 19.53 //Geothermal
103 4 -3.28 33.85 //Landfill Gas Power Generation
104 5 1e-4 39.06 //Wind (low-cost)
105 6 22.95 227.86 //Wind (high cost)
106 7 35.56 41.67 //Solar PV (utility scale)
107 8 47.05 110.68 //Nuclear
108 9 56.72 39.06 //Landfill projects (high-cost)
109 10 61.80 87.24 //Biomass
110 11 63.61 14.32 //Gas industry projects (low cost)
111 12 77.38 92.45 //Solar PV (residential)
112 13 89.18 76.82 //Coal-gas fuel switch for installed fleet








121 macc_orig_nonzero(z,pq) = macc_orig(z,pq);





127 MACC_ORIG(Z,"Q") = MACC_ORIG(Z-1,"Q")+MACC_ORIG(Z,"Q");




131 macc_orig_nonzero(z,pq)$(macc_orig_nonzero(z,"p")=0) = 0;
132























156 *kr scaling method 1
157 if((SwMACC=4),
158 MACC(Z,pq)=MACC_ORIG(Z,pq);
159 MACC(Z,"p")$(MACC(Z,"p")<>0) = MACC(Z,"p") + 42.79;
160 MACC(Z,"q") = (emitele("usa") - MACC("1","q") + MACC(Z,"q")) / 1000;
161 MACC("1","p") = 1e-4;




166 *kr scaling method 2




170 MACC(Z,"q") = (emitele("usa") - MACC("1","q") + MACC(Z,"q")) / 1000;
171 MACC(Z,"p")$(MACC(Z,"p")<0) = 1e-4;
172 MACC("20",pq) = 0;
173 );
174
175 *kr scaling method 3
176 *excludes negative prices completely
177 if((SwMACC=6),
178 MACC(Z,"p") = macc_orig_nonzero(z,"p");
179 MACC(Z,"q") = MACC_orig_nonzero(Z,"q") / 1000;






3 theta_kl_de(eee,r) value share of k in KL nest of ele,
4 theta_ve_de(i,eee,r) value share of i in E next of ele,
5 theta_vm_de(i,eee,r) value share of i in M node of ELE,
6 alpha_ve_de(i,eee,r) calibration parameter alpha, used to calibrate initial carbon and carbon responses (see appendix),
7 zprfcheck_de check parameter for zpc,
8 kle0_de reference level of kle0_de,
9 theta_pvm_de value share of M in top nest,
10 theta_kle_de value share of KLE in top nest,
11 theta_e_de value share of E in KLE nest,
12 theta_va_de value share of VA in KLE nest,
13 refp_de reference unit cost net of output tax,
14 rto1_de(eee,r) opposite of rto,
15 theta_co2_de(i,eee,r) value share of co2 in E subnests;
16
17 theta_co2_de(fe,eee,r) = pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r) / (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(fe,eee,r))
18 + pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r));
19
20 theta_co2_de("ele",eee,r) = 0;
21
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22 theta_kl_de(eee,r) = vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)) /
23 (vlm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) + vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)));
24
25 theta_ve_de(i,eee,r)$e(i) = (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)) + pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r)$fe(i))/
26 (sum(ii$e(ii),vafm(ii,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(ii,eee,r)))+sum(fe,refco2(fe,eee,r)*pcarb0(r)));
27
28 theta_vm_de(i,eee,r)$(not e(i)) = (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r))) /
29 (sum(ii$(not e(ii)),vafm(ii,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(ii,eee,r))));
30
31 alpha_ve_de(i,eee,r)$e(i) = ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) /
32 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) *pa.l(i,r)
33 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))
34 -refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb.l(r)/pcarb0(r);
35
36 zprfcheck_de("1",eee,r) = pve.l(eee,r) - sum(i$e(i),theta_ve_de(i,eee,r)*alpha_ve_de(i,eee,r));
37
38 theta_pvm_de(eee,r) = (sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) /
39 ((sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) +





45 theta_kle_de(eee,r) = 1 - theta_pvm_de(eee,r);
46
47 theta_va_de(eee,r) = (vlm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) + vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)))/
48 (sum(i$e(i),(1-theta_co2_de(i,eee,r))*vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))
49 + SUM(FE,theta_co2_de(fe,eee,r)*refco2(FE,eee,r)*PCARB0(R)) +
50 vlm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) + vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)) );
51 ;
52
53 theta_e_de(eee,r) = 1 - theta_va_de(EEE,R);
54




59 refp_de(eee,r) = 1-rto(eee,r);
60
156





66 PVM_de(z,eee,r) "price of VM nest in DE model"
67 PKLE_de(z,eee,r) "price of KLE nest in DE model"
68 PVE_de(z,eee,r) "price of VE nest in DE model"
69 PVA_de(z,eee,r) "price of VA nest in DE model"
70 P_de(z,eee,r) "price of electricity in DE model"
71 pcarb_(Z,R) "price of carbon in DE model"
72
73 *activity levels
74 VE_de(z,eee,r) "quantity (value) of E nest"
75 VKLE_de(z,eee,r) "quantity (value) of KLE nest"
76 VA_de(z,eee,r) "quantity (value) of VA nest"
77 VM_de(z,eee,r) "quantity (value) of M nest"
78 Y_de(z,eee,r) "quantity (value) of electricity"
79
80 *elasticities as variables (not indexed by z)
81 ESUB_KLE_M_de(eee,r) "elasticity of substitution for KLE_M in DE model"
82 esub_m_de(eee,r) "elasticity of substitution for m in DE model"
83 esub_k_l_de(eee,r) "elasticity of substitution for k_l in DE model"
84 esub_kl_e_de(eee,r) "elasticity of substitution for kl_e in DE model"





90 zpr_Y_de(z,eee,r) zero profits for Y
91 mkt_Y_de(z,eee,r) market for Y
92
93 zpr_kle_de(z,eee,r) zero profits at the KLE node of kle in ele
94 mkt_kle_de(z,eee,r) market for PKLE
95
96 zpr_kl_de(z,eee,r) zero profits at the KL node of kle in ele
97 mkt_PVA_de(z,eee,r) market for PVA
98
99 zpr_ve_de(z,eee,r) zero profits at the VE node of kle in ele
157
100 mkt_PVE_de(z,eee,r) market for PVA
101
102 zpr_vm_de(z,eee,r) zero profits at the M node of ele




107 *Third -- the model is the same as before except now the necessary variables are indexed by z
108 *=========================











120 *mkt_Y_de(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z).. y_de(z,EEE,R)*vom(eee,r) - SY.L(eee,r) =g=0;




125 *Market for M nest (second)
126 *=================
127
128 zpr_vm_de(Z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z).. (sum(i$(not e(i)), theta_vm_de(i,eee,r) * (PA.L(I,R) *
129 (1+RTFA(I,EEE,R)) / (1+RTFA0(I,EEE,R)) ) ** (1-ESUB_m_de(eee,r))))**(1/(1-ESUB_m_de(eee,r)))
















145 - PKLE_de(z,eee,r) =g= 0;
146
147 mkt_kle_de(Z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z)..
148 vkle_de(z,eee,r)*(VA_DE(Z,eee,r) + VE_DE(z,eee,r))








157 ( theta_kl_de(eee,r) * (RK.L(eee,r)*(1+rtf("cap",eee,r))/
158 (1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)))**(1-esub_k_l_de(eee,r))
159 + (1-theta_kl_de(eee,r))* (PL.L(r)*(1+rtf("lab",eee,r))/
160 (1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)))**(1-esub_k_l_de(eee,r)))**(1/(1-esub_k_l_de(eee,r)))










171 *Market for E nest (third)
172 *=================
173
174 **note here that the calculation of theta_ve_de has been inserted







181 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))
182 - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) *(pa.l(i,r)$(not eee(i))+pa.l(i,r)$(eee(i)$(SwPRecurse = 0))
183 + P_DE(Z,"ele","USA")$(eee(i)$(SwPRecurse = 1)))
184 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-
185 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb_.l(z,r)/pcarb0(r)
186 )**(1-esub_e_de(eee,r))






193 (PKLE_de(z,eee,r)/PVE_de(Z,eee,r))**esub_kl_e_de(eee,r) =g= 0;
194
195
196 ESUB_KLE_M_de.fx(eee,r) = ESUB_KLE_M(eee);
197 esub_m_de.fx(eee,r) = esub_m(eee);
198 esub_k_l_de.fx(eee,r) = esub_k_l(eee);
199 esub_kl_e_de.fx(eee,r) = esub_kl_e(eee);
200 esub_e_de.fx(eee,r) = esub_e(eee);
201
202 display esub_m_de.l, theta_vm_de;
203
204 *level values are those from the previous solve
205 PVM_de.l(z,eee,r) = PVM.l(eee,r);
206 PKLE_de.l(z,eee,r) = PKLE.l(eee,r);
207 PVE_de.l(z,eee,r) = PVE.l(eee,r);
208 PVA_de.l(z,eee,r) = PVA.l(eee,r);
209 P_de.l(z,eee,r) = P.l(eee,r);
210 pcarb_.l(Z,R) = PCARB.l(R);
211 VE_de.l(z,eee,r) = VE.l(eee,r);
212 VKLE_de.l(z,eee,r) = VKLE.l(eee,r);
213 VA_de.l(z,eee,r) = VA.l(eee,r);
214 VM_de.l(z,eee,r) = VM.l(eee,r);




218 *end calibration-to-GTAP testing - starting equations and variables for fitting procedure
219
220 Equations
221 FACDEMEQ_de "factor demand equation for each fossil fuel in electricity for DE model",
222 ERROREQ_de "error equation in DE model",
223 ERROREQ_de_LOG "experimental log(error) structure for objective function",
224 OBJEQ_de "objective function equation for DE model";
225
226 positive VARIABLES
227 FACDEM_de(Z,FE,EEE,R) "factor demand for each fossil fuel";
228
229 Variables
230 ERROR_de(Z) "squared error in DE model",
231 OBJ_de "objective function for DE model";
232
233 *Fourth -- demand for individual inputs into the E nest (col, gas, oil, ele)
234 *are computed using shepherds lemma on the inputs’ expenditure functions
235 *(i.e. partial zpr_ve_ / partial pa.l )
236 FACDEMEQ_de(z,fe,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z).. facdem_de(z,fe,eee,r) =e=
237 (
238 (
239 (theta_ve_de(fe,eee,r) * vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) )




244 vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) * PA.L(fe,r)
245 / (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r))
246 + refco2(fe,eee,r)*pcarb_.l(z,r)






253 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))
254 - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) *(pa.l(i,r)$(not eee(i))+
255 pa.l(i,r)$(eee(i)$(SwPRecurse = 0)) + P_DE(Z,"ele","USA")$(eee(i)$(SwPRecurse = 1)))
161
256 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-









266 emit0(fe,eee,r) = (
267 (
268 (
269 (theta_ve_de(fe,eee,r) * vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) ) /




274 vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) * PA.L(fe,r) /
275 (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r))
276 + refco2(fe,eee,r)*(1e-8) /






283 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) *pa.l(i,r)
284 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) /















299 *Fifth -- error is computed as the difference between the endogenous level of
300 *electricity carbon activity (i.e. sum over all factor demands multiplied by their
301 *reference carbon levels) less the reference level of carbon from the MACC curve
302
303 *scalar mu /-0.5/;
304 ERROREQ_de(Z)$ZFEAS(Z).. ERROR_de(Z) =e= (p_de(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*
305 SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM_de(Z,FE,"ELE","USA")) - MACC(Z,"Q");
306
307 ERROREQ_de_LOG(Z)$ZFEAS(Z).. ERROR_de(Z) =e= LOG(abs((p_de(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*
308 SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM_de(Z,FE,"ELE","USA")) - MACC(Z,"Q")));
309
310 *ERROREQ_de(Z).. ERROR_de(Z) =e= SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
311 FACDEM_de(Z,FE,"ELE","USA")) - MACC(Z,"Q");
312
313 *Sixth -- the objective is to minimize the squared errors
314 OBJEQ_de.. OBJ_de =e= SUM(Z$ZFEAS(Z),power(error_de(z),2)) +
315 SwExtend * power((sum((z,fe)$zfeas(z),REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*




















































367 ssempec_de.optfile = 1;







3 theta_k_mw(eee,r) "value share of k in top nest of MW model",
4 theta_l_mw(eee,r) "value share of l in top nest of MW model",
5 theta_ve_mw(i,eee,r) "value share of i in E nest of ele",
6 theta_vm_mw(i,eee,r) "value share of i in M node of ELE",
7 alpha_ve_mw(i,eee,r) "alpha value for MW model",
8 zprfcheck_mw "Zero profit condition check for MW model",
9 e0_mw "refernece E nest value",
10 theta_pvm_mw "value share of m in top nest of MW model",
11 theta_pe_mw "value share of E in top nest of MW model",
12 refp_mw "reference unit cost net of output tax",
13 *note theta co2 is a very small value
14 theta_co2_mw(i,eee,r) "value share of CO2 in e nest of MW model";
15
16 theta_co2_mw(fe,eee,r) = pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r) /
17 (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(fe,eee,r)) + pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r));
18
19 theta_co2_mw("ele",eee,r) = 0;
20
21 theta_k_mw(eee,r) = vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)) /
22 ((sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) +






29 theta_l_mw(eee,r) = vlm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) /
30 ((sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) +





36 theta_pvm_mw(eee,r) = (sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) /
37 ((sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) +







44 theta_pe_mw(eee,r) = (sum(i$e(i),(1-theta_co2_mw(i,eee,r))*vafm(i,eee,r)*
45 (1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))+sum(fe,theta_co2_mw(fe,eee,r)*refco2(fe,eee,r)*pcarb0(r)))/
46 ((sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) +





52 theta_ve_mw(i,eee,r)$e(i) = (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)) + pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r)$fe(i))/
53 (sum(ii$e(ii),vafm(ii,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(ii,eee,r)))+sum(fe,refco2(fe,eee,r)*pcarb0(r)));
54
55 theta_vm_mw(i,eee,r)$(not e(i)) = (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r))) /
56 (sum(ii$(not e(ii)),vafm(ii,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(ii,eee,r))));
57
58 alpha_ve_mw(i,eee,r)$e(i) = ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) /
59 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) *pa.l(i,r)
60 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) -
61 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb.l(r)/pcarb0(r);
62
63 zprfcheck_mw("1",eee,r) = pve.l(eee,r) - sum(i$e(i),theta_ve_mw(i,eee,r)*alpha_ve_mw(i,eee,r));
64
65 refp_mw(eee,r) = (1-rto(eee,r));
66
67 rto1_mw(eee,r) = 1-rto(eee,r);
68
69 e0_mw(eee,r) = ((sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) +





75 *Display theta_k_mw, theta_l_mw, theta_ve_mw, theta_vm_mw,
76 *alpha_ve_mw, zprfcheck_mw, e0_mw, theta_pvm_mw, theta_pe_mw,





81 PVM_MW(z,eee,r) "price of M nest in MW model"
82 PVE_MW(z,eee,r) "price of E nest in MW model"
83 P_MW(z,eee,r) "price of electricity in MW model"
84 PCARB_(Z,R) "price of carbon"
85
86 *and activity levels
87 VE_MW(z,eee,r) "VE in MW model"
88 VM_MW(z,eee,r) "VM in MW model"
89 Y_MW(z,eee,r) "Y in MW model"
90
91 *other variables
92 FACDEM_MW(Z,FE,EEE,R) "factor demand for each fossil fuel in MW model";
93
94 *elasticities as variables (not indexed by z)
95 ESUB_KLE_M_MW(eee,r) "elasticity of substitution for KLE_M in MW model"
96 esub_m_MW(eee,r) "elasticity of substitution for m in MW model"









106 FACDEMEQ_MW "factor demand in MW model",
107 ERROREQ_MW "error equation in MW model",
108 ERROREQ_MW_LOG "experimental log transformation of error in MW model",
109 OBJEQ_MW "MW objection function";
110
111
112 zpr_Y_MW(z,eee,r) zero profits for Y
113 mkt_Y_MW(z,eee,r) market for Y
114
115 zpr_ve_MW(z,eee,r) zero profits at the VE node of kle in ele
116 mkt_PVE_MW(z,eee,r) market for PVA
117
167
118 zpr_vm_MW(z,eee,r) zero profits at the M node of ele




123 *Third -- the model is the same as before except now the necessary variables are indexed by z
124 *=========================





130 (theta_pvm_mw(eee,r) * pvm_mw(z,eee,r) **(1-esub_kle_m_MW(eee,r)))
131 +(theta_pe_mw(eee,r) * pve_mw(z,eee,r) **(1-esub_kle_m_MW(eee,r)))
132 +(theta_k_mw(eee,r) * (RK.L(eee,r)*(1+rtf("cap",eee,r))/
133 (1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)))**(1-esub_kle_m_MW(eee,r)))







141 *other representations presented here
142 *mkt_Y_MW(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z).. Y_MW(Z,EEE,R)*vom(eee,r) - SY.L(eee,r) =g=0;
143 *mkt_Y_MW(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z).. Y_MW(Z,EEE,R)*vom(eee,r) - p_MW(z,"ele","usa")**mu =g=0;




148 *Market for M nest (second)
149 *=================
150
151 zpr_vm_MW(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z).. (sum(i$(not e(i)), theta_vm_mw(i,eee,r) * (PA.L(I,R) * (1+RTFA(I,EEE,R)) /
152 (1+RTFA0(I,EEE,R)) ) ** (1-ESUB_m_MW(EEE,r))))**(1/(1-esub_m_MW(eee,r)))
153 - pvm_mw(z,eee,R) =G= 0;
154
155 mkt_PVM_MW(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z)..




159 (P_MW(Z,EEE,r)/pvm_mw(z,eee,r))**esub_kle_m_MW(eee,r) =g= 0;
160
161 *=================





167 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) *
168 (pa.l(i,r)$(not ele(i))+pa.l(i,r)$(ele(i)$(SwPRecurse = 0)) + P_MW(Z,"ele","USA")$(ele(i)$(SwPRecurse = 1)))
169 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) -
170 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb_.l(z,r)/pcarb0(r)





176 Y_MW(Z,EEE,r)*theta_pe_mw(eee,r)*e0_mw(eee,r)*(P_MW(Z,EEE,r)/pve_mw(z,eee,r))**esub_kle_m_MW(eee,r) =g= 0;
177
178
179 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.fx(eee,r) = ESUB_KLE_M(eee);
180 esub_m_MW.fx(eee,r) = esub_m(eee);
181 esub_e_MW.fx(eee,r) = esub_e(eee);
182
183 *level values are those from the previous solve
184 PVM_MW.l(z,eee,r) = PVM.l(eee,r);
185 PVE_MW.l(z,eee,r) = PVE.l(eee,r);
186 P_MW.l(z,eee,r) = P.l(eee,r);
187 PCARB_.l(Z,R) = PCARB.l(R);
188 VE_MW.l(z,eee,r) = VE.l(eee,r);
189 VM_MW.l(z,eee,r) = VM.l(eee,r);




194 *Fourth -- demand for individual inputs into the E nest (col, gas, oil, ele)
195 *are computed using shepherds lemma on the inputs’ expenditure functions (i.e. partial zpr_ve_ / partial pa.l )
169
196 FACDEMEQ_MW(z,fe,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z).. facdem_MW(z,fe,eee,r) =e=
197 (
198 (





204 vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) * PA.L(fe,r) / (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) -
205 pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r))






212 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) -
213 pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) *(pa.l(i,r)$(not ele(i))+pa.l(i,r)$(ele(i)$(SwPRecurse = 0)) +
214 P_MW(Z,"ele","USA")$(ele(i)$(SwPRecurse = 1)))







222 *Fifth -- error is computed as the difference between the endogenous level of
223 *electricity carbon activity (i.e. sum over all factor demands multiplied by their
224 *reference carbon levels) less the reference level of carbon from the MACC curve
225
226
227 ERROREQ_MW(Z)$ZFEAS(Z).. ERROR_MW(Z) =e=
228 (p_MW(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM_MW(Z,FE,"ELE","USA")) - MACC(Z,"Q");
229
230 ERROREQ_MW_LOG(Z)$ZFEAS(Z).. ERROR_MW(Z) =e=
231 LOG(abs(((p_MW(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM_MW(Z,FE,"ELE","USA")) - MACC(Z,"Q"))));
232
233
234 *ERROREQ(Z).. ERROR(Z) =e= SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM(Z,FE,"ELE","USA")) - MACC(Z,"Q");
170
235
236 *Sixth -- the objective is to minimize the squared errors
237 OBJEQ_MW.. OBJ_MW =e= SUM(Z$ZFEAS(Z),power(error_MW(z),2))









































278 *for now, the elasticities are fixed at their respective parameter values
279 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.fx(eee,r) = ESUB_KLE_M(eee);
280 esub_m_MW.fx(eee,r) = esub_m(eee);
281 esub_e_MW.fx(eee,r) = esub_e(eee);
282
283 *fix elasticities of substitution at reference values
284 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.fx(eee,r) = 0.7634;
285 esub_m_MW.fx(eee,r) = 1.001;
286 esub_e_MW.fx(eee,r) = 0.2;
287
288 *level values are those from the previous solve
289 PVM_MW.l(z,eee,r) = PVM.l(eee,r);
290 PVE_MW.l(z,eee,r) = PVE.l(eee,r);
291 P_MW.l(z,eee,r) = P.l(eee,r);
292 PCARB_.l(Z,R) = PCARB.l(R);
293 VE_MW.l(z,eee,r) = VE.l(eee,r);
294 VM_MW.l(z,eee,r) = VM.l(eee,r);
295 Y_MW.l(z,eee,r) = Y.l(eee,r);
296
297 ssempec_mw.optfile = 1;





3 theta_kl_je(eee,r) value share of k in KL nest of ele for JE model,
4 theta_ve_je(i,eee,r) value share of i in E nest of KLE for JE model,
5 theta_col_je(i,eee,r) value share of i in CO nest of VE for JE model,
6 theta_gasoil_je(i,eee,r) value share of CO nest in EEE nes for JE modelt
7 theta_vm_je(i,eee,r) value share of i in M node of ELE for JE model,
8 alpha_ve_je(z,i,eee,r) alpha value for E nest for JE model,
9 alpha_co_je(z,i,eee,r) alpha value for coal oil nest for JE model,
10 zprfcheck_je zero profit check for JE model,
172
11 ve0_je reference value of E nest for JE model,
12 kle0_je reference KLE nest value for JE model,
13 theta_pvm_je value share of materials in top nest for JE model,
14 theta_kl_e_je value share of kl in kle nest for JE model,
15 theta_e_je value share of e in kle nest for JE model,
16 theta_va_je value share of VA in top nest for JE model,
17 refp_je reference unit cost net of output tax for JE model,
18 rto1_je(eee,r) opposite of rto -- unused for JE model,
19 theta_co2_je(i,eee,r) value share of carbon in each fe nest (very small value) for JE model,
20 theta_colgasoil_je value share of cgo in E nest for JE model,
21 theta_col_gasoil(eee,r) value share of col or GO in CGO nest;
22
23 theta_co2_je(fe,eee,r) = pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r) / (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(fe,eee,r)) + pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r));
24
25 theta_co2_je("ele",eee,r) = 0;
26
27 theta_kl_je(eee,r) = vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)) / (vlm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) + vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)));
28
29 set eeef(eee) /ele/;
30 set rf(r) /USA/;
31
32
33 parameter theta_ve0_je "reference value share of energy - used in testing";
34
35 *note that the denominator did not need to change since the nest below VE includes the same elements





41 *change to allow for dynamic representation of nest items
42 set nest1(i) "any index of e(i) in the 1st nest" /ele/; //default for worldscan is ele
43 set nest2(i) "any index of e(i) in the 2nd nest" /col/; //default for worldscan is coal
44 set nest3(i) "any index of e(i) in the 3rd nest" /gas, oil/; //default for worldscan is gas and oil
45
46 *nest one doesn’t change
47 theta_ve_je(i,eee,r)$nest1(i) = theta_ve0_je(i,eee,r) / sum(ii$e(ii), theta_ve0_je(ii,eee,r));
48
49 *nest two does change - notice the denominator here
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50 theta_ve_je(i,eee,r)$nest2(i) = theta_ve0_je(i,eee,r) / sum(ii$(nest2(ii) or nest3(ii)),
51 theta_ve0_je(i,eee,r));
52
53 *nest three does change - notice the denominator again
54 theta_ve_je(i,eee,r)$nest3(i) = theta_ve0_je(i,eee,r) / sum(ii$nest3(ii),theta_ve0_je(ii,eee,r));
55
56 *for next two equations, see email FW: This seems to work and gams file ’calibexamp.gms’ in dropbox folder
57 alpha_ve_je(z,i,eee,r)$((e(i))$(not co(i))) = ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) /
58 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) * pa.l(i,r)
59 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-
60 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb.l(r)/pcarb0(r);
61
62
63 alpha_co_je(z,i,eee,r)$co(i) = ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) -
64 pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) * pa.l(i,r)
65 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-refco2(i,eee,r) *
66 pcarb0(r)) * pcarb.l(r)/pcarb0(r);
67
68




73 zprfcheck_je("1",eee,r) = pve.l(eee,r) - sum(i$e(i),theta_ve_je(i,eee,r)*alpha_ve_je("1",i,eee,r));
74
75
76 theta_pvm_je(eee,r) = (sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) /
77 ((sum(i$(not e(i)),vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))) +






84 theta_kl_e_je(eee,r) = 1 - theta_pvm_je(eee,r);
85
86




90 vlm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) + vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)) );
91
92












105 ve0_je(eee,r) = (sum(i$e(i),(1-theta_co2_je(i,eee,r))*vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)))+
106 sum(fe,theta_co2_je(fe,eee,r)*refco2(fe,eee,r)*pcarb0(r)));
107
108 refp_je(eee,r) = 1-rto(eee,r);
109




114 *Second -- Create new variables and equations that are indexed by MACC data point (z)
115 Positive Variables
116 *prices
117 PVM_JE(z,eee,r) "price of VM in JE model",
118 PKLE_JE(z,eee,r) "price of KLE in JE model",
119 PVE_JE(z,eee,r) "price of VE in JE model",
120 PVA_JE(z,eee,r) "price of VA in JE model",
121 P_JE(z,eee,r) "price of electricity in JE model",
122 PCARB_(Z,R) "price of carbon in JE model",
123 pn1_JE(z,eee,r) "price of nest n1 in JE model",
124 pn2_je(z,eee,r) "price of nest n2 in JE model",
125 pn3_je(z,eee,r) "price of nest n3 in JE model",
126 pcol_je(z,eee,r) "price of col in JE model",
127 pgasoil_je(z,eee,r) "price of go in JE model",
175
128
129 *and activity levels
130 Y_JE(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of Y in JE model",
131 VE_JE(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of VE in JE model",
132 VKLE_JE(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of VKLE in JE model",
133 VA_JE(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of VA in JE model",
134 VM_JE(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of VM in JE model",
135 vcol_je(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of vcol in JE model",
136 vgasoil_je(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of vgasoil in JE model",
137 vn1_JE(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of vn1 in JE model",
138 vn2_JE(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of vn2 in JE model",
139 vn3_je(z,eee,r) "value (quantity) of vn3 in JE model"
140
141
142 *elasticities as variables (not indexed by z)
143 ESUB_KLE_M_JE(eee,r) "elasticity of KLE_M nest in JE model"
144 esub_m_JE(eee,r) "elasticity of m nest in JE model"
145 esub_k_l_JE(eee,r) "elasticity of k_l nest in JE model"
146 esub_kl_e_JE(eee,r) "elasticity of kl_e nest in JE model"
147 ESUB_EEE_JE(EEE,R) "elasticity of EEE nest in JE model"
148 esub_n1_je(eee,r) "elasticity of n1 nest in JE model"
149 esub_n2_je(eee,r) "elasticity of n2 nest in JE model"
150 esub_n3_je(eee,r) "elasticity of n3 nest in JE model"







158 zpr_Y_JE(z,eee,r) zero profits for Y
159 mkt_Y_JE(z,eee,r) market for Y
160
161 zpr_kle_JE(z,eee,r) zero profits at the KLE node of kle in ele
162 mkt_kle_JE(z,eee,r) market for PKLE
163
164 zpr_kl_JE(z,eee,r) zero profits at the KL node of kle in ele
165 mkt_PVA_JE(z,eee,r) market for PVA
166
176
167 zpr_vm_JE(z,eee,r) zero profits at the M node of ele
168 mkt_PVM_JE(z,eee,r) market for PVA
169
170 zpr_n1_JE(z,eee,r) zero profits at the VE node of kle in ele
171 mkt_n1_JE(z,eee,r) market for PVA
172
173 zpr_n2_JE(z,eee,r) zero profits of n2 in JE model
174 mkt_n2_JE(z,eee,r) market for n2
175
176 zpr_n3_JE(z,eee,r) zero profits of n3 in JE model




181 *Third -- the model is the same as before except now the necessary variables are indexed by z
182 *=========================











194 *mkt_Y_JE(z,eee,r)$(rf(r)$eeef(eee)$ZFEAS(Z)).. y_JE(z,EEE,R)*vom(eee,r) - SY.L(eee,r) =g=0;
195 mkt_Y_JE(z,eee,r)$(rf(r)$eeef(eee)$ZFEAS(Z)).. y_JE(z,EEE,R)*vom(eee,r) - SY.L(eee,r)*p_JE(z,eee,r)**mu =g= 0;
196
197 *=================





203 zpr_vm_JE(Z,eee,r)$(rf(r)$eeef(eee)$ZFEAS(Z)).. (sum(i$(not e(i)), theta_vm_je(i,eee,r) *
204 (PA.L(I,R) * (1+RTFA(I,EEE,R)) / (1+RTFA0(I,EEE,R)) ) ** (1-ESUB_m_JE(eee,r))))**(1/(1-ESUB_m_JE(eee,r)))






210 (P_JE(Z,eee,r)/(PVM_JE(z,eee,r)))**ESUB_KLE_M_JE(eee,r) =g= 0;
211
212 *===============================






















235 ( theta_kl_je(eee,r) * (RK.L(eee,r)*(1+rtf("cap",eee,r))/
236 (1+rtf0("cap",eee,r)))**(1-esub_k_l_JE(eee,r))
237 + (1-theta_kl_je(eee,r))* (PL.L(r)*(1+rtf("lab",eee,r))/
238 (1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)))**(1-esub_k_l_JE(eee,r)))**(1/(1-esub_k_l_JE(eee,r)))




243 VA_JE(z,eee,r)*theta_va_je(eee,r) * kle0_je(eee,r) -










253 *calculation method doesn’t matter for original values
254 parameter n1_0, n2_0, n3_0;
255
256 n1_0(eee,r) = ve0_je(eee,r);
257 n2_0(eee,r) = (1-sum(i$nest1(i),theta_ve_je(i,eee,r)))*ve0_je(eee,r);
258 n3_0(eee,r) = (1-sum(i$nest2(i),theta_ve_je(i,eee,r)))*n2_0(eee,r);
259
260 display n1_0, n2_0, n3_0;
261
262 n1_0(eee,r) = sum(i$e(i),(1-theta_co2_je(i,eee,r))*vafm(i,eee,r)*
263 (1+rtfa0(i,eee,r))+theta_co2_je(i,eee,r)*refco2(i,eee,r)*pcarb0(r));
264
265 n2_0(eee,r) = sum(i$(nest2(i) or nest3(i)),(1-theta_co2_je(i,eee,r))*
266 vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r))+theta_co2_je(i,eee,r)*refco2(i,eee,r)*pcarb0(r));
267
268 n3_0(eee,r) = sum(i$nest3(i),(1-theta_co2_je(i,eee,r))*vafm(i,eee,r)*
269 (1+rtfa0(i,eee,r))+theta_co2_je(i,eee,r)*refco2(i,eee,r)*pcarb0(r));
270





276 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) -
277 pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r)))
278 * (pa.l(i,r)$(NOT ELE(I)) + PA.L(I,R)$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 0))+
279 P_JE(z,"ele","usa")$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 1)))
280 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-
281 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb_.l(z,r)/pcarb0(r)
282 )**(1-esub_n1_JE(eee,r))))








290 ve_JE(z,eee,r) * n1_0(eee,r) -
291 VKLE_JE(z,eee,r) * n1_0(eee,r) *
292 (PKLE_JE(z,eee,r)/pve_JE(z,eee,r))**esub_kl_e_JE(eee,r) =g= 0;
293




298 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) -
299 pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r)))
300 * (pa.l(i,r)$(NOT ELE(I)) + PA.L(I,R)$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 0))+
301 P_JE(z,"ele","usa")$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 1))
302 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-
303 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb_.l(z,r)/pcarb0(r)
304 ))**(1-esub_eee_JE(eee,r)))







312 ve_JE(z,eee,r) * (1-theta_va_je(eee,r)) * kle0_je(eee,r) -
313 VKLE_JE(z,eee,r) * (1-theta_va_je(eee,r)) * kle0_je(eee,r) *










323 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) -
324 pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r)))
325 * (pa.l(i,r)$(NOT ELE(I)) + PA.L(I,R)$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 0))+
326 P_JE(z,"ele","usa")$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 1))
327 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-
328 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb_.l(z,r)/pcarb0(r)
329 ))**(1-esub_n2_JE(eee,r)))






336 vn2_JE(z,eee,r)* n2_0(eee,r) -
337 ve_JE(z,eee,r) * n2_0(eee,r) *(Pve_JE(z,eee,r)/pn2_JE(z,eee,r)
338 )**esub_n1_JE(eee,r) =g= 0;
339
340
341 display theta_ve_je, theta_e_je,theta_ve_je;
342
343 *=================




348 * VA_de(z,eee,r)*(vlm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("lab",eee,r)) + vkm(eee,r)*(1+rtf0("cap",eee,r))) -





354 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) -
355 pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r)))
356 * (pa.l(i,r)$(NOT ELE(I)) + PA.L(I,R)$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 0))+
357 P_JE(z,"ele","usa")$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 1))
358 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-








366 vn3_JE(z,eee,r) * n3_0(eee,r) -
367 vn2_JE(z,eee,r) * n3_0(eee,r)*(Pn2_JE(z,eee,r)/pn3_JE(z,eee,r)
368 )**esub_n2_JE(eee,r) =g= 0;
369
370 *separate model structure, only has ELE and FE
371 *not used in paper but still very interesting
372
373 equation zpr_fe_je(z,eee,r), mkt_fe_je(z,eee,r);




378 theta_fe_je(i,eee,r)$fe(i) = (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa0(i,eee,r)) +





384 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) -
385 pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) * pa.l(i,r)
386 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-

















403 VFE_JE.l(z,eee,r) = 1;
404 PFE_JE.l(z,eee,r) = 1;
405
406 *for now, the elasticities are fixed at their respective parameter values
407 ESUB_KLE_M_JE.fx(eee,r) = ESUB_KLE_M(eee);
408 esub_m_JE.fx(eee,r) = esub_m(eee);
409 esub_k_l_JE.fx(eee,r) = esub_k_l(eee);
410 esub_kl_e_JE.fx(eee,r) = esub_kl_e(eee);
411 esub_EEE_JE.fx(eee,r) = esub_e(eee);
412 esub_FE_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.5;
413 esub_COL_JE.fx(eee,r) = esub_e(eee);
414 esub_GASOIL_JE.fx(eee,r) = esub_e(eee);
415
416 esub_n1_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.25;
417 esub_n2_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.7;
418 esub_n3_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.5;
419
420 ESUB_KLE_M_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.01;
421 esub_m_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.6;
422 esub_k_l_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.85;
423 esub_kl_e_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.5;
424 esub_EEE_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.25;
425 esub_COL_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.7;
426 esub_GASOIL_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.5;
427
428 *level values are those from the previous solve
429 PVM_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = PVM.l(eee,r);
430 PKLE_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = PKLE.l(eee,r);
431 PVE_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = PVE.l(eee,r);
432 PVA_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = PVA.l(eee,r);
433 P_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = P.l(eee,r);
434 PCARB_.l(Z,R)$ZFEAS(Z) = PCARB.l(R);
435 VE_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = VE.l(eee,r);
436 VKLE_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = VKLE.l(eee,r);
437 VA_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = VA.l(eee,r);
438 VM_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = VM.l(eee,r);
439 Y_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = Y.l(eee,r);
183
440 *vcol_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = vcol_je.l(eee,r);
441 *pcol_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = pcol_je.l(eee,r);
442 *vgasoil_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = vgasoil.l(eee,r);
443 *pgasoil_JE.l(z,eee,r)$ZFEAS(Z) = pgasoil.l(eee,r);
444
445 vn1_JE.l(z,eee,r) = n1_0(eee,r);
446 vn2_JE.l(z,eee,r) = n2_0(eee,r);
447 vn3_JE.l(z,eee,r) = n3_0(eee,r);
448
449 vn1_JE.l(z,eee,r) = 1;
450 vn2_JE.l(z,eee,r) = 1;
451 vn3_JE.l(z,eee,r) = 1;
452
453 pn1_je.l(z,eee,r) = 1;
454 pn2_je.l(z,eee,r) = 1;
455 pn3_je.l(z,eee,r) = 1;
456
457
458 vn1_JE.lo(z,eee,r) = loval;
459 vn2_JE.lo(z,eee,r) = loval;
460 vn3_JE.lo(z,eee,r) = loval;
461
462 pn1_je.lo(z,eee,r) = loval;
463 pn2_je.lo(z,eee,r) = loval;
464 pn3_je.lo(z,eee,r) = loval;
465
466 pcol_je.lo(z,eee,r) = loval;
467 vcol_je.lo(z,eee,r) = loval;
468
469



















488 set gasoil(fe) /gas, oil/;
489 set col(fe) /col/;
490
491 nc_dum(fe)$(gasoil(fe)) = 1;
492 co_dum(fe)$col(fe) = 1;
493
494 *Fourth -- demand for individual inputs into the E nest (col, gas, oil, ele)
495 *are computed using shepherds lemma on the inputs’ expenditure
496 *functions (i.e. partial zpr_ve_ / partial pa.l )
497






504 (theta_ve_je(fe,eee,r) * vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) )




509 vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) * PA.L(fe,r) /
510 (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r))
511 + refco2(fe,eee,r)*pcarb_.l(z,r) /








519 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r)))
520 * (pa.l(i,r)$(NOT ELE(I)) + PA.L(I,R)$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 0))+
521 P_JE(z,"ele","usa")$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 1)))
522 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-
523 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb_.l(z,r)/pcarb0(r)
524 )**(1-esub_n1_JE(eee,r))))










535 (theta_ve_je(fe,eee,r) * vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) ) /




540 vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) * PA.L(fe,r) /
541 (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r))







549 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) -
550 pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) *
551 (pa.l(i,r)$(NOT ELE(I)) + PA.L(I,R)$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 0))+
552 P_JE(z,"ele","usa")$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 1)))
553 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-
554 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb_.l(z,r)/pcarb0(r)
555 )**(1-esub_n2_JE(eee,r))))











566 (theta_ve_je(fe,eee,r) * vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) ) /




571 vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) * PA.L(fe,r) /
572 (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r))








581 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r)))
582 * (pa.l(i,r)$(NOT ELE(I)) + PA.L(I,R)$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 0))+
583 P_JE(z,"ele","usa")$(ELE(I) AND (SWPRecurse = 1)))
584 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-













597 (theta_fe_je(fe,eee,r) * vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) ) /




602 vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) * PA.L(fe,r) /
603 (vafm(fe,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(fe,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(fe,eee,r))






610 ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) / (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) -
611 pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) * pa.l(i,r)
612 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-








621 *Fifth -- error is computed as the difference between the endogenous level of
622 *electricity carbon activity (i.e. sum over all factor demands multiplied by their
623 *reference carbon levels) less the reference level of carbon from the MACC curve
624




629 *scalar mu /-0.5/;
630 ERROREQ_JE(Z)$ZFEAS(Z).. ERROR_JE(Z) =e= (p_JE(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*
631 SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM_JE(Z,FE,"ELE","USA")) - MACC(Z,"Q");
632
633 ERROREQ_FE(Z)$ZFEAS(Z).. ERROR_FE(Z) =e= (p_JE(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*
634 SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM_FE(Z,FE,"ELE","USA")) - MACC(Z,"Q");
188
635
636 ERROREQ_JE_LOG(Z)$ZFEAS(Z).. ERROR_JE(Z) =e= log(abs((p_JE(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*





642 objeq_fe.. obj_fe =e= SUM(Z$ZFEAS(Z),power(error_FE(z),2)) +
643 SwExtend * sum((z,fe)$zfeas(z),power(REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
644 FACDEM_FE(Z,FE,"ELE","USA") - emit0(fe,"ele","usa"),2));
645 *==
646 *Sixth -- the objective is to minimize the squared errors
647 OBJEQ_JE.. OBJ_JE =e= SUM(Z$ZFEAS(Z),power(error_JE(z),2)) +





























676 display theta_ve_je, theta_ve0_je;
677
678 *checkje.iterlim = 0;
679


























706 checkfe.iterlim = 0;
707







































































3 *Scalar SwFixCO "switch to fix [1] esub_co in the JE model after it is freed up" /0/;
4 *this would give the JE model an ’unfair’ advantage in having more variables
5 *it is a subtlety but should be tested both way to makes sure there is no change
6
7
8 *alternative to fixing demand is to set a very inelastic demand
9 *doesn’t work as well however -- useful in testing
10 if((SwYFX = 1),
11 * mu = -0.001;





16 pcarb_.fx(z,"usa")$ZFEAS(Z) = MACC(z,"p");
17
18 alpha_ve_je(z,i,eee,r)$((e(i))$(not co(i))) = ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) /
19 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) * pa.l(i,r)
20 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-
21 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb_.l(z,r)/pcarb0(r);
22
23 alpha_co_je(z,i,eee,r)$co(i) = ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) /
24 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) * pa.l(i,r)
25 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-




30 *Define upper and lower limits for elasticities
31 *Scalar lolim "Lower limit for elasticity values" /1e-4/;
32 *Scalar uplim "Lower limit for elasticity values" /1e4/;
33
34 *Solve the models with no elasticities free
35 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
36 solve ssempec_je using mpec minimizing OBJ_je;
37 solve ssempec_mw using mpec minimizing OBJ_mw;
38
39 res_pq_DE(z,"rp") = MACC(Z,"p");
40 res_pq_DE(z,"rq") = MACC(Z,"Q");
41 res_pq_WS(z,"rp") = MACC(Z,"p");
42 res_pq_WS(z,"rq") = MACC(Z,"Q");
43 res_pq_MW(z,"rp") = MACC(Z,"p");
44 res_pq_MW(z,"rq") = MACC(Z,"Q");
45
46
47 res_pq_DE(z,"base") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*
48 SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
49
50 res_pq_WS(z,"base") = (p_je.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*
51 SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM_je.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
52





57 res_obj("base_DE","1") = obj_de.l;
58 res_obj("base_WS","1") = OBJ_je.l;





64 *//////MW Nesting Structure/////
65 *///////////////////////////////
66
67 res_elas_MW("REF","E") = esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa");
68 res_elas_MW("REF","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_mw.l("ele","usa");
69
70 esub_e_mw.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
71 esub_e_mw.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
72 solve ssempec_mw using mpec minimizing OBJ_MW;
73 res_pq_MW(z,"E") = (p_MW.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")
74 *FACDEM_MW.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
75 res_elas_MW("E","E") = esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa");
76 res_obj("E_MW","1") = obj_MW.l;
77
78 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.lo(eee,r) = lolim;
79 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.up(eee,r) = UPlim;
80 esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa") = 1.001;
81 solve ssempec_mw using mpec minimizing OBJ_MW;
82 res_pq_MW(z,"KLEM") = (p_MW.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")
83 *FACDEM_MW.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
84 res_elas_MW("KLEM","E") = esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa");
85 res_elas_MW("KLEM","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_mw.l("ele","usa");










95 *ESUB_KLE_M_de.fx(eee,r) = 1e-4;
96 *esub_m_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.391;
97 *esub_k_l_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.460;
98 *esub_kl_e_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.256;
99 *esub_e_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.500;
100
101 *ESUB_KLE_M_de.l(eee,r) = 1e-4;
102 *esub_m_de.l(eee,r) = 0.391;
103 *esub_k_l_de.l(eee,r) = 0.460;
104 *esub_kl_e_de.l(eee,r) = 0.256;
105 *esub_e_de.l(eee,r) = 0.500;
106
107
108 res_elas_DE("REF","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
109 res_elas_DE("REF","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
110 res_elas_DE("REF","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_DE.l("ele","usa");
111
112
113 esub_e_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
114 esub_e_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
115 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
116
117 res_pq_DE(z,"E_DE") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
118 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
119 res_elas_DE("E","E") = esub_e_DE.l("ele","usa");
120 res_obj("E_DE","1") = obj_de.l;
121
122 *ESUB_KLE_M_de.l(eee,r) = 1e-4;
123 *esub_m_de.l(eee,r) = 0.391;
124 *esub_k_l_de.l(eee,r) = 0.460;
125 *esub_kl_e_de.l(eee,r) = 0.256;
126 *esub_e_de.l(eee,r) = 0.500;
127
128
129 *esub_kle_m_de.fx("ele","usa") = 1e-4;
130 esub_kl_e_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
131 esub_kl_e_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
195
132 *esub_e_de.l("ele","usa") = 0.5;
133 esub_e_de.l("ele","usa") = 0.1;
134 esub_kl_e_de.l("ele","usa") = 0.1;
135 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
136
137 res_pq_DE(z,"KLE_DE") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
138 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
139 res_elas_DE("KLE","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
140 res_elas_DE("KLE","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
141 res_obj("KLE_DE","1") = obj_de.l;
142
143
144 esub_kle_M_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
145 esub_kle_M_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
146 esub_e_de.l("ele","usa") = 0.0;
147 esub_kl_e_de.l("ele","usa") = 0.0;
148 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
149
150 res_pq_DE(z,"KLEM_DE") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
151 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
152 res_elas_DE("KLEM","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
153 res_elas_DE("KLEM","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
154 res_elas_DE("KLEM","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_DE.l("ele","usa");









164 esub_n1_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.25;
165 esub_n2_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.7;
166 esub_n3_JE.fx(eee,r) = 0.5;
167
168 *res_elas_WS("REF","KLE") = esub_KLE_JE.l("ele","usa");
169 res_elas_WS("REF","n3") = esub_n3_JE.l("ele","usa");
170 res_elas_WS("REF","n2") = esub_n2_JE.l("ele","usa");
196
171 res_elas_WS("REF","n1") = esub_n1_JE.l("ele","usa");
172
173
174 *free only the gasoil elasticity
175 esub_n3_JE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
176 esub_n3_JE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
177 solve ssempec_je using mpec minimizing OBJ_je;
178
179 res_pq_WS(z,"n3") = (p_je.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
180 FACDEM_je.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
181 res_elas_WS("n3","n3") = esub_n3_JE.l("ele","usa");
182 res_obj("n3_ws","1") = OBJ_je.l;
183
184 esub_n3_JE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_WS("REF","n3");
185 esub_n1_JE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
186 esub_n1_JE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
187 *esub_n1_je.l("ele","usa") = 0.01;
188 solve ssempec_je using mpec minimizing OBJ_je;
189
190 res_pq_WS(z,"n1") = (p_je.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
191 FACDEM_je.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
192 res_elas_WS("n1","n1") = esub_n1_JE.l("ele","usa");
193 res_obj("n1_ws","1") = OBJ_je.l;
194
195
196 *free only the col substitution elasticity
197 esub_n1_je.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_WS("REF","n1");
198 esub_n3_JE.fx("ele","usa") = 0.5;
199 esub_n2_je.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
200 esub_n2_je.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
201 solve ssempec_je using mpec minimizing OBJ_je;
202
203 res_pq_WS(z,"n2") = (p_je.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
204 FACDEM_je.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
205 res_elas_WS("on2","n2") = esub_n2_JE.l("ele","usa");
206 res_obj("n2_WS","1") = OBJ_je.l;
207
208 *free up both col and gasoil
209 esub_n1_je.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_WS("REF","n1");
197
210 esub_n3_JE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
211 esub_n3_JE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
212 esub_n2_je.l("ele","usa") = 0.7;
213 solve ssempec_je using mpec minimizing OBJ_je;
214
215 res_pq_WS(z,"n23") = (p_je.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
216 FACDEM_je.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
217 res_elas_WS("n23","n2") = esub_n2_JE.l("ele","usa");
218 res_elas_WS("n23","n3") = esub_n3_JE.l("ele","usa");
219 res_obj("n23_ws","1") = OBJ_je.l;
220
221 *free up all energy nest
222 esub_n1_JE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
223 esub_n1_JE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
224 esub_n3_je.l("ele","usa") = 0.5;
225 esub_n2_je.l("ele","usa") = 0.7;
226 solve ssempec_je using mpec minimizing OBJ_je;
227
228 res_pq_WS(z,"n123") = (p_je.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
229 FACDEM_je.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
230 res_elas_WS("n123","n3") = esub_n3_JE.l("ele","usa");
231 res_elas_WS("n123","n2") = esub_n2_JE.l("ele","usa");
232 res_elas_WS("n123","n1") = esub_n1_JE.l("ele","usa");
233 res_obj("n123","1") = OBJ_je.l;
234
235
236 esub_n1_JE.l("ele","usa") = 0.25;
237 esub_n3_je.l("ele","usa") = 0.5;
238 esub_n2_je.l("ele","usa") = 0.7;
239 esub_kl_e_je.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
240 esub_kl_e_je.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
241 solve ssempec_je using mpec minimizing OBJ_je;
242
243 res_pq_WS(z,"KLE_WS") = (p_je.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
244 FACDEM_je.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
245 res_elas("WS","KLE","n3") = esub_n3_JE.l("ele","usa");
246 res_elas("WS","KLE","n2") = esub_n2_JE.l("ele","usa");
247 res_elas("WS","KLE","n1") = esub_n1_JE.l("ele","usa");
248 res_elas("WS","KLE","KLE") = esub_KL_E_JE.l("ele","usa");
198
249 res_obj("KLE_WS","1") = OBJ_je.l;
250
251
252 ESUB_KLE_M_JE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
253 ESUB_KLE_M_JE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
254 esub_n1_JE.l("ele","usa") = 0.25;
255 esub_n3_je.l("ele","usa") = 0.5;
256 esub_n2_je.l("ele","usa") = 0.7;
257 solve ssempec_je using mpec minimizing OBJ_je;
258
259 res_pq_WS(z,"KLEM_WS") = (p_je.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
260 FACDEM_je.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
261 res_elas("WS","KLEM","n3") = esub_n3_JE.l("ele","usa");
262 res_elas("WS","KLEM","n2") = esub_n2_JE.l("ele","usa");
263 res_elas("WS","KLEM","n1") = esub_n1_JE.l("ele","usa");
264 res_elas("WS","KLEM","KLE") = esub_KL_E_JE.l("ele","usa");
265 res_elas("WS","KLEM","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_JE.l("ele","usa");
266 res_obj("KLEM_WS","1") = OBJ_je.l;
267
268 ESUB_KLE_M_JE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
269 ESUB_n1_JE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
270 esub_n2_JE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
271 esub_n3_JE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
272 ESUB_KLE_M_JE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
273 ESUB_n1_JE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
274 esub_n2_JE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
275 esub_n3_JE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
276
277
278 solve ssempec_je using mpec minimizing OBJ_je;
279 res_pq_WS(z,"all_WS") = (p_je.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
280 FACDEM_je.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
281 res_elas("WS","all","n3") = esub_n3_JE.l("ele","usa");
282 res_elas("WS","all","n2") = esub_n2_JE.l("ele","usa");
283 res_elas("WS","all","n1") = esub_n1_JE.l("ele","usa");
284 res_elas("WS","all","KLE") = esub_KL_E_JE.l("ele","usa");
285 res_elas("WS","all","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_JE.l("ele","usa");





290 *res_elas_all("WS","REF","KLE") = res_elas_WS("REF","KLE");
291 res_elas_all("WS","REF","n3") = res_elas_WS("REF","n3");
292 res_elas_all("WS","REF","n2") = res_elas_WS("REF","n2");
293 res_elas_all("WS","REF","n1") = res_elas_WS("REF","n1");
294 res_elas_all("WS","n3","n3") = res_elas_WS("n3","n3");
295 res_elas_all("WS","n2","n2") = res_elas_WS("n2","n2");
296 res_elas_all("WS","n23","n2") = res_elas_WS("n23","n2");
297 res_elas_all("WS","n23","n3") = res_elas_WS("n23","n3");
298 res_elas_all("WS","n123","n3") = res_elas_WS("n123","n3");
299 res_elas_all("WS","n123","n2") = res_elas_WS("n123","n2");
300 res_elas_all("WS","n123","n1") = res_elas_WS("n123","n1");
301 res_elas_all("DE","REF","E") = res_elas_DE("REF","E");
302 res_elas_all("DE","REF","KLE") = res_elas_DE("REF","KLE");
303 res_elas_all("DE","REF","KLEM") = res_elas_DE("REF","KLEM");
304 res_elas_all("DE","E","E") = res_elas_DE("E","E");
305 res_elas_all("DE","KLE","E") = res_elas_DE("KLE","E");
306 res_elas_all("DE","KLE","KLE") = res_elas_DE("KLE","KLE");
307 res_elas_all("DE","KLEM","E") = res_elas_DE("KLEM","E");
308 res_elas_all("DE","KLEM","KLE") = res_elas_DE("KLEM","KLE");
309 res_elas_all("DE","KLEM","KLEM") = res_elas_DE("KLEM","KLEM");
310 res_elas_all("MW","REF","E") = res_elas_MW("REF","E");
311 res_elas_all("MW","REF","KLEM") = res_elas_MW("REF","KLEM");
312 res_elas_all("MW","E","E") = res_elas_MW("E","E");
313 res_elas_all("MW","KLEM","E") = res_elas_MW("KLEM","E");
314 res_elas_all("MW","KLEM","KLEM") = res_elas_MW("KLEM","KLEM");
315
316
317 res_elas_all("WS","all","n3") = res_elas("WS","all","n3");
318 res_elas_all("WS","all","n2") = res_elas("WS","all","n2");
319 res_elas_all("WS","all","n1") = res_elas("WS","all","n1");
320 res_elas_all("WS","all","KLE") = res_elas("WS","all","KLE");
321 res_elas_all("WS","all","KLEM") = res_elas("WS","all","KLEM");
322
323
324 res_obj_mod("DE","base") = res_obj("base_DE","1");
325 res_obj_mod("WS","base") = res_obj("base_WS","1");
326 res_obj_mod("MW","base") = res_obj("base_MW","1");
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327 res_obj_mod("WS","n3") = res_obj("n3_ws","1");
328 res_obj_mod("WS","n2") = res_obj("n2_WS","1");
329 res_obj_mod("WS","n23") = res_obj("n23_ws","1");
330 res_obj_mod("WS","n123") = res_obj("n123","1");
331 res_obj_mod("WS","all") = res_obj("n123","1");
332 *res_obj_mod("WS","KLE") = res_obj("KLE_WS","1");
333 res_obj_mod("DE","E") = res_obj("E_DE","1");
334 res_obj_mod("DE","KLE") = res_obj("KLE_DE","1");
335 res_obj_mod("DE","KLEM") = res_obj("KLEM_DE","1");
336 res_obj_mod("MW","E") = res_obj("E_MW","1");




2 parameter res_elas_de_seq, res_obj_seq;
3
4 *Scalar SwFixCO "switch to fix [1] esub_co in the JE model after it is freed up" /0/;
5 *this would give the JE model an ’unfair’ advantage in having more variables
6 *it is a subtlety but should be tested both way to makes sure there is no change
7
8 pcarb_.fx(z,"usa")$ZFEAS(Z) = MACC(z,"p");
9
10 alpha_ve_je(z,i,eee,r)$((e(i))$(not co(i))) = ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) /
11 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) * pa.l(i,r)
12 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-
13 refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r)) * pcarb_.l(z,r)/pcarb0(r);
14
15 alpha_co_je(z,i,eee,r)$co(i) = ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r))) /
16 (vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)) - pcarb0(r)*refco2(i,eee,r))) * pa.l(i,r)
17 + refco2(i,eee,r) * pcarb0(r) / ((vafm(i,eee,r)*(1+rtfa(i,eee,r)))-




22 *Solve the models with no elasticities free
23 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
24 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
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25 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
26 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
27 solve ssempec_mw using mpec minimizing OBJ_mw;
28
29 res_pq_DE(z,"rp") = MACC(Z,"p");
30 res_pq_DE(z,"rq") = MACC(Z,"Q");
31 res_pq_MW(z,"rp") = MACC(Z,"p");
32 res_pq_MW(z,"rq") = MACC(Z,"Q");
33
34 res_pq_DE(z,"base") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
35 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
36
37 res_pq_MW(z,"base") = (p_mw.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*SUM(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
38 FACDEM_mw.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
39
40 res_obj_seq("base_DE","1") = obj_de.l;





46 *//////MW Nesting Structure/////
47 *///////////////////////////////
48
49 res_elas_MW("REF","E") = 0.2;
50 res_elas_MW("REF","KLEM") = 0.76;
51
52
53 *free up only e nest
54 esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa") = res_elas_MW("REF","E");
55 esub_e_mw.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
56 esub_e_mw.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
57 solve ssempec_mw using mpec minimizing OBJ_MW;
58 res_pq_MW(z,"E") = (p_MW.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
59 FACDEM_MW.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
60 res_elas_MW("E","E") = esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa");
61 res_obj_seq("eo_mw","1") = obj_MW.l;
62
63 *fix e and free klem
202
64 esub_e_mw.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_MW("REF","E");
65 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
66 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.up("ele","usa") = UPlim;
67 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.l("ele","usa") = res_elas_MW("REF","KLEM");
68 solve ssempec_mw using mpec minimizing OBJ_MW;
69 res_pq_MW(z,"klemo") = (p_MW.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
70 FACDEM_MW.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
71 res_elas_MW("klemo","E") = esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa");
72 res_elas_MW("klemo","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_mw.l("ele","usa");
73 res_obj_seq("klemo_mw","1") = obj_MW.l;
74
75
76 *free up both nests
77 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.l("ele","usa") = res_elas_MW("REF","KLEM");
78 esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa") = res_elas_MW("REF","E");
79 esub_e_mw.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
80 esub_e_mw.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
81 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
82 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.up("ele","usa") = UPlim;
83 esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa") = res_elas_MW("REF","E") ;
84 ESUB_KLE_M_MW.l("ele","usa") = res_elas_MW("REF","KLEM") ;
85 solve ssempec_mw using mpec minimizing OBJ_MW;
86 res_pq_MW(z,"all") = (p_MW.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
87 FACDEM_MW.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
88 res_elas_MW("all","E") = esub_e_mw.l("ele","usa");
89 res_elas_MW("all","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_mw.l("ele","usa");




94 *//////DE Nesting Structure/////
95 *///////////////////////////////
96
97 *ESUB_KLE_M_de.fx(eee,r) = 1e-4;
98 *esub_m_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.391;
99 *esub_k_l_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.460;
100 *esub_kl_e_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.256;
101 *esub_e_de.fx(eee,r) = 0.500;
102
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103 *ESUB_KLE_M_de.l(eee,r) = 1e-4;
104 *esub_m_de.l(eee,r) = 0.391;
105 *esub_k_l_de.l(eee,r) = 0.460;
106 *esub_kl_e_de.l(eee,r) = 0.256;
107 *esub_e_de.l(eee,r) = 0.500;
108
109
110 res_elas_DE_seq("REF","E") = 0.5;
111 res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLE") = 0.26;
112 res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLEM") = 0.1;
113
114
115 *free up only E nest
116 esub_KL_E_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLE") ;
117 esub_KLE_M_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLEM");
118 esub_e_de.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","E");
119 *esub_KL_E_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
120 *esub_KL_E_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
121 *esub_KLE_M_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
122 *esub_KLE_M_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
123 esub_e_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
124 esub_e_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
125 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
126 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
127 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
128 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
129 res_pq_DE(z,"eo") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
130 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
131 res_elas_DE_seq("eo","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
132 res_elas_DE_seq("eo","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
133 res_elas_DE_seq("eo","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_DE.l("ele","usa");
134 res_obj_seq("eo_DE","1") = obj_de.l;
135
136
137 *free up only kle nest
138
139 esub_KL_E_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLE") ;
140 esub_KLE_M_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLEM");
141 esub_e_de.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","E");
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142 esub_KL_E_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
143 esub_KL_E_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
144 *esub_KLE_M_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
145 *esub_KLE_M_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
146 *esub_e_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
147 *esub_e_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
148 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
149 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
150 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
151 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
152 res_pq_DE(z,"KLEo_DE") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
153 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
154 res_elas_DE_seq("KLEo","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
155 res_elas_DE_seq("KLEo","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
156 res_elas_DE_seq("KLEo","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_DE.l("ele","usa");




161 *free up only klem nest
162
163 esub_KL_E_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLE") ;
164 esub_KLE_M_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLEM");
165 esub_e_de.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","E");
166 *esub_KL_E_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
167 *esub_KL_E_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
168 esub_KLE_M_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
169
170 *n.b. with klemo case we need to have less of an upper limit or we get into trouble
171 *with higher carbon prices
172 *trouble here means certain values reach infinity
173 esub_KLE_M_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
174 *esub_e_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
175 *esub_e_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
176 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
177 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
178 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
179 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
180 res_pq_DE(z,"KLEMo_DE") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
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181 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
182 res_elas_DE_seq("KLEMo","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
183 res_elas_DE_seq("KLEMo","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
184 res_elas_DE_seq("KLEMo","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_DE.l("ele","usa");
185 res_obj_seq("KLEMo_DE","1") = obj_de.l;
186
187
188 *free up only E and KLE nest
189
190 esub_KL_E_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLE") ;
191 esub_KLE_M_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLEM");
192 esub_e_de.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","E");
193 esub_KL_E_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
194 esub_KL_E_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
195 *esub_KLE_M_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
196 *esub_KLE_M_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
197 esub_e_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
198 esub_e_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
199 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
200 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
201 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
202 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
203 res_pq_DE(z,"E_KLE_o_DE") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
204 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
205 res_elas_DE_seq("E_KLE_o","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
206 res_elas_DE_seq("E_KLE_o","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
207 res_elas_DE_seq("E_KLE_o","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_DE.l("ele","usa");
208 res_obj_seq("E_KLE_o_DE","1") = obj_de.l;
209
210
211 *free up only E and KLEM nest
212
213 esub_KL_E_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLE") ;
214 esub_KLE_M_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLEM");
215 esub_e_de.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","E");
216 *esub_KL_E_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
217 *esub_KL_E_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
218 esub_KLE_M_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
219 esub_KLE_M_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
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220 esub_e_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
221 esub_e_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
222 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
223 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
224 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
225 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
226 res_pq_DE(z,"E_KLEM_o_DE") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
227 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
228 res_elas_DE_seq("E_KLEM_o","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
229 res_elas_DE_seq("E_KLEM_o","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
230 res_elas_DE_seq("E_KLEM_o","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_DE.l("ele","usa");




235 *free up only KLE and KLEM nest
236
237 esub_KL_E_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLE") ;
238 esub_KLE_M_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLEM");
239 esub_e_de.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","E");
240 esub_KL_E_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
241 esub_KL_E_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
242 esub_KLE_M_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
243 esub_KLE_M_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
244 *esub_e_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
245 *esub_e_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
246 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
247 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
248 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
249 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
250 res_pq_DE(z,"KLE_KLEM_DE") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*
251 sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
252
253 res_elas_DE_seq("KLE_KLEM","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
254 res_elas_DE_seq("KLE_KLEM","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
255 res_elas_DE_seq("KLE_KLEM","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_DE.l("ele","usa");




259 *free up all nests
260
261 esub_KL_E_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLE") ;
262 esub_KLE_M_DE.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","KLEM");
263 esub_e_de.fx("ele","usa") = res_elas_DE_seq("REF","E");
264 esub_KL_E_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
265 esub_KL_E_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
266 esub_KLE_M_DE.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
267 esub_KLE_M_DE.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
268 esub_e_de.lo("ele","usa") = lolim;
269 esub_e_de.up("ele","usa") = uplim;
270 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
271 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
272 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
273 solve ssempec_de using mpec minimizing OBJ_de;
274 res_pq_DE(z,"all") = (p_de.l(z,"ele","usa")**mu)*sum(FE,REFCO2(FE,"ELE","USA")*
275 FACDEM_de.l(Z,FE,"ELE","USA"));
276 res_elas_DE_seq("all","E") = esub_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
277 res_elas_DE_seq("all","KLE") = esub_KL_E_DE.l("ele","usa");
278 res_elas_DE_seq("all","KLEM") = esub_KLE_M_DE.l("ele","usa");
279 res_obj_seq("all_DE","1") = obj_de.l;
280
281 display res_pq_mw, res_elas_mw, res_pq_de, res_elas_de_seq, res_obj_seq;
calibexamp.gms
1
2 $Title Simple example of zero price commodity in the benchmark
3
4 $ontext
5 Edward J. Balistreri
6 ebalistr@mines.edu
7
8 This provides a simple example of an MPSGE model
9 that is calibrated to a non-scarce input (carbon emissions)
10 in the benchmark. The non-scarce input has a zero
11 price in the benchmark, but then is subject to a











22 clim carbon limit,
23 emitx emissions from fuel use in x,
24 emity emissions from fuel use in y,
25 pcal small reference price used for calibration;
26
27 * Let’s say that for a dollar of fuel emissions are 2 tons
28 emitx = 2*fx0;
29 emity = 2*fy0;
30
31 * Initially, for benchmarking, we will set the carbon limit to
32 * be "marginally" slack. That is the endowment exactly equals
33 * demand at a permit price of zero.
34 clim = emitx + emity;
35




40 * the smallest reference price that




45 X ! Activity level for sector X
46 Y ! Activity level for sector Y
47 W ! Activity level for sector W (Hicksian welfare index)
48
49 $COMMODITIES:
50 PX ! Price index for commodity X
51 PY ! Price index for commodity Y
52 PL ! Price index for primary factor L
209
53 PF ! Price index for fuel inputs
54 PCARB ! Price index on carbon permits
55 PW ! Price index for welfare (expenditure function)
56
57 $CONSUMERS:
58 CONS ! Income level for consumer CONS
59
60
61 $PROD:X s:1 ff:0
62 O:PX Q:x0
63 I:PL Q:lx0
64 I:PF Q:fx0 ff:
65 I:pcarb q:emitx p:pcal ff:
66
67 $PROD:Y s:1 ff:0
68 O:PY Q:y0
69 I:PL Q:ly0
70 I:PF Q:fy0 ff:















86 $SYSINCLUDE mpsgeset toymod
87
88 *Set the initial carbon price such that





93 * Choose a numeraire




98 Solve toymod using mcp
99
100 * Notice that the accuracy of the calibration depends
101 * on how close pcal is to zero:
102 * At pcal=1e-6 the Residual is 3.2e-4 and,
103 * at pcal=1e-8 the Residual is 3.2e-6.
104
105 * Let’s set up an algebraic version of the cost function
106 * for sector X to see what is going on!
107
108 Parameter
109 zprf_check Report to see if we got the algebra correct
110 alpha Leontief price index of the composite of fuel and carbon
111 theta_LX Value share of labor;
112
113 theta_LX = lx0/(lx0 + fx0 + emitx*pcal);
114
115 alpha = (fx0/(fx0-emitx*pcal) * PF.l + emitx*pcal/(fx0-emitx*pcal) * PCARB.l/pcal);
116
117 zprf_check("benchmark") = PX.l -




122 * Now run a counterfactual to make sure our algebraic representation is correct!
123
124 clim = 0.9*clim;
125
126 toymod.iterlim = 1000;
127 $include toymod.gen
128 Solve toymod useing mcp;
129
130 alpha = (fx0/(fx0-emitx*pcal) * PF.l + emitx*pcal/(fx0-emitx*pcal) * PCARB.l/pcal);
211
131
132 zprf_check("counterfactual") = PX.l -







HOURLY ELECTRICITY MODEL DISPATCH GAMS CODE
The files needed in the proper order and their descriptions are as follows:
1. Data.gms: Data setup (not included in this appendix due to length)
2. Model.gms: Creation of an hourly dispatch model with storage and carbon policies
3. Cases.gms: Solves all permutations of cases, can be simplified by reducing sets
4. SocSurpCalc.gms: Calculations social surplus component and post-processing calculations
Model.gms




5 a,aa representative hour (single hour in 24 hour day)
6 s,ss state
7 f,ff generation technology
8 pid,apid unique plant id number
9
10 set pc plant characteristics
11 - onm (operations and maintenance costs)
12 - cap (capacity)
13 - hr (heat rate)
14 - ci (carbon intensity)
15
16 set gwin(a,aa) generation window feasibility set
17 dictates that generation in aa can be
18 used in time period a
19
213
20 Parameters needed and their description (created in the Final_Data.gms file):
21 DE price elasticity of demand - assumed at 0.5
22 qref_a(r,a) reference quantity demanded
23 PlantData(R,S,F,PID,PC) unit characteristics
24 FCOSTY_S(R,F) annual fuel cost for each generation technology
25 tdcostnow(r) transmission and disribution costs for current year
26 refci(s) state level aggregate carbon limit, only active if swcapn(s) = 1
27 refcia(s) state level average emissions limit, only acive if swtpsn(s) = 1
28
29 Note that the combination of SwMAT = 1 and SwTPSN(S)
30 enforces an endogenous TPS target rate that matches the




35 X(R,S,A,F,PID) "Generation from PID in Region R, used in Region RR, in State S by fuel F (MWH)",
36 SH(R,RR,A) "Shipment from R to RR (MWH)"
37 PD(R,A) "Price at which electricity is demanded ($ / MWH)",
38 PU(R,S,A,F,PID) "Shadow price of upper bound limit on generation ($ / MWH)",
39 PCAP(S) "Price of cap-n-trade permit ($ per MTCOE)",
40 PTPS(S) "Price of TPS permit ($ per MTCOE)",
41 TGTCI(S) "Endogenous emission-intensity standard in matching TPS",
42 PSHUB(R,RR,A) "Shadow price of transmission constraint ($/MWH shipped) -- Not used in ERCOT storage model",
43 K(R,S,A,F,PID) "Capital stock associated with plant PID (MW) -- Not used with ERCOT",
44 I(R,S,A,F,PID) "Investment in plant PID (MW) -- Not used with ERCOT",
45 HPSUSED(R,A,AA) "Storage used in period A and generated in period AA",
46 HP(R) "Shadow value on storage capacity constraint"
47 natpcap "Price of national CAP emissions permit -- Not used with ERCOT",
48 natptps "Price of national TPS emissions permit -- Not used with ERCOT",
49 nattgtci "National endogenous target rate -- Not used with ERCOT";
50
51 variables
52 PITERM(R,S,F,PID) "Price of terminal investment-- Not used with ERCOT",
53 PK(R,S,A,F,PID) "Shadow value of capital -- Not used with ERCOT",






59 DemEQ(R,A) "Generation must meet demand in each region",
60 FOC_X(R,S,A,F,PID) "ZPC for X",
61 FOC_SH(R,RR,A) "ZPC for SH",
62 UBEQ(R,S,A,F,PID) "Generation cannot exceed capacity",
63 SHUBEQ(R,RR,A) "Transmission from R to RR (or the reverse) cannot exceed transmission capacity",
64 CAPEQ(S) "Carbon cap equation - focuses on aggregate emissions",
65 TPSEQ(S) "TPS policy equation - focuses on average emissions",
66 MAT_TPS_TGT(S) "Endogenously acheive aggregate emissions reduction with TPS",
67 KEQMO(R,S,A,F,PID) "Capital stock equation of motion"
68 FOC_K(R,S,A,F,PID) "FOC for capital",
69 FOC_I(R,S,A,F,PID) "FOC for investment",
70 KTERMEQ(R,S,F,PID) "Terminal capital equation",
71 FOC_HPSUSED(R,A,AA) "FOC for HPS used in A and generated in AA"
72 hpscapeq(r) "Storage used in 24 hour period cannot exceed capacity"
73
74 NAT_CAPEQ "Carbon cap equation - focuses on aggregate emissions",
75 NAT_TPSEQ "TPS policy equation - focuses on average emissions",
76 NAT_MAT_TPS_TGT "Endogenously acheive aggregate emissions reduction with TPS"
77 ;
78




















98 + (PTPS(S)$SWTPSN(S))*(PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI")-((SwMat*TGTCI(S) + (1-SwMAT)*REFCIA(S))$SWTPSn(S)))
99 + SwNATCAP*natpcap*PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI")































131 RefCA(S) =e= Sum((A,R,F,PID)$(PFEAS(R,S,F,PID)$rf(r)$fa(f,a)),X(R,S,A,F,PID)*PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI"));
132
133 hpscapeq(r)$((SwHPS=1)$rf(r))..




137 pd(r,aa) + hp(r) =g= ineff * pd(r,a);
138













































183 natdishps.optfile = 1;
184 pd.lo(R,A) = 0.0001;
185 PD.L(R,A) = pref_A(r,a);
186
187 rf(r) = no;
188 rf("ercot") = yes;
189
190 swhps = 0;
191 gwin(a,aa) = no;
192
193 *solve without storage
194 solve natdishps using mcp;
195
196 swhps = 1;
197 gwin(a,aa)$(ord(a)>ord(aa)) = yes;
198
199 *solve with storage







5 scalar swsolvecap "switch to solve the cap and a TPS that matches the CAP or a standard TPS" /0/;
6 scalar xreset "reset generation variable each solve? default 1" /1/;
7 scalar swrbsfirst "solve the tps first? default 1" /1/;
8 scalar swtaxcap "1: tax, 0:cap, 3: Constant reduction default = 3, only active with swrbsfirst = 0" /3/;
9 scalar swsolve "Switch to solve the model -- used in data checking" /1/;
10 scalar solvemult "solve multiple times? default = 0" /0/;
218
11 scalar renmult "Renewable generation capacity multiplier default = 2" /2/;
12 scalar swpabsolute /0/;
13 scalar plantexp "years pre-2015 from which we expire plants, superceded by ventyx expiration date,
14 default = 45" /45/;
15
16 option solprint = off;
17
18 set pol(s) "states with active policies" /tx/;
19 set sim "used in a loop sim = 1 for no storage, sim == 2 for with storage" /1*2/;
20
21 set rs "reduction % set to loop over" /1000,900,800,700,600/;
22 set sc "storage capacity (MW) set to loop over" /5000/;
23 set cr "fuel prices to loop over, 1: no change, 2: high gas 3: low gas 4: high coal 5: low coal" /1/;
24 set es "expansion set to loop over [1: no expansion, 2:planned expansion, 3:double renewables]" /2/;
25 *note that ds should always be the full set but can be restricted with
26 *set dsfeas below
27 set ds "demand set to loop over, see info below" /1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12/;
28 $ontext
29 ds 1,2,3,4 pertain to average spring, summer, autumn, winter days
30 ds 5,6,7,8 pertain to peak spring, summer, autumn, winter days
31 ds 9,10,11,12 pertain to low spring, summer, autumn, winter days
32 $offtext
33
34 set dsfeas(ds) "declares feasibility of type of day" /1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12/;
35 *set dsfeas(ds) "declares feasibility of type of day" /1/;
36
37 if(smax(sim,ord(sim))>2,

















54 parameter fcostorig "original fuel costs";
55 fcostorig(r,f) = fcosty_s(r,f);
56
57 parameter pabsolute,
58 absrefca "absolute reference carbon cap",




63 *remove generation from states outside of TX
64 *note that sd does not matter for ERCOT but is helpful if trying to solve WECC
65 pfeas(r,"sd",f,pid) = no;
66 pfeas(r,"ok",f,pid) = no;
67 pfeas(r,"nm",f,pid) = no;
68 pfeas(r,"al",f,pid) = no;
69
70 refcia(s) = 0;
71 refca(s) = 0;
72
73 *upper bound price multiplier to keep price in bound
74 *default 5, never hits the bound but speeds up solve time
75 SCALAR UBP /5/;
76 option mcp = path;
77
78 parameter repemit "reported emissions",
79 pref_case "resulting reported price for each case",
80 refcarun "resulting aggregate emissions from each run",
81 repperm "resulting permit price from each run",
















97 rf(r) = no;




102 *setup parameters for initial solving
103 phin(s) = 0.00;
104 refcia(s) = 0;
105 swhps = 0;
106 gwin(a,aa) = no;





112 solve natdishps using mcp;





118 sgen(s)$(Sum((A,R,F,PID)$(RF(R)$PFEAS(R,S,F,PID)),X.l(R,S,A,F,PID))) = yes;
119
120 if(swxlobound=1,
121 x.lo(r,s,a,f,pid)$(pfeas(r,s,f,pid)$x.l(r,s,a,f,pid)$plantdata(r,s,f,pid,"ci")) = 1e-5;
122 );
123
124 pfeas(r,s,f,pid)$(not sgen(s)) = no;
125
126 SwHPS = 1;
127 gwin(a,aa) = no;
221
128 gwin(a,aa)$(ord(a)>ord(aa)) = yes;
129 rf(r)$newrf(r) = yes;
130
131 if(swsolve=1,
132 solve natdishps using mcp;
133 );
134








143 scalar adj /1/;
144
145 redrun(s) = 0;
146
147 parameter qrefaorig(r,a);









157 kinitaorig(r,s,f,pid)$(rf(r)$pol(s)) = kinita(r,s,f,pid);
158 kinitaorig(r,s,f,nid)$(rf(r)$pol(s)) = plantdata(r,s,f,nid,"cap")/FACTOR;
159
160 *adjusting aggregated capacity for solar and wind plants
161 kinitaorig(r,s,"sun","24999")$(rf(r)$pol(s)) = 1000*kinitaorig(r,s,"sun","24999");
162 kinitaorig(r,s,"wnd","24999")$(rf(r)$pol(s)) = 1000*kinitaorig(r,s,"wnd","24999");
163
164 *adjusting aggregated capacity for NG plants -- note this assumes 100 plants with a
165 *tight distribution of characteristics
166 kinitaorig(r,s,"ng",nid)$(rf(r)$pol(s)) = 10 * plantdata(r,s,"ng",nid,"cap")/FACTOR;
222
167 kinitaorig(r,s,"ng",pid)$(rf(r)$(ord(pid)>25099)) = 0;
168
169 *kill off other representative plants
170 kinitaorig(r,s,"sun",pid)$(rf(r)$(ord(pid)>24999)) = 0;




175 plantdatadis(r,s,f,pid,pc)$rf(r) = plantdata(r,s,f,pid,pc);
176 display plantdatadis;








185 hpscap("ercot") = asc.val / factor;
186
187 loop(acr,
188 if(acr.val = 1,
189 fcosty_s(r,f) = fcostorig(r,f);
190 fcosty_s(r,f)$gasf(f) = 5.06;
191 fcosty_s(r,f)$coal(f) = 2.26;
192 );
193
194 if(acr.val = 2,
195 fcosty_s(r,f) = fcostorig(r,f);
196 fcosty_s(r,f)$gasf(f) = 7.92;
197 fcosty_s(r,f)$coal(f) = 2.26;
198 );
199
200 if(acr.val = 3,
201 fcosty_s(r,f) = fcostorig(r,f);
202 fcosty_s(r,f)$gasf(f) = 3.50;






208 fcosty_s(r,f) = fcostorig(r,f);
209 fcosty_s(r,f)$gasf(f) = 5.06;




214 fcosty_s(r,f) = fcostorig(r,f);
215 fcosty_s(r,f)$gasf(f) = 5.06;




220 fcosty_s(r,f) = fcostorig(r,f);
221 fcosty_s(r,f)$gasf(f) = 7.92;




226 fcosty_s(r,f) = fcostorig(r,f);
227 fcosty_s(r,f)$gasf(f) = 3.50;




232 fcosty_s(r,f) = fcostorig(r,f);
233 fcosty_s(r,f)$gasf(f) = 5.06;




238 fcosty_s(r,f) = fcostorig(r,f);
239 fcosty_s(r,f)$gasf(f) = 7.92;














253 if(aes.val = 1,
254 pfeas(r,s,f,nid) = no;
255 kinita(r,s,f,pid) = kinitaorig(r,s,f,pid);
256 );
257
258 if(aes.val = 2,
259 pfeas(r,s,f,nid)$(rf(r)$kinitaorig(r,s,f,nid)) = yes;
260 pfeas(r,s,f,pid)$(rf(r)$kinitaorig(r,s,f,pid)$(plantdata(r,s,f,pid,"age")>
261 plantexp)$(not noretf(f))) = no;
262 kinita(r,s,f,pid) = kinitaorig(r,s,f,pid);
263 );
264
265 if(aes.val = 3,
266 pfeas(r,s,f,nid)$(rf(r)$kinitaorig(r,s,f,nid)) = yes;
267 kinita(r,s,"sun",nid) = renmult*kinitaorig(r,s,"sun",nid);
268 kinita(r,s,"wnd",nid) = renmult*kinitaorig(r,s,"wnd",nid);
269 pfeas(r,s,f,pid)$(rf(r)$kinitaorig(r,s,f,pid)$(plantdata(r,s,f,pid,"age")>
270 plantexp)$(not noretf(f))) = no;
271 );
272
273 kinitrun(acr,ars,r,f,aes) = sum((s,pid)$pfeas(r,s,f,pid),kinita(r,s,f,pid));




278 if(ads.val = 1,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"spring")/factor);
279 if(ads.val = 2,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"summer")/factor);
280 if(ads.val = 3,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"fall")/factor);
281 if(ads.val = 4,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"winter")/factor);
282 if(ads.val = 5,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"pspring")/factor);
283 if(ads.val = 6,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"psummer")/factor);
225
284 if(ads.val = 7,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"pfall")/factor);
285 if(ads.val = 8,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"pwinter")/factor);
286 if(ads.val = 9,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"lspring")/factor);
287 if(ads.val = 10,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"lsummer")/factor);
288 if(ads.val = 11,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"lfall")/factor);
289 if(ads.val = 12,qref_a(r,a) = qref_season(r,a,"lwinter")/factor);
290
291





297 hpscapr(r,run)$rf(r) = hpscap(r);
298 repwest(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"scap","scap",run) = sum(r$rf(r),hpscapr(r,run));
299
300 if(swfirst = 0,
301 SWELAS = 0;
302 swhps = 0;




307 if(swfirst = 1,
308 swhps = 1;




313 swmat = 0;
314 swtpsn(s) = no;
315 SWcapN(S) = no;
316 swtaxn(s) = no;
317
318 if(swsolve=1,
319 if(xreset = 1,
320 x.l(r,s,a,f,pid) = 0;
321 );
322 solve natdishps using mcp;
226
323 if(solvemult=1,
324 solve natdishps using mcp;
325 solve natdishps using mcp;
326 solve natdishps using mcp;
327 );
328 );
329 *abort$(natdishps.objval gt 1e-4) ’bau did not solve correctly’;
330 repa(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_bau","price",r,a,run)$rf(r) = pd.l(r,a);
331
332 repa(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_bau","gen",r,a,run)$rf(r) = Sum((S,F,PID)$PFEAS(R,S,F,PID),
333 X.l(R,S,A,F,PID));
334

























360 repgen(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,run)$pfeas(r,s,f,pid) = X.l(R,S,A,F,PID);
361
227
362 rephps(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_bau",r,run,a,aa)$rf(r) = hpsused.l(r,a,aa);
363
364 swelas = 1;
365
366 if(swrbsfirst = 0,
367 if(swfirst = 1,
368 swcapn(s)$refca(s) = yes;
369 );
370
371 if(swfirst = 0,
372 swelas = 1;
373 pref_a(r,a)$rf(r) = pd.l(r,a);
374 PD.UP(R,A)$RF(R) = UBP*PREF_A(R,A);
375 PD.LO(R,A)$RF(R) = PREF_A(R,A) / UBP;
376 swfirst = 1;
377 refca(s)$pol(s) = (1-red(s))*Sum((A,R,F,PID)$PFEAS(R,S,F,PID),
378 X.l(R,S,A,F,PID)*PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI"));





384 if(swrbsfirst = 1,
385 if(swfirst = 1,
386 swtpsn(s)$refcia(s) = yes;
387 );
388
389 if(swfirst = 0,
390 swelas = 1;
391 pref_a(r,a)$rf(r) = pd.l(r,a);
392 PD.UP(R,A)$RF(R) = UBP*PREF_A(R,A);
393 PD.LO(R,A)$RF(R) = PREF_A(R,A) / UBP;
394 swfirst = 1;
395 refcia(s)$pol(s) = ars.val;






401 if(xreset = 1,
402 x.l(r,s,a,f,pid) = 0;
403 );
404 solve natdishps using mcp;
405 if(solvemult=1,
406 solve natdishps using mcp;
407 solve natdishps using mcp;





413 if(swrbsfirst = 0,
414 abort$(natdishps.objval gt 1e-4) ’cap did not solve correctly’;
415


















434 repperm(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_tax",s,run)$swtaxn(s) = taxa(s);
435














449 repgen(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_tax",r,s,f,pid,a,run) = X.l(R,S,A,F,PID);
450 rephps(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_tax",r,run,a,aa)$rf(r) = hpsused.l(r,a,aa);
451 );
452
453 if(swrbsfirst = 1,
454 abort$(natdishps.objval gt 1e-4) ’tps did not solve correctly’;













468 repperm(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_tps",s,run)$swtpsn(s) = ptps.l(s);




















488 repgen(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,run)$pfeas(r,s,f,pid) = X.l(R,S,A,F,PID);
489




494 if(swrbsfirst = 0,
495 swtpsn(s)$pol(s) = yes;
496 swcapn(s) = no;




501 if(swrbsfirst = 1,
502 refca(S)$pol(s) = Sum((R,F,PID,A)$(RF(R)$PFEAS(R,S,F,PID)),
503 X.l(R,S,A,F,PID)*PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI"));
504 swtpsn(s) = no;
505 swcapn(s)$refca(s) = yes;




510 if(xreset = 1,
511 x.l(r,s,a,f,pid) = 0;
512 );
513 * if(swsolvecap = 1,
514 solve natdishps using mcp;
515 if(solvemult=1,
516 solve natdishps using mcp;
517 solve natdishps using mcp;
231






524 if(swrbsfirst = 1,
525 abort$(natdishps.objval gt 1e-4) ’cap did not solve correctly’;



















545 repperm(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_tax",s,run)$swtaxn(s) = taxa(s);
546
547 repperm(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_tax",s,run)$swcapn(s) = pcap.l(s);
548



















567 if(swrbsfirst = 0,
568 abort$(natdishps.objval gt 1e-4) ’tps did not solve correctly’;
569













583 repperm(asc,acr,ars,aes,ads,"s_tps",s,run)$swtpsn(s) = ptps.l(s);
584



















































































666 *end runs, begin various reporting parameters
667































































729 permdis(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",run) = repperm(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","tx",run);






3 scalar swinccarb "test reference case to not include carbon benefits, default 1" /1/;
4
5 *reporting parameters can get carried over if hpsused.l(r,a,aa) is not cleared
6 *changing here to clear the reporting variables
7 rephps(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,"1",a,aa) = 0;
8 rephps(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,"1",a,aa) = 0;
9 rephps(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax",r,"1",a,aa) = 0;
10
11 *still set gwin though since
12 gwin(a,aa)$(ord(a)>ord(aa)) = yes;
13





18 scalar swconbau "switch to have the same reference case [1], default = 1" /1/;
19 *This switch =1 indicates that all comparison of welfare changes will be with respect to
20 *the BAU without storage case as opposed to the
21
22 scalar scc "social cost of carbon" /50/;
23 *default 50 -- from epa 2030 3% discount rate
24 *gets converted to $/1000lbs CO2 below
25
26 parameter cstemp "placeholder for consumer surplus calculations",




31 *patched from earlier - should be fixed to have season and day as a set
32 qrefcase1("1",r,a)$dsfeas("1") = qref_season(r,a,"spring")/factor;
33 qrefcase1("2",r,a)$dsfeas("2") = qref_season(r,a,"summer")/factor;
34 qrefcase1("3",r,a)$dsfeas("3") = qref_season(r,a,"fall")/factor;
35 qrefcase1("4",r,a)$dsfeas("4") = qref_season(r,a,"winter")/factor;
36 qrefcase1("5",r,a)$dsfeas("5") = qref_season(r,a,"pspring")/factor;
37 qrefcase1("6",r,a)$dsfeas("6") = qref_season(r,a,"psummer")/factor;
38 qrefcase1("7",r,a)$dsfeas("7") = qref_season(r,a,"pfall")/factor;
39 qrefcase1("8",r,a)$dsfeas("8") = qref_season(r,a,"pwinter")/factor;
40 qrefcase1("9",r,a)$dsfeas("9") = qref_season(r,a,"lspring")/factor;
41 qrefcase1("10",r,a)$dsfeas("10") = qref_season(r,a,"lsummer")/factor;
42 qrefcase1("11",r,a)$dsfeas("11") = qref_season(r,a,"lfall")/factor;




47 -qrefcase1(ds,r,a) * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,run)**(-DE) *
48 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,run) * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,run)**DE -
49 repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,run)**DE * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,run)) / (DE-1);
50
51 cstemp(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax",r,a,run)$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)) =
52 -qrefcase1(ds,r,a) * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax","price",r,a,run)**(-DE) *
53 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,run) * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax","price",r,a,run)**DE -















68 -qrefcase1(ds,r,a) * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,run)**(-DE) *
69 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"1") * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,run)**DE -
70 repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"1")**DE * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,run)) / (DE-1);
71
72 cstemp(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax",r,a,run)$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)) =
73 -qrefcase1(ds,r,a) * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax","price",r,a,run)**(-DE) *
74 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"1") * repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax","price",r,a,run)**DE -
















91 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,run,"cs")$dsfeas(ds) = sum(a,cstemp(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,a,run));
92 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax",r,run,"cs")$dsfeas(ds) = sum(a,cstemp(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax",r,a,run));
93


















































































173 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,run,"rev") - deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,run,"cost");
174
175 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax",r,run,"profit")$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)) =






182 *emissions in 1000lbs -- need to convert scc from mt to k lbs via 2.2
183 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,run,"car")$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)) =
184 SCC * (repall(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","emit",r,run)-repall(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","emit",r,run))/2.2;
185
186 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax",r,run,"car")$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)) =
187 SCC * (repall(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","emit",r,run)-repall(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax","emit",r,run))/2.2;
188
189
190 if(swconbau = 1,
191 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,run,"car")$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)) =
192 SCC * (repall(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","emit",r,"1")-repall(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","emit",r,run))/2.2;
193
194 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax",r,run,"car")$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)) =




















214 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,run,"ps") + deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,run,"cs");
215
216 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tax",r,run,"delta") =





























246 checktps(es,ds,rs,sc,cr,"tps")$(sss(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","1")>sss(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","2")) = 1;
247
248 parameter discheck;










258 1 80 ,
259 2 77 ,
260 3 79 ,
261 4 84 ,
262 5 4 ,
263 6 7 ,
264 7 5 ,
265 8 3 ,
266 9 7 ,
267 10 7 ,































298 gwin(a,aa) = no;
299 gwin(a,aa)$(ord(a)>ord(aa)) = yes;
300
301 pdiff(es,cr,sc,ds,rs,a,aa)$gwin(a,aa) = repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price","ercot",a,"2") -
302 repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price","ercot",aa,"2");
303





309 maxpdiff(es,cr,sc,ds,rs) = smax((a,aa)$gwin(a,aa),pdiff(es,cr,sc,ds,rs,a,aa));





315 allout(es,cr,sc,ds,rs,"cs",run) = deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot",run,"cs")/1000;
316 allout(es,cr,sc,ds,rs,"ps",run) = deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot",run,"ps")/1000;
317 allout(es,cr,sc,ds,rs,"profbau","1") = deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","ercot","1","profit")/1000;
318 allout(es,cr,sc,ds,rs,"car",run) = deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot",run,"car")/1000;












330 diffout(es,cr,sc,ds,rs,"ps") = (deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","1","ps") -
331 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","2","ps")) / 1000000;
332
333 diffout(es,cr,sc,ds,rs,"cs") = (deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","1","cs") -
334 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","2","cs")) / 1000000;
335
336 diffout(es,cr,sc,ds,rs,"car") = (deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","1","car") -
337 deltass(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","2","car")) / 1000000;
338





















360 merit(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,r,s,f,pid,"cost","TPS",run)$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)$pfeas(r,s,f,pid)) = plantdata(r,s,f,pid,"ONM")























































414 kinitnew(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,r,s,f,pid,"bau",run)$rf(r) = kinita(r,s,f,pid);











































































































520 *all that generated above their marginal cost
521 costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)$
522 sum(a,repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2"))) =
523 ( plantdata(r,s,f,pid,"ONM")
250
524 + tdcostnow(r)
525 + FCOSTY_case(cr,R,F)*PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"HR")
526 );
527
528
529 costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)$(rf(r)$dsfeas(ds)$
530 sum(a,repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2"))) =
531 ( plantdata(r,s,f,pid,"ONM")
532 + tdcostnow(r)
533 + FCOSTY_case(cr,R,F)*PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"HR")
534 + swinccarb*repperm(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",s,"2")*(PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI")-reptgt(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,s,"2"))
535 );
536
537
538
539 parameter propstorage,profstorage;
540
541 parameter repcost;
542
543 propstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","low")$(sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$
544 (repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
545 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)>repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"2"))),
546 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")))=
547 sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$(repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
548 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)>repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"2"))$
549 (PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI")>reptgt(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"tx","2"))),
550 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")
551 )/(
552 sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$(repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
553 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)>
554 repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"2"))),
555 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")
556 ))
557 ;
558
559 propstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","low")$(sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$
560 (repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
561 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)>repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,"2"))),
562 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")))=
251
563 sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$(repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
564 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)>repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,"2"))$
565 (PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI")>reptgt(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"tx","2"))),
566 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")
567 )/(
568 sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$(repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
569 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)>
570 repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,"2"))),
571 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")
572 ))
573 ;
574
575 profstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","low") =
576 sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$((PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI")<reptgt(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"tx","2"))$
577 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
578 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)<=
579 repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"2"))),
580 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")
581 *(repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"2")
582 - costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid))
583 )/1e6;
584
585 profstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","high") =
586 sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$((PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI")>
587 reptgt(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"tx","2"))$repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
588 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)<=repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"2"))),
589 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")*
590 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price",r,a,"2") -
591 costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid))
592 )/1e6;
593
594
595 profstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","low") =
596 sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$((PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI")<reptgt(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"tx","2"))
597 $repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
598 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)<=
599 repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,"2"))),
600 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")*
601 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,"2") -
252
602 costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid))
603 )/1e6;
604
605
606 profstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","high") =
607 sum((r,s,f,pid,a)$((PlantData(R,S,F,PID,"CI")>reptgt(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"tx","2"))
608 $repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")$
609 (costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid)<=
610 repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,"2"))),
611 repgen(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,s,f,pid,a,"2")*
612 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price",r,a,"2") -
613 costgens(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps",r,"cost",r,s,f,pid))
614 )/1e6;
615
616
617 profstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","lowstor") =
618 propstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","low")*
619 sum((a,aa)$gwin(a,aa),rephps(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","ercot","2",a,aa)*
620 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price","ercot",a,"2")))
621 /1e6;
622
623 profstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","highstor") =
624 (1-propstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","low"))*
625 sum((a,aa)$gwin(a,aa),rephps(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","ercot","2",a,aa)*
626 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_bau","price","ercot",a,"2")))
627 /1e6;
628
629 profstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","lowstor") =
630 propstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","low")*
631 sum((a,aa)$gwin(a,aa),rephps(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","2",a,aa)*
632 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price","ercot",a,"2")))
633 *sum((a,aa)$gwin(a,aa),rephps(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","2",a,aa)*
634 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price","ercot",a,"2")))
635 /1e6;
636
637 profstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","highstor") =
638 (1-propstorage(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","low"))*
639 sum((a,aa)$gwin(a,aa),rephps(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","2",a,aa)*
640 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price","ercot",a,"2")))
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641 *sum((a,aa)$gwin(a,aa),rephps(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","ercot","2",a,aa)*
642 (repa(sc,cr,rs,es,ds,"s_tps","price","ercot",a,"2")))
643 /1e6;
644
645
646
647 option profnostorage:2:5:2
648 display profnostorage;
649
650 option profstorage:2:4:2
651 display profyearref;
652
254
